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EDISON SCHOOLS AND THE PRIVATIZATION
OF K-12 PUBLIC EDUCATION:
A LEGAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS
Lewis D. Solomon*
If you were asked to advise today's leaders, what do you think is
the greatest single problem facing the United States today?
I don't have any doubt: The greatest problem facing our country
is the breaking down into two classes, those who have and those
who have not. The growing differences between the incomes of
the skilled and the less skilled, the educated and the unedu-
cated, pose a very real danger. If that widening rift continues,
we're going to be in terrible trouble. The idea of having a class
of people who never communicate with their neighbors-those
very neighbors who assume the responsibility for providing their
basic needs-is extremely unpleasant and discouraging. And it
cannot last. We'll have a civil war. We really cannot remain a
democratic, open society that is divided into two classes. In the
long run, that's the greatest single danger. And the only way I
see to resolve that problem is to improve the quality of
education.1
INTRODUCTION
Over the fifteen years following the 1983 publication of the
landmark study, A Nation at Risk,2 more than six million Ameri-
cans dropped out of high school. Of those who remained in school,
ten million students reached the twelfth grade unable to read at a
basic level, more than twenty million were unable to do basic math,
and nearly twenty-five million were unfamiliar with the essentials
* Lewis D. Solomon is the Theodore Rinehart Professor of Business Law at the
George Washington University Law School. Danielle Rynczak, J.D., Florida State
University College of Law, 2002, and Matthew C. Franker, second year law student at
the George Washington University Law School, assisted in researching and writing
this Article. Without the extraordinary efforts of Matthew A. Mantel, Reference Li-
brarian, the Jacob Burns Law Library, the George Washington University Law
School, this Article could not have come to fruition.
1. Mardell Jefferson Raney, Interview with Milton Friedman, 5 TECHNOS: Q. FOR
EDU. & TECH., Spring 1996, at 4, 11.
2. The National Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation at Risk: The
Imperative for Education (Apr. 1983), at http://www.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/risk.html
(last visited May 15, 2003).
1281
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
of American history.3 In the most recent Third International Math-
ematics and Science Study, which compared half a million students
in over forty-one countries at three grade levels, American twelfth
graders were so inadequate on their math and science exams, that
only students from Cyprus and South Africa scored lower.4 In
short, many American high school graduates are barely able to
communicate, orally or in writing, they are deficient in mathemat-
ics, ill-informed about United States history, and lack good work
habits.
The numbers are even more astonishing in urban areas where
minority students drop out or slip through the cracks of an educa-
tional system on the brink of its demise. As America's inner cities
deteriorate, the parents of children living in poor neighborhoods
are further disadvantaged in the kind of education their offspring
receive. Inner city public schools are shamefully deficient and are
marked by low academic performance, increased violence, high
dropout rates, and demoralized students and teachers.' Poor phys-
ical conditions, inadequate supplies, non-existent technology, tran-
sient students, poorly qualified teachers who quickly burn out, and
highly qualified instructors who move on,6 also characterize many
urban schools in low income areas. We have re-created a dual
school system, separate and unequal. A widening chasm exists be-
tween good and bad schools, between those students who receive
an adequate education and those who emerge from school barely
able to read and write.7 Low income, minority children go to worse
schools, have less expected of them, and are taught by less moti-
vated and less knowledgeable teachers. As a result, an enormous
achievement gap exists between white and Asian-Americans on
one hand, and African-Americans and Latinos on the other. These
gaps are reflective of those that have developed between high per-
forming schools and low achieving schools; between those people
who are educated and those who are not; and between those stu-
dents who complete high school and those who drop out.
This crisis in American K-12 public education, marked by dissat-
isfaction with student outcomes and perennially underperforming
3. William J. Bennett, A Nation Still at Risk, 90 POL'Y REV. 23, 23 (1998).
4. Diane Ravitch, Our School Problem and Its Solutions, 9 CITY J. 33, 34 (1999).
5. See, e.g., Walter C. Farrell, Jr. et al., Will Privatizing Schools Really Help Inner-
City Students of Color?, 52 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 72, 72 (1994).
6. See, e.g., Jay Mathews, Top Teachers Rare in Poor Schools, WASH. POST, Sept.
10, 2002, at A5.
7. See, e.g., William C. Symonds et al., For-Profit Schools, Bus. WK., Feb. 7, 2000,
at 72.
1282
EDISON SCHOOLS
schools, led, in part, to increased focus on accountability and the
passage of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001.8 This Act, the
most extensive reform of the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act of 1965, increases federal K-12 funding, mandates student
testing in math and reading every year in grades three through
eight, and allows parents to transfer children from failing public
schools to other public schools run by their present systems or to
charter schools within the same district. It also led to an increased
willingness to explore other alternatives, including solutions previ-
ously considered radical, such as the privatization of K-12
education.
Most generally, privatization involves the transfer of public
funds to the private sector, and the provision of services by private
enterprises that were once provided by the public sector. It con-
notes a shift in the control of public resources and an alteration in
the structures through which public funds are spent.9
Privatization through outsourcing in K-12 public education is not
new. For-profit firms have long supplied books, crayons, com-
puters, tutoring, and counseling services. School districts have long
contracted out transportation, custodial, and food services to
achieve greater cost efficiencies. What is new is the use of business
firms to manage a school, a group of schools, or even an entire
school system.
In the 1990s, school boards began contracting out instructional
services. For-profit educational management organizations
("EMOs") began to compete directly with public school bureau-
cracies. At the same time, many states allowed the formation of
publicly-funded charter schools that operate with more flexibility
than traditional public schools.
This Essay examines the private takeover of the management of
K-12 publicly funded schools. Under this management model, pri-
vate enterprises replace the administrators who had previously
8. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq.
(2003)). See generally Adam Clymer & Lizette Alvarez, Congress Reaches Compro-
mise on Education Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at Al; Helen Dewar, Landmark
Education Legislation Gets Final Approval in Congress, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2001, at
A8. Parents' caution and the lack of capacity at "good" schools to handle additional
students, however, limit the school act's "choice" aspects. See Chester E. Finn, Jr.,
Leaving Many Children Behind, WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 26/Sept. 2, 2002, at 15; Di-
ana Schemo, Few Exercise New Right to Leave Failing School, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28,
2002, at Al.
9. See generally DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERN-
MENT: How THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT Is TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR
(1992); E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY To BErTER GOVERNMENT (1987).
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been appointed by local school boards. These private firms con-
tract with charter boards or districts to operate one or more
schools. Public sources provide funding for the delivery of services
under a specific set of guidelines. EMOs receive authority to man-
age a school, set the curriculum, sponsor professional development,
and, sometimes, staff the school and set performance incentives.
This Essay focuses on one particular EMO, Edison Schools, Inc.
("Edison"). A publicly held corporation with a highly visible pro-
file, Edison is the nation's largest private manager of public and
charter schools. The firm operates 150 schools in twenty-three
states and the District of Columbia, and educates 80,000 students. 10
This Essay attempts to answer key questions regarding the quest to
privatize K-12 public education. Specifically, can for-profit schools
raise student achievement, streamline educational bureaucracies,
retain talented teachers and administrators, be more responsive to
consumers, achieve cost savings, and be profitable?
Part II of this Essay examines the situation in Philadelphia's
public schools and the efforts of a local school reform commission
to revitalize K-12 education. Part III looks into the personalities of
those who started and today run Edison. Who are they and why
did they create a business to privatize public schools? Who are the
key players in Edison's management team? Part IV analyzes
Edison's financial position. Edison seeks to create efficiencies by
centralizing business services, curricular design, and teacher train-
ing. Yet, will the firm remain financially viable? Will it become
profitable and eventually achieve profits comparable to other,
traditional investment returns? Part V discusses the structured ed-
ucational approach Edison uses in its schools. Is Edison improving
test scores and helping children learn? Part VI addresses the pol-
icy considerations-the pros and cons behind the efforts to priva-
tize public schools. Will privatization force public schools to
rethink their approaches and devise more efficient management ar-
rangements and more effective instructional practices? Can priva-
tization help meet the needs of low income, minority families
whose offspring are currently caught in failing schools that merely
serve as warehouses for these children?
10. EDISON SCH., INC., FORM 10-Q/A, at 6-7a (Nov. 14, 2002). How Edison counts
the number of schools it operates is not straightforward. If one building houses K-8
grades, Edison counts it as two schools-an elementary and a middle school, even if
there is only one principal. EDISON SCH., INC., PROSPECTUS 48 (Nov. 10, 1999) [here-
inafter PROSPECTUS]; see Diana B. Henriques & Jacques Steinberg, Woes for Com-
pany Running Schools, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2002, at Al.
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I. THE PHILADELPHIA STORY:
THE QUEST TO PRIVATIZE K-12 EDUCATION
Philadelphia, the nation's seventh largest school district,11 is one
of many cities in the United States desperately struggling to find
the answers to staggering academic underperformance. Philadel-
phia schools are so ineffective that roughly fifty percent of high
school students drop out, and its schools fail to adequately educate
seventy percent of those students who do remain to graduate.' 2
Frustrated by an educational system that could neither retain stu-
dents nor properly instruct those who remained, the Pennsylvania
legislature enacted Act 46 ("Act") in 1998,'3 allowing the state to
take over a fiscally distressed school district. The Act permits the
Pennsylvania Secretary of Education, after declaring a school dis-
trict to be distressed, to establish a five-member school reform
commission having broad authority to remake the district almost
completely as it sees fit.
To determine whether Philadelphia's school district should be re-
vamped, former Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge awarded a
$2.7 million contract to Edison on August 1, 2001 to study the Phil-
adelphia schools, and, specifically, to: 1) examine the district's aca-
demic performance and finances; and 2) recommend structural
changes. 4 After two months of research, Edison reported that the
School District of Philadelphia is facing grave academic and fiscal
crises, with two-thirds of its schools failing and a significant and
11. Philadelphia Schools Become Experiment in Privatization Under State, City
Control, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2001, at B5.
12. EDISON SCH., INC., STRENGTHENING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PHILADEL-
PHIA SCHOOL DISTRICT, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR OF PENNSYLVANIA 4 (2001)
[hereinafter REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR] (citing Andrew Porter & Mitch Chester,
Building a High-Quality Assessment and Accountability Program: The Philadelphia
Example, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EDUCATION POLICY 2002, at 285 (Diane Ravitch
ed., 2002)).
13. 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6-691 (1998). As amended in October 2001, the Penn-
sylvania Governor would name four of the five school reform commission members.
Two would serve initial seven-year terms, one an initial five-year term, and one an
initial three-year term. Previously, a new state administration could replace a gover-
nor's appointees. The city's mayor would appoint one commissioner to an initial
three-year term. Id. § 6-696(a)-(b). The amendments clarify that the commission
could enter into contracts with private for profit and nonprofit providers to operate
the individual schools. Id. § 6-696(i). Through the Education Empowerment Act of
2000, Pennsylvania required the state's twelve lowest-performing school districts to
craft empowerment plans under supervision of the Department of Education; the
state would takeover any district (subject to two exceptions) not meeting academic
achievement goals in three years. Id. § 17-1703-B.
14. Robert C. Johnston, Edison To Study Woes of Philadelphia Schools, 20 EDUC.
WK., Aug. 8, 2001, at 3.
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growing budget deficit. 5 Not unexpectedly, Edison recommended
selecting a number of schools for immediate and intensive inter-
vention. These schools were to be operated by approved organiza-
tions in conjunction with an independent school management
company, or by an independent school management company
alone.' 6
Because Edison concluded that an entrenched, ineffective bu-
reaucracy represented a key obstacle to successful change, the re-
port advised the streamlining and restructuring of the district's
organization.17 One option indicated by Edison, the use of a pri-
vate management firm, could strengthen the central office's man-
agement capabilities. 8
Edison also called for decreasing the number of instructional and
non-instructional personnel, reducing administrative overhead by
outsourcing custodial work, lowering the cost of benefits, and mini-
mizing procurement costs.'9 In short, Edison saw the need to put
new solutions in place to improve the Philadelphia schools immedi-
ately. The report left the conclusion that the status quo seemed far
riskier than some type of change in district operations.
Immediately after the report's issuance on November 1, 2001,
Pennsylvania Governor Mark S. Schweiker, who had succeeded
Ridge upon his appointment to Director of Homeland Security for
the Bush Administration, sought a restructuring of the school dis-
trict's central office under a new management team that would be
rewarded for results and held accountable for failure.2 ° Schweiker
15. REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, supra note 12, at 2. The Report estimated that
the Philadelphia school district would have an operating deficit of $150 million in
2001-02 that would grow to more than $300 million by 2005-06. Id. at 55. Educational
performance of the district was similarly abysmal. The Report noted that fifty-eight
percent of Philadelphia students had Pennsylvania test scores in the lowest quartile,
compared with twenty-four percent in the rest of the state, and that only thirteen
percent of eleventh graders were capable of reading a newspaper with seventy-five
percent comprehension. Id. at 13.
16. Id. at 5-6, 32. The Report recommended that these schools undergo a com-
plete restructuring of all instructional programs and operating procedures.
17. Id. at 40. The Report was particularly critical of the district's administration,
noting that turf battles were prevalent due to severely overlapping areas of authority,
and that the district lost the benefits of scale by its failure to implement a uniform
curriculum and IT.
18. Id. at 7, 39-47. The Report strongly emphasized the need for Philadelphia to
embark on a large scale reform of its finances, education programs, organizational
structure, and governance. Id. at 79.
19. Id. at 7, 55-67, 76-79. See generally Susan Snyder & Dale Mezzacappa, Edison
Rips District Over "Accountability," PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 1, 2001, at A8.
20. Press Release, Office of the Governor of Pennsylvania, Schweiker Unveils
Historic Proposal to Improve Philadelphia's Public Schools (Nov. 1, 2001).
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backed Edison, specifically recommending that the school district
enter into a six-year, $101 million contract that gave the firm mana-
gerial control over the beleaguered district. Schweiker also wanted
as many as sixty partnership schools, each run by a community
group in conjunction with a qualified educational management
firm, or by a qualified educational management entity alone.2'
Edison sought to run the district's central administration and to
be the lead provider, running forty-five of the partnership
schools. 22 The idea of relinquishing control of both district man-
agement and a number of schools to a for-profit enterprise such as
Edison, however, was met with vociferous opposition.
Hundreds of protestors, including school administrators, teach-
ers, union leaders, parents, students, and community activists, op-
posed the privatization of Philadelphia's schools.23 Motivated by
the fear that the firm would cut jobs as a cost saving measure, ad-
ministrators, teachers, union leaders, and non-instructional person-
nel opposed Edison's takeover of the district's management.
Parents felt threatened by Edison because they feared losing con-
trol over their schools. Some felt that Edison would ignore their
concerns, and that a private firm would not be held accountable if
it did not fulfill its promises of educational improvement.
Adult protestors, tacitly encouraged by City Hall, took to the
streets during the negotiations between Governor Schweiker and
Philadelphia Mayor John F. Street. In late November 2001, protes-
tors blocked streets, snarled rush hour traffic, and waved signs in
an effort to stop privatization, calling the proposed plan a rape.24
Schweiker's proposal included plans to implement a five-member School Reform
Commission, to increase budgeting efficiencies, to focus spending on the poorest per-
forming schools, to implement performance pay for principals and students, and to
conduct a fundamental restructuring of district management.
21. Id.; see Michael A. Fletcher, Philadelphia's Schools to be Privately Run Under
Pennsylvania Plan, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2001, at Al. Part of the proposed $101 mil-
lion contract would have gone for salaries, teacher and principal recruitment, consult-
ing, software and other curricular innovations. Dale Mezzacappa & Susan Snyder,
Edison's Share of City School Deal: $101 Million, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 13, 2001, at
Al.
22. Susan Snyder, CEO of New York-Based School Firm Wants Multiyear Pact for
Philadelphia, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 2, 2001, at B1.
23. See, e.g., Susan Snyder & Cynthia Burton, Mayor, Governor Discuss Schools,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 17, 2001, at B1; Susan Snyder et al., No Agreement Yet on
School-Reform Takeover of Philadelphia Schools, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 30, 2001, at
Al.
24. Susan Snyder, Hundreds Protest State Takeover of Philadelphia Schools,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 29, 2001, at Bi; All Things Considered (National Public Radio
broadcast, Nov. 30, 2001).
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Students also protested. Hundreds walked out of classes and
formed a human chain around the school administration building
in hopes of keeping K-12 education public.2 1 They also protested
outside City Hall and the State Office Building in Philadelphia. 6
Community activists joined in as well. The President of the Phil-
adelphia chapter of the NAACP and members of the African-
American Clergy of Philadelphia pledged to carry out acts of civil
disobedience to voice their opposition to the state takeover.27 Af-
ter promoting Edison as the best choice to manage the district's
schools, Schweiker retreated in the face of mounting opposition,
agreeing that the soon-to-be appointed school reform commission
would manage the district's central office and pay all district em-
ployees directly. Edison would serve as a consultant and have a
role in recruiting managers for the district, but without the power
to hire and fire top central administrators, its main role would be to
provide support to the commission as it implemented its reform
plan. 8 On December 21, 2001, after weeks of highly publicized,
tumultuous negotiations and only hours before the state imposed
deadline for the troubled public school system, Schweiker and
Street finally reached a compromise regarding how much money
was needed to run the district and the composition of the reform
commission.29 As a result of their deal, the state agreed to spend an
additional $83 million on Philadelphia schools in the 2003 fiscal
year, and, in turn, the city would add an additional $45 million to
the school district's multi-billion dollar budget. Although the Act
specified a five-member commission with only one member chosen
25. All Things Considered, supra note 24.
26. Susan Snyder, Philadelphia Officials Agree to Provide More Funds for Schools,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 19, 2001, at Al (describing how the Philadelphia police esti-
mated the crowd at the student protest to be well over 1,000 people, chanting slogans
such as "We're not for sale!").
27. Kathleen Brady Shea, Ministers Vow to Fight For Schools, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Dec. 3, 2001, at B1 (describing how the protesters, led by Reverend Vernal E. Simms,
Sr., blocked traffic on a busy road and planned numerous other disturbances).
28. Press Release, Office of the Governor of Pennsylvania, Gov. Schweiker and
Mayor Street Achieve Breakthrough on Philadelphia Schools (Nov. 20, 2001). See
Michael Rubinkam, Pa. Governor Drops Reform Proposal for City Schools, WASH.
POST, Nov. 21, 2001, at A2; Susan Snyder & Dale Mezzacappa, Deal Reached on
Phila. Schools, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 21, 2001, at Al; Jacques Steinberg, Penn-
sylvania Abandons Plan To Privatize School Offices, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, at
A12.
29. Pennsylvania Department of Education, Declaration of Distressed School Dis-
trict Status (Dec. 21, 2001) (on file with author); see Jacques Steinberg, In Largest
Schools Takeover, State Will Run Philadelphia's, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2001, at Al;
Philadelphia Schools Become Experiment in Privatization Under State, City Control,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2001, at B5.
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by the mayor, the Governor agreed to allow Street to appoint a
second member to give Philadelphia a greater voice on the
commission.3 °
Once the state takeover had been agreed to, the nature of the
debate switched to the role that Edison would play in the district's
transformation. Schweiker's solution to Philadelphia's public edu-
cation crisis focused on the privatization of the most at-risk
schools, with Edison independently operating as many as forty-five
schools. Although expected to be a proxy for Schweiker, the Phila-
delphia School Reform Commission ("Commission"), led by
Schweiker-appointee James E. Nevels, declared from the outset
that there would be competition for management contracts and
that Edison would receive no deferential treatment.31
The Commission demonstrated its professed expression of inde-
pendence by carving out a significantly smaller role for Edison
than that envisaged by both the Governor and Edison. The Com-
mission rejected awarding Edison the proposed six-year, $101 mil-
lion contract that would have given the company management
control over the district's central administration as well as opera-
tional responsibility for forty-five schools, as originally envisioned
by Schweiker. The Commission, instead, awarded eleven firms, in-
cluding Edison, a significant role in improving the district, from
30. Susan Snyder & Marc Schogol, City Agrees to School Takeover; Street Ready
for a "Full Partnership," PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 22, 2001, at Al; see James M. O'Neill,
New City Schools Chief Meets an Old Problem, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 14, 2002, at C3;
Susan Snyder, Schweiker, Street Name School Overseers, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 15,
2002, at Al; Susan Snyder et al., Seven Groups to Get $120 Million to Run City
Schools, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 1, 2002, at B1. Governor Schweiker appointed James
E. Nevels, Chairman and CEO of the Swarthmore Group, Inc., as Chairman of the
Commission, James P. Gallagher, Ph.D., President of Philadelphia University, and
Daniel J. Whelan, President and CEO of Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc. as members.
Mayor Street appointed former school board members Sandra Dungee Glenn, Presi-
dent of the American Cities Foundation, and Michael Masch, Vice President for
Budget and Management Analysis, University of Pennsylvania, to the Commission.
31. Susan Snyder & Dale Mezzacappa, Schools Chief Lays Out Proposals, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Jan. 10, 2002, at B1. Philadelphia school employee unions and communi-
ties filed a lawsuit charging that if the School Reform Commission entered into a
contract with Edison, it would violate state conflict of interest laws. The trial court
refused to grant a preliminary injunction that would have prevented Edison from win-
ning a contract from the Commission. Judge Clears Way for Edison to Run Philadel-
phia Schools, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2001, at A10; see Comm'n to Keep Our Pub. Sch.
Pub. v. Schweiker, No. 22 EM 2002, 2002 Pa. LEXIS 438, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 13,
2002).
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school safety and teacher recruitment to student retention and
32food services.
The Commission similarly rejected giving Edison a contract to
operate forty-five schools on site. Instead, on April 17, 2002, when
the Commission chose to privatize forty-two out of seventy low-
performing schools, it awarded only twenty to Edison, with the re-
mainder being split among two other for-profit education manage-
ment firms, Chancellor-Beacon Academies, Inc. and Victory
Schools, Inc., two universities, Temple University and the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, and two non-profit organizations, Universal
Companies and Foundations, Inc.33
Despite these deviations from Schweiker's initial proposal,
Edison remains the predominant player in Philadelphia's reform
efforts. With $40 million in new financing in hand to implement its
largest contract to date,34 the success of Edison's efforts rests upon
the firm's ability to pacify local opposition and institute the re-
32. Jacques Steinberg, Edison Gets a Share of Philadelphia Contracts, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 2002, at A14. In August 2002, the school district's new chief executive officer
indicated that he did not plan to implement the Commission's plan to award Edison a
scaled-back role as the lead consultant. Susan Snyder & Dale Mezzacappa, Pa. Hiring
of Edison Slammed by Casey, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 2, 2002, at Al.
33. Tom Ferrick, Jr., In This Corner, The Teachers Union, PHILA. INQUIRER, May
12, 2002, at Bi; Susan Snyder & Martha Woodall, School Assignments, PHILA. IN-
OUIRER, Apr. 18, 2002, at Al; Jacques Steinberg, Private Groups Get 42 Schools in
Philadelphia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2002, at Al. The Philadelphia School Reform
Commission selected one of its own administrators, not Edison, to manage nineteen
reconstituted schools that the Commission had broken up by changing the teaching
staff and administration to spur academic achievement. Robert Tomsho, Edison Is
Dealt School Setbacks in Two Key States, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2002, at D6; Martha
Woodall, Edison Plans to Expand Schools, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 24, 2002, at B1.
The twenty schools Edison will manage serve 14,500 children, making it Edison's larg-
est contract. Jacques Steinberg, Philadelphians Jittery Over Plan to Privatize 20
Schools, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2002, at A10. Edison received an $881 per student
increase, not the $1500 per pupil increase it sought over the city's average per student
expenditure. This led the firm to curtail its model in Philadelphia. Edison Reaches
Contract on Philadelphia Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2002, at C6; Edison Signs Deal
to Run Twenty Schools in Philadelphia, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2002, at B10; Michael A.
Fletcher, Private Enterprise, Public Woes in Philadelphia Schools, WASH. POST, Sept.
17, 2002, at Al, All; Susan Snyder et al., Seven Groups to Get $120 Million to Run
City Schools, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 1, 2002, at Bt. On October 28, 2002, the Phila-
delphia School District finalized and signed a contract, terminable "at will" by the
school district, with Edison allowing the district to keep over $6 million worth of com-
puters, books, and other materials if the firm defaults on its credit agreements or does
not complete its five-year contract. Dale Mezzacappa, District to Pay Edison $5.2
million, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 29, 2002, at Bi.
34. Jacques Steinberg & Diana B. Henriques, Edison Schools Get Reprieve: $40
Million in Financing, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2002, at Cl; Robert Tomsho & Daniel
Golden, Edison Gets Merrill, Chesley Funding, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2002, at A6.
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forms necessary to breathe new life into the moribund school dis-
trict. Other states across America are watching as events unfold,
and may potentially take similar action, producing tremendous
growth opportunities for Edison and other EMOs.
II. EDISON'S FOUNDERS AND ITS CURRENT KEY EXECUTIVES
H. Christopher Whittle, the founder of Edison, was not a student
who slipped through the cracks of a poor educational system, illit-
erate, and unable to get by. Viewed by some as a ruthless self-
promoter, Whittle has been compared to characters such as Jay
Gatsby and has been called a prophet, a visionary, and even the
devil. According to one commentator, he had avowedly set out
not just to make money, but to shape the minds of new generations
through information and education. 36 Whittle is a bold entrepre-
neur who has profited from controversial ideas, earning him the
ear of investors and the scorn of those within the education
establishment. 37
Whittle received his undergraduate degree from the University
of Tennessee in 1969 and started his business career with the crea-
tion of a campus guide called Knoxville in a Nutshell with classmate
Phillip Moffitt. 38 Soon afterwards, they purchased Esquire maga-
zine which was headquartered in New York. Whittle and Moffitt,
unknown in the New York area, heralded their arrival in 1979 with
a full-page advertisement in the New York Times explaining "Why
We Bought Esquire" and featuring a picture of the two shaggy-
haired entrepreneurs. No one in New York publishing had ever
heard of them, and the city's literary establishment regarded them
as suspect, dubbing them "Whiffle and Moppet. '' 39 Esquire subse-
quently flourished and, in 1986, Whittle sold his interest to Moffitt.
In the transaction Whittle took the other Knoxville-based busi-
nesses the two owned, and gave them the new moniker of Whittle
Communications L.P. Two years later, he sold half of Whittle
Communications to Warner Communications (soon to be known as
35. Jennet Conant, The Whittle of Oz, VANITY FAIR, Dec. 1994, at 207, 208. See
generally Peter Schrag, Edison's Red Ink Schoolhouse, NATION, June 25, 2001, at 20.
36. James B. Stewart, The World of Business: Grand Illusions, NEW YORKER, Oct.
31, 1994, at 66.
37. 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 14, 1999).
38. Conant, supra note 35, at 207; Diane B. Henriques, A Learning Curve for
Whittle Venture, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2002, at Cl.
39. Conant, supra note 35, at 208.
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Time Warner, now AOL Time Warner) for $185 million, with Whit-
tle personally receiving $40 million.4 °
The entrepreneurial Whittle did not stop there. He built a lav-
ish, $55 million headquarters, Whittlesburg, covering two city
blocks in Knoxville and modeled after Thomas Jefferson's campus
at the University of Virginia. 41 He created one of the most contro-
versial business ideas marketed to public schools-television with
commercials in the classroom. By bringing advertisers directly to
students, Channel One, launched in 1989, implemented Whittle's
vision of a classroom television news service that airs educational
programs reaching middle and high schools around the country.42
Parents, students, and educators generally had no problem with the
information content, however, as with a regular television station,
the programming was funded by advertisements. Segments of pro-
grams were sandwiched in between commercials by advertisers
who paid dearly for the opportunity to market their teen-oriented
products to a captive target audience. The education establishment
and others regarded marketing to children in the classroom as the
Avery depth of crassness, 43 resulting in a serious, stubborn image
problem for both Channel One and Whittle.
By creating other forms of ingenious content as a means to con-
vey advertising, Whittle ultimately built Whittle Communications
into a business generating hundreds of million of dollars in annual
revenues. The firm's secondary revenue generator, Special Reports
magazine, provided information along with pharmaceutical adver-
tisements to patients in physicians' waiting rooms.44 Later, Whittle
Communications expanded by launching the Medical News Net-
work, a continuing education service for physicians and waiting
room patients sponsored by pharmaceutical companies.45 Unable
to generate the hoped-for revenue streams, and burdened by ex-
travagant overhead expenses, mounting bank debt, and hemor-
rhaging cash, the Whittle Communications empire, consisting of
Channel One, Special Reports, and Medical News Network, as well
40. Id.; Diana B. Henriques & Jacques Steinberg, Woes for Company Running
Schools, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2002, at Al; Jesse Kornbluth, Chris and Benno's Excel-
lent Adventure, VANITY FAIR, Aug. 1992, at 172.
41. Conant, supra note 35, at 208; Stewart, supra note 36, at 71-72.
42. Conant, supra note 35, at 206; Jay Mathews, New School of Thought: Making
Education Pay, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2000, at El; Charles Trueheart, Chris Whittle's
New Thought of School: Is the Edison Project Simple Elitism, or the Future of Educa-
tion, or Both?, WASH. POST, July 21, 1992, at B1.
43. 60 Minutes, supra note 37.
44. Conant, supra note 35, at 206-07.
45. Id. at 207, 244.
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as Whittlesburg, collapsed. By the mid 1990s, it was dismantled
and sold along with many of Whittle's personal assets to meet his
own liabilities.46
As a result of the meteoric rise and subsequent demise of Whit-
tle Communications, many who know Whittle came to regard him
as an overly optimistic idealist who deludes himself on how suc-
cessful his business ideas were, are, and will be. As one journalist
put it, "Chris Whittle's greatest strength is his ability to delude
himself and those around him. That is his genius. ' 47 Another con-
cluded, "[h]e exaggerates reality... [promising] more than he can
deliver. 48
Today, Whittle has one remaining enterprise, Edison (originally
known as the Edison Project), which he founded in 1992.49 Whittle
named the company after Thomas Edison because he believed the
idea of for-profit education to be as revolutionary as the light
bulb.50 Because his former business failures have, in part, been
blamed on Whittle spreading himself too thin, Whittle promises
that he will devote the rest of his career to making Edison a suc-
cess.51 Although Whittle is the founder of Edison and currently
serves as the firm's Chief Executive Officer and President, as well
as a member of its board of directors, Whittle did not want Edison
to be viewed as simply another one of his ingenious commercial
propositions.52 Consequently, he assembled a respected manage-
ment team to surmount his lack of a background in education and
his unproven fitness as a reformer of K-12 public schools. Two
Whittle hires, Benno C. Schmidt, Jr. and John E. Chubb, are
noteworthy.
Whittle began by luring Schmidt from the presidency of Yale
University, where he had served for six years, with the promise of
building a national network of high-tech private schools.53 In April
1992, he hired Schmidt as President and Chief Executive Officer,
46. Id. at 245-46; The Education of Chris Whittle, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Sept. 1, 1997,
at 31-32. The demise of Whittle Communications is chronicled in Stewart, supra note
36, at 66.
47. Conant, supra note 35, at 207; see Henriques, supra note 38, at B1.
48. Henriques, supra note 38, at B1.
49. PROSPEcrus, supra note 10, at 27.
50. 60 Minutes, supra note 37.
51. Conant, supra note 35, at 207.
52. James Traub, Has Benno Schmidt Learned His Lesson?, 47 NEW YORK, Oct.
31, 1994, at 53.
53. Id. at 52-53.
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to develop Edison's curriculum and plan the firm's growth. 54
Later, Whittle took over the role of President (from March 1997
through July 2002), and of CEO (since July 1998), after Schmidt
had switched to Chairman of the Board of Directors beginning in
March 1997. Although far removed from elementary or secondary
schools, Schmidt brought instant credibility to the Edison Project
as well as considerable administrative experience and fundraising
skills. His star-studded resume includes a clerkship with U.S. Su-
preme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren, seventeen years at Colum-
bia Law School, culminating in the deanship of that law school, and
then one of the finest perches in academic administration, the pres-
idency of Yale. He had demonstrated formidable fundraising tal-
ents both at Columbia Law School and Yale." Shaped by his own
experiences of being educated in the country's most elite private
schools, Schmidt argued for an idealistic curriculum, such as teach-
ing Greek to students. 6
The other members of Edison's management team counterbal-
anced Schmidt's ivory tower expectations with more practical per-
spectives. Whittle hired John E. Chubb, Ph.D., who now serves as
Edison's Chief Education Officer and Executive Vice President.5
Overseeing Edison's curriculum, instruction and assessment since
1992, Chubb began his career teaching at Stanford University. In
addition to serving as a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute,
Chubb is a noted author of books on educational reform, including
his co-authored work, Politics, Markets, and America's Schools,
where he advocated parental choice and competition among
schools as tools needed to break the bureaucratic and parochial
obstacles to improving America's K-12 public schools.5
Over the course of three years of extensive research and debate
(from 1992 to 1995), Edison developed, under Schmidt's leader-
54. PROSPECTUS, supra note 10, at 56; Susan Chira, Whittle's School Unit Gains
Prestige and Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1992, at B8; Mary Jordan, Whittle's For-
Profit Schools: Bold Claims and Criticism, WASH. POST, May 31, 1992, at A3; Walecia
Konrad et al., Chris Gets His Man: Now Can Whittle Get Going?, Bus. WK., June 8,
1992, at 30; Deborah Sontag, Yale President Quitting to Lead National Private-School
Venture, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1992, at Al.
55. Richard Bernstein, The Yale Schmidt Leaves Behind, N.Y. TIMES, June 14,
1992, § 6, at 33; Sontag, supra note 54, at Al; Traub, supra note 52, at 52-53.
56. Traub, supra note 52, at 54. Schmidt set forth his preliminary views on the
aims of the Edison Project in Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Education Innovation for Profit,
WALL ST. J., June 5, 1992, at A10.
57. EDISON SCH., INC., FORM 10-K/A, at 4, 23 (Oct. 2, 2002) [hereinafter FORM 10-
K/A, 10/2/02]; PROSPECTUS, supra note 10, at 56.
58. JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS 85-234 (1990).
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ship, the innovative synthesis for its curriculum and school de-
sign.5 9 The design team,60 consisting of approximately thirty full-
time professional employees and numerous outside consultants,
education researchers, curriculum developers, teachers, principals,
administrators, and specialists in technology, school finance, and
management, introduced a range of perspectives on improving K-
12 education. They recommended revamping a number of ele-
ments, including curriculum, instruction, assessment, professional
development, and school organization, and they sought to assem-
ble the best empirical evidence of the impact of potential reforms.
Originally, Whittle envisioned the Edison Project opening hun-
dreds of its own private schools at a multi-billion dollar cost.61 Re-
alizing that capital costs for such an endeavor were too high,
Whittle and Schmidt refashioned Edison into a for-profit manager
of public and charter schools.62
By early 1995, with its core team having developed the model for
Edison's educational approach and the firm having raised sufficient
capital, Edison embarked on a plan to manage schools over a
63 te~three-year span. In the fall of 1995, Edison began by managing
four elementary schools, three public schools in Sherman, Texas,
Wichita, Kansas, and Mount Clemens, Michigan and one charter
school in Boston, the Boston Renaissance Charter School. The au-
tumn of 1996 saw the firm running middle schools in each of the
original four sites and elementary schools in Colorado Springs,
Colorado, Dade County, Florida, Worcester, Massachusetts, and
59. PROSPECTUS, supra note 10, at 43.
60. Edison's core design team that led its research and development effort con-
sisted of: Chubb, Sylvia L. Peters, a celebrated inner-city school principal; Nancy
Hechinger, a leading innovator in education-technology; two prominent editors,
Dominique Browning, formerly of Newsweek, and Lee Eisenberg, formerly of Es-
quire; Daniel Biederman, president of the two largest business improvement districts
in New York City; and Chester E. Finn, Jr., former assistant U.S. Secretary of Educa-
tion and scholar critical of the public school establishment. John E. Chubb, Lessons
in School Reform from the Edison Project, in NEW SCHOOLS FOR A NEW CENTURY:
THE REDESIGN OF URBAN EDUCATION 86-122 (Diane Ravitch & Joseph P. Viteritti
eds., 1997).
61. Tim W. Ferguson, Business World: Whittle's Lesson Plan for the Public
Schools, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1992, at A15; N.R. Kleinfield, Plan for High-Tech Pri-
vate Schools Poses Risks and Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1992, at B8.
62. Geraldine Fabrikant, Whittle Said to Shrink Its Schools Project, N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 1993, at D1; Mary Jordan, Whittle to Revamp Plan to Build Chain of For-
Profit Private Schools, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1993, at A6; Patrick M. Reilly, Whittle to
Launch Leaner School Project After Failing to Attract Outside Investors, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 2, 1993, at B8. For an analysis of the capital considerations in managing public
schools versus building private schools, see Chubb, supra note 60, at 105-06.
63. Chubb, supra note 60, at 89.
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Lansing, Michigan. In 1997, it added middle schools to its elemen-
tary schools in Lansing, Michigan and Worcester, Massachusetts, a
high school to its schools in Mount Clemens, Michigan, and new
schools in Chula Vista, California, Colorado Springs, Colorado,
Wichita, Kansas, Detroit and Flint, Michigan, Duluth, Minnesota,
and San Antonio, Texas.64
The management team Whittle assembled has experienced little
turnover. Schmidt and Chubb remain with Edison, but the firm's
management team has also become somewhat more diverse. Ma-
nuel J. Rivera, who served as superintendent of the Rochester,
New York public schools from 1991 to 1994, joined Edison as Exec-
utive Vice President and Director of Schools in 1994.65 From 1998
to 2002, he served as Edison's Executive Vice President for Devel-
opment. Reverend Floyd H. Flake, a Democratic member of the
United States House of Representatives (1986-97), served as Presi-
dent of Edison Charter Schools from May 2000 to September 2002
(and as a consultant to the firm thereafter) and as an Edison direc-
tor since 2000. Flake is a highly successful clergyman, the senior
pastor of the Allen African Methodist Episcopal Church in
Queens, New York (since 1976), President of Wilberforce Univer-
sity (since July 2002), and a senior fellow at the Manhattan Insti-
tute for Social and Economic Policy. 66 The financial inexperience
which characterized the management team during Whittle's first
endeavor, Whittle Communications, however, remains manifest at
Edison. Edison's executives and staff members have proven una-
ble to counterbalance Whittle's demonstrated failings at tasks such
64. EDISON PROJECT, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT ON SCHOOL PERFORMANCE 3
(1999); PROSPECTUS, supra note 10, at 49-50. For the early history of the expansion of
the Edison schools, see Peter Applebome, For-Profit Education Venture to Expand,
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1997, at A12; Firm Approved to Run Some Kan., Mich. Schools;
Edison Project Has Funding Despite Woes of Founder Chris Whittle, WASH. POST, Jan.
28, 1995, at Cl; William Celis III, Private Groups to Run 15 Schools In Experiment by
Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1995, at Al; Rene Sanchez, A Flicker of Grander
Plans, Edison Project Underway at 4 Schools, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1995, at A3; Rene
Sanchez, Edison School Project Growing Slowly; Public Education Venture Entering
Third Year, Has Yet to Make Profit, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1997, at A3; Steve
Stecklow, Wichita Schools Agree to For-Profit Edison Project, WALL ST. J., May 12,
1994, at B6.
65. PROSPECTUS, supra note 10, at 57; see Jo Anna Natale, Sector Shifters, 16 Ex-
ECUTIVE EDUC., Sept. 1994, at 21, 23-24.
66. EDISON SCH., INC., FORM 14A, at 5 (Oct. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Form 14A, 10/
28/02]; FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 23.
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as careful cash-flow analysis. Almost none of his recruits had
much, if any, comparable experience at other big companies.67
Over the past ten years, Whittle and Schmidt have achieved one
goal: they have attracted the attention of education leaders.
Edison has become a lightning rod in the stormy national debate
over school reform.68 A key part of for-profit education, however,
is the profit. Now that Edison has rapidly acquired school manage-
ment contracts, culminating in the contract to operate twenty Phil-
adelphia schools, what are the firm's financial results?
Il. CAN K-12 FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION BE PROFITABLE?
The centerpiece of the privatization of K-12 public schools is the
profit motive. Edison seeks to turn the management of public and
charter schools into a profit-making enterprise. Yet, perhaps what
the critics feared most has not materialized: Edison has never
earned a profit and has, in fact, sustained net operating losses in
every fiscal quarter since it began operations.69 In its 1999 prospec-
tus, issued shortly before its initial public offering, the firm can-
didly stated: "We have not yet demonstrated that public schools
can be profitably managed by private companies and we are not
certain when we will be profitable, if at all."'70
Despite increasing revenues from $38.6 million in the fiscal year
1997 to $375.8 million in fiscal year 2001,'7 1 Edison lost $50.6 mil-
lion and $38.5 million in fiscal years 2000 and 2001, respectively.72
Although its revenues reached $465 million, Edison lost $86 mil-
67. Henriques, supra note 38, at C1. Beginning in July 2002, Charles J. Delaney,
an Edison director who had served on the board as the representative of UBS Capital
Americas since July 1999, assumed the role of vice chairman, sharing the office of the
CEO with Whittle. Delaney replaced former CFO Adam Field as the key officer
responsible for financial and accounting. Delaney seemingly brings a new, strong se-
nior management presence with more ability to challenge Whittle than Field seemed
to do. FORM 14A, 10/28/02, supra note 66, at 5; THINK EQUITY PARTNERS, EDISON
SCH., INC. 2 (Aug. 2, 2002).
68. Henriques, supra note 38, at C1.
69. EDISON SCH., INC., FORM 10-Q, at 16 (Nov. 14, 2002) [hereinafter FORM 10-Q,
11/14/02].
70. PROSPECTUS, supra note 10, at 9.
71. Id. at 97; see EDISON SCH., INC., FORM 10-K, at 27 (Sept. 26, 2001) [hereinafter
FORM 10-K, 9/26/01].
72. PROSPEcrus, supra note 10, at 97; see also BEAR, STEARNS & CO., INC.,
EDISON SCHOOLS, INC. (EDSN-18.91), at 2, 40 (Dec. 11, 2001); Charles Forelle &
Robert Tomsho, Edison Schools Posts Big Loss, Will Restate Two Years' Results,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2002, at B6.
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lion in fiscal year 2002.73 The firm's aggregate deficits since No-
vember 1996 have exceeded more than a quarter of a billion
dollars, totaling $276.3 million as of September 30, 2002.74
Edison met these losses mainly by issuing new shares of common
stock. Prior to going public in November 1999, the firm sold shares
of convertible preferred stock to venture capital investors and to
others backing the company.75 Venture capital financing enabled
Edison to begin acquiring public school takeover and charter
school contracts. Not only did Edison receive $110 million from its
November 10, 1999 initial public offering,76 but subsequently it also
raised additional working capital in two secondary offerings in Au-
gust 2000 and March 2001, netting $71 million and $81 million,
respectively. 77
Edison has also relied heavily on debt financing to meet its capi-
tal needs. For instance, in November 2001, Edison established a
$35 million asset based, revolving credit facility with Merrill Lynch
Mortgage Capital, Inc. ("MLMCI"). 78 This line of credit was collat-
eralized by certain Edison accounts receivable, basically fees from
management agreements owed by clients, to be sold or contributed
to a wholly-owned special purpose company, Edison Receivables
Company, LLC ("Edison Receivables"), which could draw on the
credit line. The terms included: interest at the London Interbank
Offered Rate ("LIBOR") interest rate plus 350 basis points (or
73. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 4, 23; Press Release, Edison Schools,
Inc., Edison Schools Reports 35% Rise in 4th Quarter Net Revenues to $137.8 million
(Sept. 5, 2002).
74. FORM 10-Q, 11/14/02, supra note 69, at 10; Diana B. Henriques & Jacques
Steinberg, Woes For Company Running Schools, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2002, at Al.
75. EDISON SCH., INC., AMENDMENT #8 TO FORM S-1, pt. II, at 1-2 (Nov. 5, 1999).
As of June 30, 1999, Edison owed about $13.9 million on long-term (thirty-six to forty-
eight month) notes with five financing companies, collaterized by computer equip-
ment, furniture, and other corporate assets, bearing fixed annual interest rates of fif-
teen to 20.4 percent. PROSPEcTus, supra note 10, at 106. For a history of the venture
capital funding of Edison, see Peter Applebome, Entrepreneur Gets $30 Million To
Establish For-Profit Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1995, at A20; Edison Project Adds
Schools and Investors, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1999, at A15; Ross Kerber, Edison Project
Completes Funding for $30.5 Million, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1996, at C18; New Financ-
ing to Allow Edison Project to Expand, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 1998, at A6; Steve
Stecklow, Edison's For-Profit Schools Get Terms for Financing, but Number is Cut,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1995, at B12.
76. FORM 10-K, 9/26/01, supra note 71, at 36. Edison also received $41.7 million
from two private placements of its stock in July 1999.
77. Id.
78. Credit and Security Agreement between Edison Receivables Company, LLC
and Merrill Lynch Mortgage Capital, Inc., Oct. 31, 2001, in FORM 10-Q, 11/14/02, supra
note 69, exhibit 10.02.
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about six percent at that time), net worth and debt level covenants
described as not too restrictive,79 and a no earnings covenant.
Despite its gloomy financial past, many financial analysts predict
that Edison can and will make money.80 They premise this conclu-
sion on two fundamental business concepts: economies of scale and
cost efficiencies. The more contracts Edison enters into with public
and charter schools, as well as with public authorities taking over
school districts, the more revenues it will generate. As revenues
increase, many of its costs remain the same. As the venture ex-
pands, the cost for Edison to educate each student declines because
costs, such as curricular development and other central overhead
expenses (including facility coordination, purchasing, business ser-
vices, student assessment, and financial reporting), are spread
among more and more pupils. In other words, standardizing ad-
ministrative and support services for a large number of schools
reduces the per-student cost of these services. Cost efficiencies ex-
ist. The firm will pay lower prices for its inputs by pooling purchas-
ing, curricular research, and information technology even if its
schools are in different geographical areas. As Edison increases
the number of students it serves, these cost efficiencies and the re-
sulting economies of scale raise the chances of its achieving profit-
ability. Thus, a critical mass of schools will provide the requisite
economies of scale (barring unexpected expenditures such as litiga-
tion, lobbying, and public relations expenses) that, when coupled
with the expected cost savings, will allow the enterprise to reach
profitability.
The unfolding Philadelphia story in the second half of 2001 and
the early part of 2002 made security analysts optimistic about
Edison's long-term financial prospects. Edison had hoped to enter
into a contract to manage forty-five Philadelphia schools, thereby
gaining 37,500 students.81 Assuming the Philadelphia School Re-
form Commission would pay Edison the same amount that the
school district spent educating students (estimated between $8,000
and $9,000 annually), a contract of this magnitude would have rep-
resented over $290 million in annual revenues. 82
79. JEFFERIES & Co., INC., EDISON SCHOOLS, INC. 1(Nov. 6, 2001).
80. See, e.g., BEAR, STEARNS & CO., INC., supra note 72, at 35; JEFFERIES & CO.,
INC., EDISON SCHOOLS, INC. 1 (Oct. 3, 2001). See generally David N. Plank, Charter
Schools and Private Profits, 57 SCH. ADMIN. 12, 14 (2000).
81. See, e.g., MERRILL LYNCH, EDISON SCHOOLS, INC.: A PHILADELPHIA STORY 2
(2001).
82. Id.; see CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON, EDISON SCHOOLS, INC. 3 (Apr. 9, 2001)
(noting that the annual revenue potential would be from $245 to $320 million if
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The potential nationwide market for education management or-
ganizations is huge. In addition to the firm's prospects in Philadel-
phia, security analysts calculate that of the 90,000 K-12 schools in
the United States, the lowest quartile, approximately 22,000, are
failing schools.83 These represent Edison's primary target market.
Although Edison currently serves only .15 percent of the K-12 mar-
ket, Philadelphia may be the first of many failing school districts
that look to Edison, the only national company with requisite expe-
rience, infrastructure, and capital, 4 to run large numbers of these
schools. Penetrating the failing school market increases the likeli-
hood that Edison will receive a larger portion of the approximately
$300 billion the United States spends annually on K-12 public edu-
cation,85  thereby significantly aiding the firm's quest for
profitability.
In contrast to Edison's financial woes, another publicly held edu-
cation management firm, Nobel Learning Communities, Inc., has
been, and currently is, profitable.86 The success of this firm, admit-
tedly smaller than Edison, indicates that, if costs can be controlled,
it is possible for Edison's business model to succeed, at least if suc-
cess is measured in terms of achieving profitability rather than by
gaining a "sufficient" rate of return on capital, the measure a tradi-
tional business would use.
The problem thus far seems to be implementing cost-cutting
measures because a key element of Edison's strategy centers on
reducing its central office expenses below those of large, urban
school districts. Edison's administrative, curriculum, and develop-
Edison were to manage fifty schools-a growth of over fifty percent from fiscal year
2001); THINK EQUITY PARTNERS, EDISON SCHOOLS, INC. 1 (Mar. 22, 2002) (estimat-
ing that management of forty-five schools would result in revenues of $300 million).
83. BEAR, STEARNS & Co., INC., supra note 72, at 4.
84. Id. It is also uncertain whether a brand name-the Edison model-works in
education. To establish a brand identity, Edison must rely on quality control and
similarity from site to site based on standard operating procedures. Some experts
believe a need exists to adapt to local conditions. Even within the same geographical
market, what people value about education varies widely. For instance, some want a
school to nurture a child's individuality, others want a school to facilitate a child's
functioning in groups. Andrew Cassel, Edison School's Rise, Potential Fall, PHILA.
INQUIRER, May 17, 2002, at C1. Despite these concerns, a huge market exists for a
first mover, such as Edison.
85. JEFFERIES & CO., INC., EDISON SCHOOLS, INC. 8 (June 5, 2002).
86. NOBEL LEARNING CMTYS., INC., FORM 10-K, at 17 (Sept. 28, 2001); see Theo-
dore Spencer, A Tale of Two Education Stocks, FORTUNE, Jan. 22, 2001, at 144; Wil-
liam C. Symonds, Edison: How Big a Blow for School Choice?, Bus. WK., June 3,
2002, at 44 (detailing how Nobel currently operates 174 schools serving 25,000 stu-
dents; its revenues are $160 million).
1300
EDISON SCHOOLS
ment expenses currently equal about fifteen percent of its net reve-
nues,87 a staggering percentage considering that its curriculum is
already developed and that its business model depends in part on
removing the layers of bureaucracy and cost inefficiencies that so
plague public school districts. In the future, Whittle hopes to re-
duce the firm's administrative costs to seven to eight percent of its
revenues, leaving an operating profit margin of seven to eight per-
cent.88 The administrative costs of managing numerous schools,
however, with a private bureaucracy in place of the public ones,
remain stubbornly high. For instance, in fiscal year 2002, Edison
added 107 new headquarters employees, a substantial increase in
staff for its school operations, education divisions, and central of-
fice administration, in order to enhance its legal, contracting, and
financial reporting functions.89 In the summer of 2002, however,
the firm fired about sixty (15.6 percent) of the 385 employees who
worked at its headquarters with a view to reducing its central office
expenses by over ten percent in fiscal year 2003, as compared with
fiscal year 2002.90
The optimistic scenario-that by becoming bigger and more effi-
cient, Edison's revenues will grow faster than its expenses-has its
skeptics. Commentators blame Edison's high costs on everything
from the firm's extensive investment in its new schools under man-
agement-approximately $1.5 million per school 91 (with start-up
costs of $2,500 per student at each new school to purchase com-
puters, implement the Edison curriculum, and train teachers92)
87. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 29 ( providing the Fiscal Year 2002
Statement of Operations Data; actual percentage is 15.3 percent); see Henriques,
supra note 38, at Cl; William C. Symonds, Edison: Pass, Not Fail, Bus. WK., July 9,
2001, at 70.
88. Whittle hopes to spend seventy-nine percent of revenues on the classroom, six
percent on capital costs, eight percent on administrative costs, leaving a seven percent
profit margin (meaning Edison must cut its administrative expenses as a percent of
revenue by more than fifty percent). Mathews, supra note 42, at El; Symonds, supra
note 7, at 64; see Symonds, supra note 87, at 70 (noting that Edison budgeted seven
percent on administrative expenses versus twenty-seven percent at the average school
district.)
89. FORM 10-K/A, 10/02/02, supra note 57, at 33 (citing $7.5 million in expenses
relating to SEC inquiry and its sales and marketing activities in Philadelphia).
90. David Evans, Edison Has Cut 15.6% of Jobs at Headquarters, BLOOMBERG
NEWS, Aug. 21, 2002; Press Release, Edison Schools, Inc., Edison Schools Concludes
Headquarters Reengineering (Aug. 21, 2002).
91. Edward Wyatt, Challenges and the Possibility of Profits for Edison Schools,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2001, at B1.
92. FORM 10-K, 9/26/01, supra note 71, at 9; EDISON SCH., INC., FOURTH ANNUAL
REPORT ON SCHOOL PERFORMANCE 11 (2001) [hereinafter FOURTH ANNUAL RE-
PORT]; see Henriques & Steinberg, supra note 74, at Al.
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while the revenue it receives is fixed, to its executive salaries and
marketing expenditures, 93 to, as previously noted, a lack of busi-
ness, particularly financial, acumen among its top executives. 94
Leaving aside Edison's central office expenses, schools generally
have high variable costs. As the firm grows, it must continuously
add teachers, administrators, and support staff. These high on site,
labor-intensive expenses make it difficult for Edison to reduce
marginal costs to the degree necessary to attain profitability. 95
In order to decrease expenses, a typical Edison school has few
specialists, such as special education experts. Instead, Edison
teachers assume as many of these functions as possible. The com-
pany maintains, however, that it makes special education staff
available at its schools to provide a full range of services, including
additional support in regular classrooms and self-contained class-
rooms for students with greater needs. 96 John E. Chubb candidly
admits that:
[t]his program has been perhaps the most difficult innovation
that Edison has implemented, for it is not easy to get all school
staff members-and not just special education staff members-
to take responsibility for special education students and to know
how to serve them.... All [Edison sites] have found responsible
inclusion a serious challenge. 97
Critics have charged that Edison discourages the enrollment of stu-
dents with disabilities or discipline problems who require extensive
services because these services make such students considerably
more costly to educate. 98
93. Symonds, supra note 86, at 44; cf John Chubb, A Supply-Side View of Student
Selectivity, in CHOICE WITH EQuiTy 112-13 (Paul T. Hill ed., 2002) (maintaining that
Edison uses relatively low-cost techniques to advertise and attract families).
94. See supra note 67 and accompanying text; see also Henriques, supra note 38, at
C1.
95. See Cassel, supra note 84, at C1 (quoting Columbia University Teachers Col-
lege Professor Henry Levin). For a negative assessment of the business aspects of for-
profit schools, see Henry M. Levin, Bear Market, Eouc. NEXT, Spring 2001, at 6.
96. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 7.
97. John E. Chubb, The Performance of Privately Managed Schools: An Early
Look at the Edison Project, in LEARNING FROM SCHOOL CHOICE 226 (Paul E. Peter-
son & Bryan C. Hassel eds., 1998).
98. See, e.g., Nancy J. Zollers & Arun K. Ramanathan, For-Profit Charter Schools
and Students with Disabilities: The Sordid Side of the Business of Schooling, 80 PHI
DELTA KAPPAN 297, 298 (1998). In the fall of 1997, Edison's Boston Renaissance
Charter School was cited for violating the rights of a student with disabilities, leading
to a finding of non-compliance with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
The finding stemmed from numerous mistakes the school made in providing educa-
tional services to a kindergarten student with a disability. See generally Peggy Farber,
The Edison Project Scores-and Stumbles-in Boston, 79 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 506
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Other possible labor cost-saving measures, which must be bal-
anced against the firm's desire to meet its students' educational
needs and foster academic achievement, include reducing the num-
ber of teachers, using cheaper teachers (by hiring part-time instruc-
tors, younger, less experienced teachers, or, if state laws give it
flexibility, hiring without concern to meeting certification require-
ments), or increasing class sizes. The development of educational
technology to reduce the labor-intensive nature of K-12 education
represents another possibility.
Four financial concerns raise further questions about the long-
term viability of Edison's business model. First, some Edison man-
agement agreements provide for a fee based on the average per
pupil amount the district spends on all its public school students
(K-12), rather than the average expenditure for the type of school
Edison operates. Typically, this amount is higher than the amount
a district spends on K-8 students because districts generally spend
less per pupil on elementary students and more per pupil on secon-
dary students.99 Edison is able to achieve cost savings by focusing
on educating elementary, not secondary, students who do not re-
quire specialized courses, facilities, and equipment.
Realizing the gap in what it currently offers school districts and
other public authorities, one part of the firm's strategy focuses on
opening Edison high schools in districts where the firm operates
elementary and middle schools. Edison candidly admits, however,
that it has limited experience operating high schools, and its com-
plete high school curriculum, school design, and operating plan are
not fully tested. 10
Second, private donations subsidize some Edison schools. In the
2001-02 school year, for example, philanthropic entities supported
(1998). But see John E. Chubb, Edison Scores and Scores Again in Boston: Response
to an Article by Author Peggy Farber, 80 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 205 (1998). Chubb
notes that Boston Renaissance has a special education program that has acted as a
model of quality. Chubb, supra note 97, at 226. For an overview of the legal aspects
of outsourcing special education services, see FRANK R. KEMERER, NAT'L CTR. FOR
THE STUDY OF PRIVATIZATION IN EDUC., LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING EDUCATIONAL
PRIVATIZATION AND AccoUNrTABILiTy 26-29 (2000), available at http://www.ecs.org/
htmllDocument.asp?chouseid=2588 (last visited May 15, 2003); see also Jay P.
Heubert, Schools Without Rules? Federal Disability Law and the Paradoxes of Deregu-
lation, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 320 (1997).
99. FORM 10-K, 9/26/01, supra note 71, at 42; EDISON SCH., INC., FORM 10-Q, at
24-25 (May 17, 2002); see Henriques & Steinberg, supra note 74, at Al (noting that
Edison's claims of doing more with less at elementary schools were not entirely
accurate).
100. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 3; FORM 10-Q, 11/14/02, supra note
69, at 18.
2003] 1303
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
eleven of the 133 Edison schools. 1 1 These charitable contribu-
tions, which went directly to the firm's school board or charter
board clients, not to Edison, generally fund those expenses that the
firm previously made without adequately considering the possibil-
ity of a payback on their expenditures, for example, the initial capi-
tal investment in curriculum, technology, and the facilities upgrade
requisite to opening new schools. Edison also relies on philan-
thropy in geographical areas where public sector per-pupil expend-
itures make it difficult for the company to achieve a satisfactory
financial performance. In particular, all of its schools in California
have been supported by charitable giving. 10 2 These donations,
while helpful in defraying the substantial sums Edison invests when
starting to manage a new school, raise questions about the firm's
business model as well as its ability to be weaned away from such
support.
Generally speaking, Edison receives (and spends) more funds
than a district spends on educating similar students. Many educa-
tional reformers say schools serving mostly students from low in-
come families need more funding than those serving more affluent
families. Schools in inner city areas typically have fewer resources,
such as libraries and access to technology. Therefore, the need for
Edison to bolster school resources is greater. 10 3
Edison strives to turn around poorly performing schools-some-
thing local school boards have long neglected to do. Although
Edison contracts with school districts, charter boards, and other
public authorities to run schools and thus receives public sector
funding, this funding is rarely enough. Most of the contracts
Edison receives are for a district's worst performing schools-dys-
101. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 38; see BEAR, STEARNS & Co., INC.,
supra note 72, at 99; Henriques & Steinberg, supra note 74, at Al. For example,
Edison entered into an agreement with a client, seemingly the Clark County (Las
Vegas), Nevada School District, obligating the firm to raise $10.5 million in un-
restricted philanthropic funds to be distributed over a two year period ending on June
30, 2003. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 38. To fulfill the contract, Edison
has provided $2.2 million of its own funds. Charles Forelle, Flunked by Investors,
Edison Schools Scorns Talk of Failure, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2002, at B1; see FORM 10-
Q, 11/14/02, supra note 69, at 16.
102. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 36. The D2F2 Foundation, funded by
Donald and Doris Fisher, founders of The Gap, intends to provide up to $22.5 million
to Edison schools, primarily in California. Of this amount, $9 million has already
been paid and used in Edison schools. Id.; see Schrag, supra note 35, at 20; Somini
Sengupta, Edison Project Gets Aid To Open New Schools, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1998,
at A4.
103. See, e.g., William C. Symonds, How to Fix America's Schools, Bus. WK., Mar.
19, 2001, at 66.
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functional places serving disproportionately large numbers of poor
kids that superintendents would just as soon get rid of and that, in
many cases, could not do much worse.104 Prior to the summer of
2002, Edison pumped money into these hopelessly inadequate
schools, providing up-to-date technology, putting computers in the
homes of each student above the second grade, and offering teach-
ers extensive professional development. 105 Edison also provides
students with daily structured reading classes, plus art, music, and
Spanish instruction beginning in kindergarten, educational benefits
not previously offered in these schools. 106
Third, charter schools pose a special challenge for Edison. The
charter schools run by the firm are generally starting from scratch.
These schools require a facility that is not typically provided by
public authorities. Because a charter board generally lacks the req-
uisite resources to obtain the financing for its facility and start-up
costs, Edison has advanced or lent funds or guaranteed the debt of
various charter schools it manages. Thus, Edison's charter school
financing provides the seed money for new business. By Septem-
ber 30, 2002, however, Edison had lent its charter schools $84.9
million, a considerable increase from the $13.9 million that it had
provided through June 1999. Furthermore, about $19.9 million is
not secured by any collateral or is subordinated to a senior
lender.1"7 Some financing arrangements extend beyond the current
term of the firm's management agreements and may continue even
if these contracts are terminated. If not repaid, these loans could
cause the firm serious financial difficulty, further adversely affect-
ing its financial results and its precarious financial position.1 0 8
In addition to providing loans or guarantees, Edison also entered
into long-term leases for facilities occupied by its charter school
clients. Some of the lease terms exceed the initial term of the
firm's management agreements and, thus, Edison's obligations to
make lease payments continue even if its management agreements
are terminated or not renewed. Edison's total rental exposure ex-
104. Schrag, supra note 35, at 20.
105. See Chubb, supra note 60, at 114 (explaining the Edison Project's investment
plan which heavily funds the launch and development of new schools).
106. Id. (listing capital investments designed to bolster school development).
107. See FORM 10-Q, 11/14/02, supra note 69, at 7; PROSPECrus, supra note 10, at
14; see also Henriques & Steinberg, supra note 74, at Al; Megan E. Mulligan, School
Daze, FORBES, Dec. 24, 2001, at 124 (noting that Edison has also guaranteed $21.8
million in loans to charter boards and has provided $500,000 in cash as collateral for
charter board loans).
108. FORM 10-Q, 11/14/02, supra note 69, at 19; see Wyatt, supra note 91, at B1.
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ceeds $48 million.'019 To obtain funds to finance initiatives beyond
fiscal year 2003, Edison must refinance the obligations owed to it
by helping its existing charter school clients obtain tax exempt
bonds or bank financing to repay loans and advances to the firm. 0
Rather than providing credit support itself, it must attempt to se-
cure this type of financing from other sources for new charter cli-
ents before schools are opened. In addition, because non-charter,
contract business is less-capital intensive, requiring no investments
in real estate construction or acquisition, but only renovation,
Edison will likely focus more on gaining management agreements
with public schools.111
Finally, Edison derives all of its revenue from public sources.1 12
A decline in funding of K-12 education resulting from budgetary
constraints would adversely affect the firm.' 13
These problems, coupled with the Philadelphia School Reform
Commission's decision to award only twenty schools to Edison
when as many as forty-five were expected, severely damaged inves-
tor trust and confidence in the firm. The final blow came on May
14, 2002, when the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") issued a cease-and-desist order requiring Edison to
change its revenue reporting to only count those revenues actually
received by the company. 14
Following a February 13, 2002 Bloomberg News Service re-
port,115 the SEC began an investigation into Edison's disclosure of
109. FORM 10-Q, 11/14/02, supra note 69, at 8 (estimating that Edison's future lease
obligations amount to $48.7 million over the next twenty years).
110. See FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 47; see also Yvette Shields, Deal
in Focus: Chicago Charter School System Offers $16M of Triple-B Bonds, BOND
BUYER, June 5, 2002, at 32; Press Release, Edison Schools, Inc., Edison Schools Re-
ports First Quarter Results with Year-over-Year Improvement (Nov. 14, 2002). In
addition, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2002 provides credit enhancement initia-
tives to assist with charter school facility acquisition, construction, and renovation.
Pub. L. No. 107-110, §§ 5221-5231, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002).
111. See, e.g., Mark Walsh, Lack of Profitability Spurs School-Management
Shakeout, 21 EDUC. WK., Sept. 12, 2001, at 8.
112. FORM 10-Q, 11/14/02, supra note 69, at 23.
113. Robert Tomsho, Edison's Payment Is Uncertain From Its Biggest School Con-
tract, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2002, at B7.
114. In re Edison Sch., Inc., Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursu-
ant to Section 21C, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order, Securi-
ties Exchange Act Release No. 45,925, May 14, 2002, available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/admin/34-45925.htm (last visited May 15, 2003). One writer asserts that
Whittle previously inflated revenues at Whittle Communications. Stewart, supra note
36, at 64-65, 75.
115. David Evans, Edison Schools Boosts Revenue With Funds Not Received,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Feb. 13, 2002.
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its past revenue reporting and the adequacy of its financial con-
trols. The inquiry revolved around Edison's practice of counting as
revenue funds that certain school districts continued to pay directly
to teachers and companies that provide school-related services on
Edison's behalf, without actually transferring the funds through
Edison. Although this practice did not affect the firm's bottom
line, as expenses not directly incurred were also counted, it altered
the percentage of Edison's losses relative to its revenue, thereby
hiding some of the company's underlying financial weakness. De-
spite Edison's insistence that this practice was legitimate and in ac-
cordance with generally accepted accounting principles, a swift
negative reaction hit Edison's stock price following the release of
the Bloomberg report and then the SEC's order.116 Investors were
skittish about companies with disclosure and accounting problems
in the wake of the unfolding financial scandals at Enron,
WorldCom, and other companies. This was particularly the case
for a company such as Edison whose stock, in the absence of earn-
ings, was almost entirely dependent upon rapid revenue growth.
The SEC's cease-and-desist order focused on Edison's disclosure
improprieties."1 The order concluded:
Edison has filed reports with the Commission that have not dis-
closed certain information regarding Edison's business opera-
tions. Specifically, Edison has not disclosed that a portion of its
reported revenues included payments that did not reach Edison
and were made by school districts to teachers and other provid-
ers of services in Edison's schools) 18
Under the SEC cease-and-desist order, Edison agreed to reclas-
sify prior revenues for fiscal years 1998-2001 and the first two
quarters of fiscal year 2002. These changes reflect a net revenue
amount that excludes certain school district expenses, including
teachers' salaries and non-instruction services such as facilities
maintenance and transportation (so-called "buy back services"),
where the districts retained a level of control over expenditures
116. See Bloomberg News Report on Edison Schools Revenue Recognition Inaccu-
rate and Irresponsible, P.R. NEWSWIRE, Feb. 13, 2002; Edison Schools Reaffirms Reve-
nue Recognition Policy, P.R. NEWSWIRE, Feb. 14, 2002; David Evans, Edison Schools
Says Revenue Includes Unreceived Funds, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Feb. 15, 2002; Queena
Sook Kim, Edison Quarterly Loss Widened, Stock Falls Amid Accounting Questions,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2002, at A8; Martha Woodall, Edison's Accounting of Revenues
Questioned, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 14, 2002, at Al.
117. See In re Edison Sch., Inc., Order, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
45,925, at 1.
118. Id.
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sufficient that Edison could not be considered the primary obligor
on the contracts. The company promised that in the future it
would report revenues from these contracts on a net basis. In most
Edison contracts, however, the firm is liable for salaries and other
expenses and it will continue to report its gross revenues from
these arrangements.
Although the SEC settlement caused Edison's stock price to
plummet, 119 the firm did not admit any wrongdoing and the SEC
did not impose any fines or penalties. In addition to improving its
public disclosures by distinguishing those costs paid directly by
Edison from those costs paid by local school districts, Edison
agreed to enhance its internal audit system by appointing a director
of internal audit who will report periodically to the audit commit-
tee of the firm's board, not to its senior management.120 Although
Edison escaped the SEC relatively unscathed, it is now subject to
ten class action lawsuits by shareholders alleging that some of
Edison's public disclosures regarding its financial condition were
materially false and misleading in that the firm's revenue reporting
practices allegedly improperly inflated its total revenues and artifi-
cially boosted the price of its stock.121
The firm's lack of profitability, coupled with the SEC's cease-
and-desist order and growing skepticism whether Edison's business
model is capable of ever turning a profit, caused a precipitous de-
cline in the firm's stock. From a January 2002 high of more than
$21 per share, its stock plummeted to fourteen cents per share on
October 10, 2002 only to rebound to $1.62 by the end of 2002.122 It
also became apparent that the company would need $30-$40 mil-
lion to keep its commitment to manage twenty Philadelphia
schools as well as open and/or expand other new schools across the
country. With the equity market closed due to the collapse in the
price of its stock price, the prospects of securing sufficient debt fi-
nancing to undertake the firm's continued expansion seemed
119. See Kim, supra note 116, at A8.
120. See In re Edison Sch., Inc., Order, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
45,925, at 7. The firm's Finance and Audit Committee Charter is set forth in FORM
10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, app. A. Edison's audit committee, which disbanded in
July 2002, was reconstituted with a new chairman who began serving on November 15,
2002. See FORM 14A, 10/28/02, supra note 66, at 6-7; see also Laura Smitherman,
Edison School's CEO Whittle Got $1, Options in 2002, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 28,
2002.
121. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 20-21, 77; FORM 10-Q, 11/14/02, supra
note 69, at 8.
122. See Edison Schools 'A,' available at http://cgi.money.cnn.com/tools/bigcharts/
bigcharts.html?mode=basic&ticker=EDSN&time=2yr (last visited May 15, 2003).
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daunting, but Whittle was able to piece together a deal to keep its
plans on track and the company afloat.
On July 31, 2002, the November 2001 revolving credit agreement
with MLMCI was amended to add School Services LLC (a newly
formed entity organized by Leeds Weld and Co. and the Adler
Group) as an additional lender, to increase the line of credit from
$35 million to $55 million and to extend the term of the agreement
(and the line of credit provided) to June 30, 2003 (and subse-
quently to July 15, 2003).123 This line of credit bears interest at
LIBOR plus seven percent (or, at Edison's option, prime plus 4.5
percent) and is collateralized by accounts receivable held by
Edison Receivables. 124 The agreement required Edison to observe
certain financial covenants and restrictions, including a maximum
consolidated debt-to-equity ratio. 125 On July 31, 2002, Edison also
entered into a separate Credit and Security Agreement with School
Services, giving the firm the right to borrow $10 million, at twelve
percent interest, collateralized by certain real property owned by
two wholly owned Edison subsidiaries. 126 It also entered into a re-
volving loan for up to $10 million with School Services at twelve
percent interest, secured by notes payable from charter schools and
other indebtedness to Edison and substantially all the firm's other
assets, except accounts receivable sold to Edison Receivables. The
facility matures on June 30, 2004 and is subject to significant pre-
payment obligations. The agreement requires the company to ob-
serve certain financial covenants and restrictions, including a debt-
equity ratio and a minimum earnings before interest, taxes, depre-
ciation, and amortization requirement for fiscal year 2003.127
The School Services lenders also received warrants to buy about
10.7 million newly issued Edison shares at $1 per share. If Merrill
Lynch and School Services exercise all the warrants given to them,
they will jointly own the largest block of Edison stock. 28
Despite being forced to grant warrants for a seventeen percent
stake in the company, accept financing at interest rates indicative
123. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 36, 79; Amended and Restated Credit
and Security Agreement, dated as of July 31, 2002 between Edison Receivables Co.
LLC, The Lenders, and Merrill Lynch Mortgage Capital, Inc., in EDISON SCH., INC.,
FORM 10-K, exhibit 10.36 (Sept. 30, 2002) [hereinafter FORM 10-K, 9/30/021.
124. See FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 36.
125. Id.
126. Id.; Credit and Security Agreement, dated as of July 31, 2002, among Edison
Schools, Inc., School Services, LLC, 110th and 5th Associates, LLC, and Bayard Rus-
tin Charter School, LLC, in FORM 10-K, 9/30/02, supra note 123, exhibit 10.45.
127. See FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 36.
128. Id.
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of an unprofitable, failing firm, and pledge all of its assets, the capi-
tal infusion will allow Edison to implement its Philadelphia expan-
sion plan, open two new schools in Kansas City, Missouri and
Indianapolis, Indiana, and expand twelve existing Edison schools
in various cities. 29
Stepping back from the details of Edison's rocky financial situa-
tion in 2002, the good news is that its problems appear to relate
more to poor execution than to a failed business model. Genuine
concerns certainly exist, however, Edison's financial and manage-
rial difficulties appear solvable. Edison has been able to grow rap-
idly based on what appears to be a successful educational product.
Edison can help secure its long-term future by consolidating its
gains, maintaining and improving the quality of the education it
provides, and implementing efficiency savings through cost con-
trols-especially through staff cuts and expense reductions at its
headquarters.
Furthermore, Edison will pursue seven strategies. First, it will
curtail its previous rapid expansion strategy, focusing instead on
profitability and the termination (or renegotiation) of unprofitable
management contracts. Second, unless funding exists to provide a
means of payback, it will curtail giving students home computers, a
practice which accounts for about half of its on site capital spend-
ing.13' This step will reduce its start-up capital expenditures from
the historical $2,500 level to $1,500 (or even less) per student.
Third, it will seek to refinance the funds it has lent to the charter
schools it manages. Fourth, the firm will expand its summer school
operations and begin offering after-school and tutoring services.3
Fifth, it will market its management services to other failing school
districts which are subject to state takeovers. If the takeover
model proves successful in Philadelphia, it may offer an attractive
solution for other states. Edison must avoid, however, the dangers
of extensive reliance on large, new contracts and the possibility of
strong opposition to its management operations accompanied by
129. Edison undertook a 2002-03 school expansion program in twelve locations-
Washington, D.C.; Atlanta, Georgia; Albany, the Bronx, Buffalo, Tonawanda, and
Rochester, New York; Philadelphia and Phoenixville, Pennsylvania; Milwaukee, Wis-
consin; and two schools in Dayton, Ohio. Edison Schools Announces Twelve Expan-
sions and Two New School Openings, P.R. NEWSWIRE, May 23, 2002.
130. See William C. Symonds, Edison: An "F" in Finance, Bus. WK., Nov. 4, 2002,
at 52.
131. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 15; FORM 10-0, 11/14/02, supra note
69, at 15; Edison Schools to Expand Supplemental Services, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2002,
at C4.
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adverse publicity. Sixth, it may strive to establish clusters of
schools within the same district to facilitate the sharing of local ser-
vices, such as custodians and maintenance personnel. This ap-
proach will also enable the company to capitalize on its
relationship with a district and its knowledge of the market.'3 2 Sev-
enth, rather than taking over the management of schools, Edison,
through its Affiliates Division, will use its intellectual capital to
market consulting services, such as an achievement management
system, a benchmark assessment system to generate monthly data
on students, and professional development programs designed to
help principals become better administrators and show teachers
how to better manage their classrooms, all shepherded by an
achievement advisor. The division will offer Edison's capabilities
to some 6,600 small and medium-size school districts, with 1,000 to
10,000 students. 133 Under the consulting arrangements, a district
would continue to operate schools, but would pay fees and royal-
ties to Edison for access to its capabilities, thus helping the firm
meet the costs of running its headquarters and allowing it to capi-
talize on its research and development efforts.
First and foremost, if Edison demonstrates achievement gains at
the schools it runs, it will improve its chances of attaining more
management and consulting contracts, thus enhancing its financial
position. The greater the academic improvement, the more ac-
cepting the public will become. If achievement scores demonstrate
the firm's success, public sentiment will likely encourage more
school districts, charter boards, and public authorities to enter into
contracts with Edison. As one brokerage firm stated, in explaining
achievement test scores as one of the most quantifiable and identi-
fiable ways of measuring the firm's financial value, "academic
achievement will drive financial results .... Thus, the logic is quite
simple: Edison schools are outperforming; the public is gaining re-
spect; more clients will surface; the business should grow. One
need not attend an Edison school to appreciate that simple
logic."1 34
132. See FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 15; Jay Mathews, Putting a For-
Profit Company to the Test, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2002, at A9; Jacques Steinberg, For-
Profit School Venture Has Yet to Turn a Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2002, at A17.
133. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 14-15; Blanche Fraser, Vice President
for Development, Edison Schools, Inc., Statement at the Progressive Policy Institute,
Education Forum (Sept. 13, 2002) (on file with author).
134. BANC OF AM. SEC., EDISON SCHOOLS, INC. 3 (2001).
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IV. Is PRIVATE SCHOOL MANAGEMENT HELPING STUDENTS?
All of the schools Edison manages are structured under the
Edison Model, offering a coherent vision of school design, curricu-
lum, and pedagogy. The model integrates proven best practices
with leaps in technology and school organization. According to
John E. Chubb, it attempts to bring together in a single, compre-
hensive school design those wide-ranging factors shown consist-
ently to influence student achievement and school performance.
The factors include not only the obvious education variables-cur-
riculum, instruction, and assessment-but also more general fac-
tors such as organization, leadership, management, technology,
culture, and community.135 The model provides for the organiza-
tion of a school based on academies, houses, and teams.136 A
school consists of segments-small schools-within-a school, called
academies-where two or three age/grade levels are grouped to-
gether. Each academy consists of three houses of one hundred to
one hundred eighty students similar in age and grade levels. Stu-
dents remain within a house until they graduate from an academy.
In these houses, teachers typically follow the same students for sev-
eral years. Edison believes this organization ensures that students
are better known by their teachers, helps foster student-teacher re-
lationships and encourages teachers to feel more ongoing responsi-
bility for individual students.137 A team of four to six teachers
leads each house and works with students at each level of the
house in the core academic program. Additional teachers supple-
ment the team with subjects such as art, music, and physical
fitness. 138
Detailed and demanding student academic standards guide the
Edison curriculum, specifying what students should know and be
able to do at the end of each school year in twenty fields of
study.139 Edison offers a rich and ambitious1 40 curriculum consist-
ing of five domains: 1) humanities and the arts; 2) mathematics and
science; 3) character and ethics; 4) health and physical fitness; and
135. Chubb, supra note 93, at 91.
136. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 7; OFFICE OF EVALUATION & RE-
SEARCH, MIAMI-DADE COUNTY PUB. SCH., EVALUATION OF THE EDISON PROJECT
SCHOOL: FINAL REPORT: 1999-2000 SCHOOL YEAR 2-3 (2001); Chubb, supra note 97,
at 215.
137. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 7.
138. Id.; OFFICE OF EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 136, at 3; Chubb, supra
note 97, at 215.
139. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 6.
140. Chubb, supra note 97, at 215.
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5) practical arts and skills.14' Edison employs an interdisciplinary
approach with lessons based on projects or real life problems re-
quiring students to delve into different disciplines. 4 2 The firm's
instruction methods are derived from systematic, empirical re-
search. 143 Its elementary schools use a K-5 reading program, "Suc-
cess for All," developed and refined by researchers at Johns
Hopkins University. Its schools generally use K-12 mathematics
programs developed by the University of Chicago School Mathe-
matics Project and science programs developed by some of the na-
tion's leading organizations of science educators. Edison also has
built its educational program around a set of democratic and uni-
versal core values designed to promote discipline, strong character,
and a positive learning environment with students receiving ethical
learning instruction. All students at each grade level take a fine
arts or music class daily. 144
The Edison Model dramatically alters the school day and year
(in those schools that choose to adopt this part of its program) in
order to provide more class time for students. The extra time per-
mits a focus on fundamentals while still providing a curriculum rich
in the arts and humanities. As a result of this emphasis on time in
the classroom, the school day, after the first year of a school's oper-
ation, is sixty to 120 minutes longer than the average school day-
seven hours for students in kindergarten through grade two, eight
hours for students beginning in third grade. Often the school day
does not end until 4 p.m. The school year is, on average, 200
days-about twenty days longer than the traditional public school
year. 45 This additional time spent in the classroom, if maintained
over the course of a child's schooling from kindergarten through
the twelfth grade, amounts to an additional four years of
instruction. 146
The model integrates technology into its learning environment as
a productivity tool that facilitates writing, research, analysis, and
141. OFFICE OF EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 136, at 6.
142. Id. at 6-7.
143. Chubb, supra note 60, at 111. For a critical assessment of the "Success for All"
program, see Stanley Pogrow, At Odds-Success for All is a Failure, 83 PHI DELTA
KAPPAN 463 (2002).
144. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 6; Chubb, supra note 93, at 91.
145. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 7; OFFICE OF EVALUATION & RE-
SEARCH, supra note 136, at 4-5; Chubb, supra note 97, at 217, 225.
146. OFFICE OF EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 136, at 4; Chubb, supra
note 97, at 217.
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communication for students, teachers, and parents. 47 In addition
to generally giving each teacher a laptop computer, each Edison
classroom has at least one computer for student use. Where fund-
ing permits, after the first year of a school's operation, a computer
and modem is made available for home use to each student in the
third-grade or higher. Realizing that significant improvements in
learning require closer collaborations between schools and fami-
lies, an internet-based internal message, conference, and informa-
tion system, called "The Common," connects students, students'
families, teachers, and principals. Students use the network to
email teachers and submit assignments electronically. The princi-
pal keeps an electronic bulletin board for announcements and sug-
gestions by parents. Parents and teachers communicate via chat-
room discussions and post data on e-bulletin boards. 48
Edison also uses traditional communication modes. Teachers
meet with parents face-to-face, with the child in attendance, on a
quarterly basis and also maintain communication via telephone. 49
If there is sufficient space in a school, the principal maintains a
Parent Center where family members can receive information on
curriculum and school activities, so that parents feel encouraged to
visit their child's school and become more informed. The school
often uses the Parent Center for meetings and workshops that keep
parents involved with both the school and their children's
education.150
To regularly monitor its students' progress against its academic
standards, Edison has developed a Quarterly Learning Contract
("QLC").25 Each quarter, teachers prepare a report card, with
traditional letter grades and extensive commentary, tracking each
student's progress against the firm's annual academic standards
and setting specific goals for each student. The contract represents
a formal statement of future learning objectives agreed to by the
school, the student, and the student's parents, as well as a state-
147. Chubb, supra note 93, at 91. See generally Div. OF EVALUATION, ACCOUNTA-
BILITY & INFOR. Sys., DALLAS PUB. SCH., INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT ON EDISON
7-8 (2001) (on file with author); FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 7; FOURTH
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 11; Chubb, supra note 97, at 216, 226.
148. OFFICE OF EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 136, at 10; Chubb, supra
note 97, at 218; FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 7.
149. OFFICE OF EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 136, at 10; Chubb, supra
note 97, at 230.
150. OFFICE OF EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 136, at 11.
151. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 7-8; FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 92, at 13-14; OFFICE OF EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 136, at 7-8;
Chubb, supra note 97, at 217-25.
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ment of the student's actual attainment of past expectations.
Through the QLC, parents morally commit to monitor their chil-
dren's progress and to help them achieve the specified goals.
Each Edison school interacts with its community in an effort to
ensure that the educational program meets local priorities and con-
cerns. About one-quarter of the curriculum is tailored by the
school, utilizing community history and teacher inspired curricular
adaptation. 52 The school also enlists the cooperation of commu-
nity social service agencies to help specific students. Moreover, the
school itself becomes a hub of activity for the neighborhood with
programs and services offered in the afternoons and evenings dur-
ing the school year and throughout the summer.
The Edison Model has three stated objectives: first, to raise each
student's academic achievement to the highest level possible; sec-
ond, to increase parent involvement and satisfaction to levels con-
sistent with educational excellence; and third, to improve school
climate so as to foster greater learning.'53 School districts, charter
boards, and other public authorities that contract with Edison,
however, look to objective standards in measuring success. Most
often these public bodies want to see improvement in the students'
standardized achievement test scores in basic skills. Results are
also measured in terms of parental satisfaction.
A. Raising Academic Achievement
Although most Edison schools show a positive academic
achievements trend, controversy exists concerning the magnitude
of the gains and the methodology to be used in making assess-
ments. To resolve questions raised by studies issued by (or funded
by) privatization opponents, Edison commissioned the RAND
Corporation in 2000 to conduct a three-year independent evalua-
tion of student achievement outcomes at Edison schools. 154
152. OFFICE OF EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 136, at 8-9, 11.
153. PETER W. COOKSON, JR. ET AL., THE EDISON PARTNERSHIP SCHOOLS: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ACADEMIC CLIMATE AND CLASSROOM CULTURE 37 (2000); OFFICE
OF EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 136, at 11.
154. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 2. A report by the U.S. General
Accounting Office on the academic performance of Edison and two other for-profit
firms was inconclusive. With one exception, claims that Edison improved student per-
formance could not be substantiated. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INSUFFICIENT
RESEARCH TO DETERMINE EFFECTIVENESS OF SELECTED PRIVATE EDUCATION COM-
PANIES, GAO-03-11, at 2-3 (2002); Diana Jean Schemo, U.S. Report Makes No Call on
For-Profit Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2002, at A19.
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National teachers' unions offer studies critical of the academic
performance of Edison students. A 1998 report by the American
Federation of Teachers ("AFT") based on an analysis of test
scores, concluded that some Edison Schools fell behind compara-
ble public schools, while only a few came out dramatically ahead.
Overall, the flat or negative comparative trends indicated to AFT
that Edison was not showing substantive gains across its schools. 55
A subsequent AFT report, issued in 2000, provided a second over-
view of the performance of Edison schools. Once again, AFT
found that Edison students did not perform better than students in
comparable, traditional public schools in the same district (or
state). The overall conclusion was that "Edison schools do as well
or worse than comparable schools; occasionally they do better." '156
Edison opponents have prepared other unfavorable comparisons
of the firm's schools with measures of statewide achievement. 57
Public authorities in desperate need of assistance with chroni-
cally under performing schools contract with Edison. Typically, the
schools which Edison manages average a thirty-four percent profi-
ciency rate on the criterion-referenced tests that measure the abil-
ity of students to meet specified standards, compared with schools
in the same district that average a forty-six percent proficiency. 158
These numbers reflect the nature of many Edison schools. School
districts (or state authorities) often turn to privatization as a mea-
sure of last resort for desperately failing schools. 159 Edison seeks
to bring these academically underachieving schools up to more ac-
ceptable levels.
155. AM. FED'N OF TEACHERS, STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT IN EDISON SCHOOLS:
MIXED RESULTS IN AN ONGOING ENTERPRISE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 38-92 (1998), at
http://www.aft.org/research/Edisonproject/index.htm (last visited May 15, 2003).
Edison asserted in a written response that, "achievement is generally and clearly on
the rise. Not in every single instance, sometimes impressively and other times only
moderately-but overall a promising positive trend that no amount of manipulation
can turn around." THE EDISON PROJECT, RESPONSE TO THE AFT REPORT ON STU-
DENT ACHIEVEMENT IN EDISON SCHOOLS 5 (1998) (emphasis omitted), available at
http://www.aft.org/research/Edisonproject/edrespnd/Edres2.htm (last visited May 15,
2003).
156. AM. FED'N OF TEACHERS, TRENDS IN STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT FOR EDISON
SCHOOLS, INC.: THE MERGING TRACK ROUND IN AN ONGOING ENTERPRISE 6 (2000),
available at http://www.aft.org/research/Edisonproject/index.htm (last visited May 15,
2003); see Edward Wyatt, Union Study Finds For-Profit Schools No Better, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2000, at A16.
157. See, e.g., Press Release, Congressman Chaka Fattah, Edison Schools Perform
Poorly Nationwide (Dec. 17, 2001), at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/speech/pa02/fat-
tah/pr_011217_edison.htm (last visited May 15, 2003).
158. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 14.
159. Id. at 15.
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Edison maintains that its schools should be judged by the trend
of assessment scores rather than by the actual percentages of stu-
dents attaining state specification on criterion-referenced tests.
Edison argues that the actual percentages do not accurately pre-
sent the progress achieved in those schools where virtually no stu-
dents attained state norms before Edison was contracted. 160 In
other words, because of the previous low performance of the
schools which Edison generally gets to manage, the firm wants its
schools assessed on their rates of improvement, not by a skewed
comparison with other schools in the same district (or state).
These considerations also make comparisons of progress between
Edison and similar district schools complicated since the factors
that led the district to contract with Edison initially are not likely
to be replicated in those schools that the district continues to con-
trol.161 Thus, one of the nation's most renowned education schol-
ars concluded that since Edison is typically invited to administer
schools that are in trouble, comparisons of Edison schools to state
or national norms are likely to underestimate Edison school ef-
fects.'62 This result is augmented by Edison's claim that the com-
petition it creates with district run schools improves those schools
as well since the district schools must adopt industry-best practices
in an attempt to maintain enrollment.
Using the firm's methodology, positive academic achievement is
evident in most Edison schools. In fact, the company has achieved
substantial student academic achievement at its schools, leading
one expert to conclude that "the weight of the evidence, though
not definitive, generally supports Edison claims that they are pro-
viding more effective schools than are otherwise available to the
students in the communities they serve.' '1 63
Overall, eighty-four percent of the schools managed by Edison
achieve better results than they did when they were run by the
public sector, while only eleven percent (eight schools) registered
lower levels of performance since contracting with Edison.164
160. Id. at 16-17. In the school year 2000-01, ninety percent of schools opened with
students who achieved below the average of their respective home districts. Chubb,
supra note 93, at 105-06.
161. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 16-17.
162. PETER E. PETERSON, A GUIDE TO RECENT STUDIES OF SCHOOL EFFECTIVE-
NESS 6 (1998).
163. Id. at 2, 7.
164. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 17-18. Edison frankly admits its
failures. For example, third and fourth grade students at the Woodland B. Edison's
Classical Academy in Kansas City, Missouri, lost an average of thirteen percentage
points from 2000 to 2001 on the Missouri Assessment Program, while fourth graders
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From the 1995-96 school year through the 2000-01 school year, stu-
dents increased their criterion-referenced test scores by an annual
average of six percent. 65 For the 2000-01 school year, the average
gain on criterion-reference tests was seven percentage points, one
point higher than the average gain from 1995 to 2001.166 Moreo-
ver, this gain is at the proficient level, or higher, indicating that an
ever-increasing number of Edison students are passing or even ex-
ceeding their state's standards. The firm also has sharply reduced
the number of students failing state standards. From 1995 to 2001,
Edison schools reduced the failure rate on criterion-referenced
tests by an average of six percentage points per year. In the 2000-
01 school year, Edison schools reduced failure rates an average of
more than nine percentage points per school. 67
Edison has also demonstrated impressive gains on norm-refer-
enced tests, such as the Stanford Achievement Test or the Iowa
Test of Basic Skills, that measure performance on a percentile basis
against students taking the test nationally. The average beginning
scores for Edison schools were in the thirty second percentile on
these tests, compared to a forty fifth national percentile rank for
the schools in the same district. 168 From the 1995-96 school year
through the 2000-01 school year, Edison students, on average,
gained five percentiles per year on national norm-referenced
at the Wilson-Edison Partnership School in Battle Creek, Michigan lost on average of
nine percentage points on the Michigan Educational Assessment Program from 2000
to 2001. Id. at 23, 84, 93. For a summary of Edison's academic failures, see Press
Release, Congressman Chaka Fattah, SRC Notified on Edison's Poor Record of Per-
formance (Feb. 4, 2002), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/]ist/speech/pa02 fat-
tah/srcnotified.htm (last visited May 15, 2003). Critics maintain that to arrive at the
eighty-four percent figure, Edison averaged the average annual change in test scores
for each grade on each subject tested and then arrived at a school-wide average, with
large gains in one subject or one grade masking declines in others. Jacques Steinberg
& Diana B. Henriques, Complex Calculations D on Academics, N.Y. TIMES, July 16,
2002, at A10.
165. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 5, 16; FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 92, at 20. Critics fault Edison's methodology for combining test results
from different testing companies. Steinberg & Henriques, supra note 164, at A10.
166. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 16; FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 92, at 20-21.
167. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 16; FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 92, at 20.
168. FORM 10-K, 9/26/01, supra note 71, at 7, 16-17; FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 92, at 21. A report commissioned by the National Education Association,
hardly an Edison advocate, stated that students in Edison schools are generally show-
ing academic achievement gains consistent with grade level advancement on norm-
referenced tests. GARY MIRON & BROOKS APPLEGATE, AN EVALUATION OF STU-
DENT ACHIEVEMENT IN EDISON SCHOOLS OPENED IN 1995 AND 1996, at xxii (2000)
(on file with author).
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tests. 69 Increasing student achievement five percentiles a year,
twenty percentiles over four years, is the difference between many
students not graduating from high school with few going to college,
and virtually all graduating from high school and many going to
college. 170 As Edison schools raise the levels of academic achieve-
ment, "they are changing the lives of large numbers of students."''
Once again, privatization opponents dispute these positive
trends. A study of ten schools Edison opened in 1995, funded by
the National Education Association ("NEA"), found "that stu-
dents in [these] schools . . .- while they often start at levels below
national norms and district averages-progress at rates comparable
in other district schools."' 72 This conclusion drew a sharp rejoinder
from Edison which focused on the study's methodological infirmi-
ties. Edison countered by asserting that the study's:
ultimate judgment of "trends" on state tests uses an "odds-ra-
tios" statistical model that requires test scores to be truncated to
simple pass-or-fail dichotomies. This statistical simplification lit-
erally throws away all information about student progress every-
where along the achievement scale except the point of passing
or failing. This is a serious problem for low-achieving schools
which often make their initial progress by moving students out
of the lowest performance categories and into "partially profi-
cient" categories, just short of passing. According to the . . .
pass-or-fail scheme a school that placed every student in the cat-
egory just below passing would get equal performance scores.
This measure is egregiously unfair, not to mention hopelessly
inaccurate. It is a plain bias against finding success in schools
working with traditionally low performing students.'73
Stepping back from the methodological quandaries, Edison's
success, based on the positive trends and the improvement in test
169. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 5, 15.
170. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 22; see Press Release, Edison
Schools, Inc., Edison Hosts Investor Update, Announces "Life-Changing" Test-Score
Results (June 18, 2002) (quoting John Chubb, "These are life-changing improvements
.... These improved scores mean improved opportunities for children to lead fulfil-
ling lives.").
171. MIRON & APPLEGATE, supra note 168, at xxiv.
172. EDISON SCH., INC., UNION-SPONSORED STUDY PROVIDES PREDICTABLY Bi-
ASED EVALUATION OF EDISON SCHOOLS (2001). Edison critiqued the report for in-
cluding only ten of 113 schools in the study and for omitting the 1999-2000 school year
(the most recent year for which data were available), when that data indicated great
improvement in the schools studied. These factors, coupled with the study's omission
of any trend data, led Edison's Chief Operating Officer, Christopher Cerf, to state
that the report was literally a sham.
173. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 22-23.
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scores, means more when its school population is compared to the
national school population. In the 2000-01 school year, sixty-four
percent of Edison students were African-American, and another
seventeen percent were Latino.174 Economically disadvantaged
students, represented by the proxy of those receiving free or re-
duced-price lunches, comprised seventy percent of Edison students
during the same academic year.'75 Edison schools generally have
succeeded with economically disadvantaged students and those of
color, who have traditionally lagged in academic achievement and
have languished in a public school system unable to meet their
needs and unreceptive to change. 176 Thus, Edison is making strides
in its schools to close the minority achievement gap.
Beyond the aggregate statistics and trends, academic achieve-
ment gains at some Edison schools are noteworthy. In the 2000-01
school year, the student population at the Dodge-Edison Elemen-
tary School in Wichita, Kansas consisted mostly of students from
low-income families, with sixty-eight percent eligible for free or re-
duced-price lunches. 77 From Spring 1998 to Spring 2001, second
graders at this school increased their reading scores by over forty
percent while fifth grade results jumped by thirty-five percent. 178
Math scores also increased during this time period, by more than
twenty-nine percent among second graders and nearly ten percent
for fifth grade students.179 Even an NEA commissioned study con-
cluded, ". . . the gains made by students enrolled in Dodge-Edison
are both substantial and positive."' 8 °
Three Edison elementary schools in Baltimore, Maryland also
demonstrated great success in their second year of operation. Af-
ter a difficult first year that saw scores at two of the schools de-
cline, the firm received much criticism, despite its successes at a
third.' 8' At one school, Furman-Templeton Elementary School, no
third-grader during Edison's first year passed the Maryland School
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. MIRON & APPLEGATE, supra note 168, at xiv, 63-78; cf. AM. FED'N OF TEACH-
ERS, supra note 155, at 47-55; AM. FED'N OF TEACHERS, supra note 156, at 31 ("Based
on state assessments, however, reading performance at Dodge-Edison is the same or
lower than comparable schools, showing little progress since 1996. Math performance
is below average for comparable schools and shows no progress since 1996.").
180. Liz Bowie, Edison Fails to Improve Two Schools, BALT. SUN, Jan. 20, 2002, at
B1.
181. Id.; see FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 63-65.
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Performance Assessment Program tests, and fifth grade scores de-
clined in every subject.182 In the second year of Edison operation,
the three schools, all of which are nearly one-hundred percent Af-
rican-American and two of which have more than eighty-five per-
cent of students receiving free and reduced-price lunches, 83 posted
astounding gains across all grade levels.
Scores at Montebello Elementary, which had posted extraordi-
nary gains in the 2000-01 school year, fell slightly to the ninetieth
percentile (down from the ninety-fifth percentile) in reading and to
the ninety-fourth percentile in math.184 Overall, the school raised
its scores twenty-three percentage points per year over the two
years among groups of students in all grade levels and subjects.185
The Furman-Templeton Elementary posted a one-year first
grade math increase from the twenty-third percentile to the sev-
enty-fourth percentile in the Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills;
while scores at Gilmore Elementary increased from the fifteenth to
the forty ninth percentile. 86 Even on a comparable basis, the re-
sults are impressive. On the math portion of the Maryland Func-
tion Test, forty-four percent of the sixth graders at the three Edison
schools passed compared to eleven percent in the Baltimore City
Public School system. In reading, seventy percent of Edison sixth
graders met the requirements compared to sixty-three percent of
sixth graders district wide. 87
Despite these impressive test scores in the three Baltimore
schools, Edison remained a focal point of controversy, reflecting
smoldering tensions between the firm and the school board follow-
ing the State Board of Education's decision to take three of the
lowest-performing elementary schools out of the district's control
and place them under Edison management. One Baltimore City
school board member even accused Edison of recruiting the best
students from Baltimore to its three schools and trying to send
back "difficult and expensive students to other district schools.' '1 88
182. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 63-65.
183. Id.
184. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 65; Press Release, Edison
Schools, Inc., All Edison Schools in Baltimore Post Dramatic Gains on Citywide Stan-
dardized Test (Apr. 23, 2002).
185. Press Release, supra note 184.
186. Erika Niedowski, Three Privatized Schools Show Gains on Test, BALT. SUN,
Apr. 23, 2003, at B1.
187. Press Release, Edison Schools, Inc., Edison Schools in Baltimore Excel on
State Test (Apr. 12, 2002).
188. Liz Bowie, City Board Quashes Expansion for Edison, BALT. SUN, June 12,
2002, at B3.
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In other instances, the Edison schools have shown mixed test re-
sults. Henry E. S. Reeves Elementary School, located in an eco-
nomically depressed area of Miami, Florida, has demonstrated a
positive trend line. From the Spring of 1999 to the Spring of 2001,
the performance of fifth grade students on the Florida Comprehen-
sive Assessment Test increased at the top three levels by twelve
percent; however, fourth graders only showed a two percent gain
during the same time period.18 9 An NEA-funded study rated the
school's performance as "mixed," with some improvements for
Edison students but "the gains made by Reeves on the [criterion-
referenced tests]-are similar to those made by the district and
state groups."'190 Moreover, in the 2000-01 school year, on a com-
parison basis, Reeves' students, eighty percent of whom were Afri-
can-American, 191 never exhibited an academic advantage in
reading or mathematics over students in the program offered by
the regular Miami-Dade County Public Schools. 19 2
The Boston Renaissance Charter School, one of Edison's first
schools, demonstrated similarly mixed results, leading the NEA-
funded researchers to conclude that the school "does not differ
substantially from other district schools."'193 Academic gains were,
however, achieved at this school where for the 2000-01 school year,
African-Americans and Latinos comprised, respectively, seventy-
eight percent and thirteen percent of the student body.' 94 From
the Spring of 1998 to the Spring of 2000, the percentage of fourth
grade students achieving proficient or advanced levels on the Mas-
sachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System increased by one
percent in English language arts and twelve percent in mathemat-
ics; the percentage of eighth graders scoring at these levels rose
eleven and nine percent, respectively. 95 In 2001, sixty-nine per-
cent of the school's eighth graders failed a statewide math test, ex-
ceeding the fifty-four percent failure rate in the Boston school
district. In English, twenty-two percent of the eight graders failed
189. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 49.
190. MIRON & APPLEGATE, supra note 168, at 46-62.
191. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 49.
192. OFFICE OF EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 136, at 46-47; see AM.
FED'N OF TEACHERS, supra note 156, at 27.
193. MIRON & APPLEGATE, supra note 168, at 120; see AM. FED'N OF TEACHERS,
supra note 156, at 90-120 (rating the school's performance as "mixed"). Likewise, the
1998 AFT study concluded, "it is still achieving at about the level of other schools
serving low income students that are not participating in the Edison program." AM.
FED'N OF TEACHERS, supra note 155, at 84.
194. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 66.
195. Id.
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compared with twenty percent district wide. 96 Although the
school's gains on the state's tests exceeded those of the district
from 1996 to 2001, the charter board decided to reduce its relation-
ship with Edison, citing an unusual governance arrangement (with
teachers and administrators accountable to both the board and
Edison) and a desire to pursue an independent educational path.1 97
Thus, it left Edison to provide only special education and profes-
sional development services.
Even if Edison has not yet raised academic achievement, a ques-
tionable conclusion, the substantial changes it makes will likely
benefit students' academic performances in the long-term. In the
2000-01 school year, attendance rates reached ninety-four percent
at Edison schools, compared to ninety-two percent for public
schools nationally. 198 By significantly increasing the number of
computers available to students, Edison has given dramatically
greater access to information. Since opening its first schools in
1995, Edison has placed 12,299 computers in its classrooms and has
given an astounding 29,728 computers to students' families for
home use. 199 These technological investments in its schools, stu-
dents, and families, although not contributing to the firm, facilitate
learning and are helping to close the "digital divide" affecting the
poor and minority communities where Edison mainly operates.
B. Increasing Parental Satisfaction and Involvement
Edison schools enjoy "high" parental satisfaction. In a 2000-01
school year survey prepared for Edison by an independent market
research firm, and covering all the firm's schools then in operation,
a majority (fifty-four percent) of parents rated Edison schools an
A, another thirty-three percent rated the schools a B, for a total of
eighty-seven percent of parents giving Edison schools an A or a
B.200 In comparison, parents in traditional public schools rated
196. Daniel Golden, Boston School Severs Its Ties With Edison, WALL ST. J., May
16, 2002, at B2; see AM. FED'N OF TEACHERS, supra note 156, at 35.
197. Big Charter School in Boston Breaks Its Ties with Edison, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,
2002, at A21; Golden, supra note 196, at B2; Press Release, Edison Schools, Inc.,
Edison Schools Announces Change in Relationship (May 15, 2002).
198. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 27.
199. Id. at 10-11. This is in addition to the 3,985 laptops that Edison has given to
teachers in its schools, increasing their ability to communicate with parents and to
integrate computer skills into classroom activities.
200. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 14 (stating that, for the 2001-02
school year, over fifty percent of the parents of Edison students gave its schools
grades of A or A-); FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 24-25; see Susan
Snyder, Is Edison The Answer? Nationwide, Consultant Averages a "B," PHILA. IN-
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their schools, on average, a B-. 2 1 According to the same market
research firm, only 40.3 percent of parents with students in U.S.
public schools for the 1999-2001 school years gave a grade of A
or A-.20 2 The level of parental satisfaction at Edison schools, the
equivalent of a B+ ranking (3.4 on a 4.0 scale), significantly exceeds
the average parental ranking of 2.6 on a 4.0 scale for public
schools.2 °3
Parental satisfaction is also reflected in an Edison's student mo-
bility (or school leaving) rate of twelve percent, far below the na-
tional average of seventeen percent.20 4 This is significant because
the rate is traditionally higher in economically disadvantaged areas,
such as those generally served by Edison.
Compared to public schools, Edison parents are not only more
satisfied, but also more involved, 0 5 thereby demonstrating how ac-
tive parents can be in their children's education when given multi-
ple opportunities to participate. As previously discussed,20 6 the
Edison Model provides for more interaction between the school
and home environments, particularly through the use of computer
technology and the implementation of quarterly parent-teacher
meetings. Where funding permits, the distribution of a computer
to every family of students in the third grade and above keynotes
Edison's emphasis on parental involvement. Parents are also en-
couraged to share accountability for their children's academic per-
formance by co-signing the QLC. Nearly all parents, some ninety-
four percent, attend scheduled meetings with teachers.20 7 In addi-
tion, many parents participated in educational workshops and sem-
inars designed to instruct them on how to help their children learn
effectively.20 8 Because the learning process continues beyond the
school day, parent involvement in a child's education is crucial. By
promoting more parent participation, Edison may facilitate in-
creases in academic achievement, raise school attendance, and de-
crease drop-out rates even as the firm expands its operation of high
schools.
QUIRER, Mar. 31, 2002, at Al (stating that "Edison's greatest strength is perhaps pa-
rental satisfaction.").
201. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 25.
202. FORM 10-K, 9/26/01, supra note 71, at 15.
203. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 25.
204. Id. at 27.
205. OFFICE OF EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 136, at 53.
206. See FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 8.
207. Chubb, supra note 97, at 230 (reporting that ninety-four percent of parents
attended QLC meetings in 1997).
208. OFFICE OF EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 136, at 53.
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C. Improving School Climate
The school environment has dramatically improved in Edison
schools. Even a report commissioned by the NEA concluded,
"[o]verall, the academic climate of the Edison schools is positive
and the classroom culture promotes learning .... Most Edison
Schools are safe, orderly, and energized .... 29 Increased and
consistent enforcement of discipline through an insistence on ap-
propriate student conduct and the implementation of rules gov-
erning student speech and attire instills a sense of safety and pride
in Edison schools.
Teachers working at Edison schools overwhelmingly report posi-
tive experiences. As one elementary school teacher noted, "I think
becoming an Edison teacher has been one of the most exciting
things in my career. I am so glad I took the risk. ' '210 Sixty-six per-
cent of Edison teachers rate their school an A or B; turnover at
Edison schools has decreased to a median rate of seventeen per-
cent, only slightly above the public school average of fourteen per-
cent.211 The longer Edison operates a school, the greater the
enthusiasm teachers express about working for Edison.212 Also,
teachers with more experience were happier teaching at Edison
schools, and experienced teachers who had taught for more than
seven years were the most enthusiastic about working in an Edison
school.213 The results may be surprising because Edison demands
more of its teachers because both the school day and school year
are longer. Higher morale has lead to greater enthusiasm in the
classroom, more effort applied at work, and decreased turnover.
The enhanced satisfaction and higher morale among Edison in-
structors may be attributed to the fact that Edison "recreates"
schools. Edison contracts to manage poorly performing public
schools and turns them into safe and orderly places. Teachers are
enthusiastic about the cohesive curriculum and school design, the
increased access to technology and other resources, and the profes-
sional support they receive.214 As one teacher put it:
I feel extremely fortunate to have had the opportunity to start
and to work at this Edison school. Imagine! I have become very
computer literate, have my own laptop computer and a class-
209. COOKSON ET AL., supra note 153, at 3.
210. Id. at 29.
211. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 25-26.
212. COOKSON ET AL., supra note 153, at 34.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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room filled with equipment, materials, and curriculum books for
every subject. I have been trained in every subject area and
have also become a trainer for reading and science. I am a part
of a school design that not only consists of weekly training but
sharing meetings with my grade level co-workers and also meet-
ings that coordinate my teaching efforts with those teachers in
my house.215
Teachers point to the extensive professional development, the
opportunity to work in teams, and the career ladder Edison pro-
vides. The firm invests heavily in the professional development of
its teachers, enabling them to continue to develop their skills as
educators on an ongoing basis. Edison typically offers its teaching
staff two weeks of training before a new school opens and addi-
tional training during a school's first year. In those schools with
longer days, teachers generally receive two free periods each day
for their own professional development. Each year they also re-
ceive at least three days to continue their professional development
through various modes, including national and regional confer-
ences related to the Edison curriculum and school design, ongoing
site support, and national meetings and conferences providing
training in specialized school leadership roles.2 16 The high quality
of professional development Edison teachers receive, one study
found, motivates them to a considerable extent.217
The Edison Model encourages teachers to work together in
teams, thereby reducing their isolation.2 18 As one veteran teacher
stated, "Never have I felt so much a part of a team. '219 Certain
teachers, designated as the "lead teacher," assume responsibility
for a team's management and serve on a school-wide management
215. Id. at 28. One study found that the overall structure of the Edison design
motivates and satisfies teachers to a "moderate extent." Laura Ann Miller, The Im-
pact of the Edison Design on Teachers and Their Perception of Its Impact on Im-
proved Student Achievement Over Time 109 (2000) (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation,
University of LaVerne, LaVerne, California) (on file with author) (reporting ninety-
two completed surveys from teachers currently working in three Edison schools in
California). This study also found that teachers in their third and fourth years at an
Edison school find the Edison school design more motivating that first year teachers.
Id. at 110-11, 115, 148, 158.
216. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 6; FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 92, at 12-13; OFFICE OF EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 136, at 9; Chubb,
supra note 97, at 216, 226.
217. Miller, supra note 215, at 121-22, 149, 150. Teachers with more experience in
an Edison school were more satisfied with their professional development opportuni-
ties than new teachers. Id. at 124.
218. COOKSON ET AL., supra note 153, at 35.
219. Id. at 30.
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team, enabling them to participate in their school's management.2 °
These teachers are also awarded with higher salary in many of the
schools where Edison controls payroll. Daily professional develop-
ment time enables teachers to work and plan as a team and provide
peer tutoring for team members.
Edison teachers are particularly pleased with the implementa-
tion of a career ladder approach that allows truly outstanding
teachers to receive promotions and pay increases, instead of the
"flat career" trajectory that typifies K-12 public schools.221 The
firm offers a four-level career program-resident, teacher, senior
teacher, lead teacher-for teacher advancement 222-which promotes
the best to positions of greater responsibility, professional fulfill-
ment, and compensation, while removing the weakest from the
classroom.
Edison teachers also benefit from strong, experienced principals,
who are not afraid to fire non-performing teachers.223 Edison prin-
cipals monitor the hiring and assessment of teachers and strive to
retain only productive instructors. Principals are held accountable
for school performance in three areas: student academic achieve-
ment, financial management, and community satisfaction. Each
principal is appraised and compensated based on her progress
220. Chubb, supra note 97, at 225.
221. COOKSON ET AL., supra note 153, at 36, 41. One study found, however, that
career ladder opportunities only provided "moderate" scores for motivation and satis-
faction. Miller, supra note 215, at 118, 163.
222. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 8; OFFICE OF EVALUATION & RE-
SEARCH, supra note 136, at 8.
223. COOKSON ET AL., supra note 153, at 37. For-profit firms manage instructional
and administrative personnel more effectively by reconstituting their schools with
teachers and principals who buy into a particular model and who opt as a team to do
something differently. Beyond adequate funding, skilled onsite management, and
dedicated teachers, the entire school community-administrators, instructional, and
non-instructional staff-ought to share a common vision. Edison has ideally sought
complete control over the teachers and principals at its schools. It reasons that suc-
cessful schools rest on successful cultures, staffed by people with similar educational
philosophies. This approach works for Edison-run independent charter schools,
where the firm recruits its teachers. In a school (or schools) Edison manages for a
district (or a state authority), the firm generally operates with unionized teachers
under a collective bargaining agreement, modified in various areas, such as length of
the school day and year, compensation, and methods of evaluation. Typically, each
teacher is guaranteed employment in the district, but not necessarily in an Edison
school. If a teacher wants to stay at that school, she goes through an interview pro-
cess with Edison with the firm having the choice whether to offer a position at that
site. For teachers, the risks of participation are low. If they do not like the Edison
experience, they are guaranteed their seniority and position in the district. Chubb,
supra note 60, at 112.
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against these accountability criteria.224 Edison exerts its leadership
by holding principals accountable and replacing those who do not
meet its standards. 225
Overall, Edison schools are meeting their objectives. Despite
mixed or even negative test results at some Edison schools, gener-
ally the evidence supports Edison's assertions of a significant posi-
tive trend in academic achievement. Other beneficial elements
include the building of stronger relationship between parents and
teachers and an improved school environment.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
There is no dispute that America's public schools are failing, es-
pecially inner-city schools. What should be done to improve K-12
education, however, is widely debated.226 Teachers' unions and ad-
ministrators want to reward failure with additional funds for more
teachers, programs, and specialists, without a corresponding in-
crease in accountability. To a large degree, the public sector's solu-
tion has been to pump more money into schools, with few, if any,
results to show for the increased per pupil expenditures. Many
school districts, such as Philadelphia, are turning to new alterna-
tives in order to revitalize their education systems. Edison, the
forerunner in for-profit education, is sparking heated discussions in
communities considering alternatives to failing public schools.
Simply put, this debate revolves around a single question: should
we put our faith in market-based reforms, such as privatization, or
continue to look to K-12 education as a public sector monopoly?
After presenting various arguments, this Section concludes that the
introduction of EMOs, such as Edison, into the school marketplace
will impact education in a positive direction by promoting competi-
tion that ultimately will prove beneficial for students.
A. Arguments Against For-Profit K-12
Contrary to popular belief, business has a long history of in-
volvement in K-12 education. Profits have been made from the
sale of books, curricular materials, equipment, technology, and
testing programs. As private enterprises expand their operations
into direct involvement with the education of students by taking
over the management of K-12 schools, concern has arisen about
224. FORM 10-K/A, 10/2/02, supra note 57, at 8.
225. COOKSON ET AL., supra note 153, at 35, 37.
226. See, e.g., Symonds, supra note 103, at 66.
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the transformation of an institution seen as serving as the "public
good"-a civilizing, democratizing force which promotes social
harmony, equality and tolerance, and creates a sense of commu-
nity-into an institution that creates and reproduces the prevailing
capitalistic, consumer-oriented culture. In addition to this public
school ideology, opponents of EMOs maintain that parents will not
make sound educational decisions for their children and that for-
profit firms will be unresponsive to parents' and community
concerns.
First, opponents of privatization offer a nostalgic, rather idealis-
tic vision of the "public good," centered on the notion of a com-
mon democratic culture.227 As one commentator put it, "[t]o
deploy public funds away from public education and toward priva-
tized schemes is a betrayal of the democratic public interest....
The mission of public education is serving the social good, 228 and
the development of "social power and insight. ' 229 Others stated:
[p]ublic education is a social commitment that transcends indi-
vidual interest and corporate gain .... It means that, as a human
service, education is grounded in a belief in human dignity that
transcends the values and behaviors associated with markets. It
means public education cannot be squeezed to fit the market
model and still meet the needs of a just society.23°
Public education is viewed as a "public good"-one that invests
in young persons the hope that they will become knowledgeable,
productive, and civil adults, with a concern not only for themselves
or even for their society, but also for the welfare of the planet and
for posterity. Such education is best removed from the market-
place, which is necessarily bent on producing monetary profit over
a relatively brief period of time.231 In other words, public schools
227. See, e.g., CAROL ASHER ET AL., HARD LESSONS: PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND PRIVA-
TIZATION 9, 97 (1996). See generally ROBERT NEELLY BELLAH ET AL., THE GOOD
SOCIETY (1991) (outlining many of these "common good" arguments and the dismis-
sal of a consumer-oriented, competitive approach); MERLE CURTI, THE SOCIAL
IDEAS OF AMERICAN EDUCATORS (1935) (analyzing motivations and philosophies of
early American educators).
228. Daniel Tanner, Manufacturing Problems and Selling Solutions-How to Succeed
in the Education Business Without Really Educating, 82 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 188, 202
(2000).
229. Id. (quoting JOHN DEWEY, THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY 18 (1915)).
230. Heidi Steffens & Peter W. Cookson, Jr., Limitations of the Market Model,
EDUC. WK., Aug. 7, 2002, at 48, 51.
231. Howard Gardner, Paroxysms of Choice, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 19, 2000, at
44, 49; see Jonathan Kozol, Whittle and the Privateers: Corporate Raid on Education,
NATION, Sept. 21, 1992, at 272.
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promote cultural unity, while privatization, at least so the argument
runs, facilitates social fragmentation by undermining America's
shared civic culture, which is based on a common set of values,
basic knowledge, respect for the rule of law, and active participa-
tion in the democratic governance.
Critics of privatization fear a commercial culture will replace
civic values and democratic principles with the language of the
market replacing the language of democracy. Education would
then become less of a force for social improvement and more of a
source of shareholder benefit.232 This idealized conception con-
fuses the purpose of public education by overemphasizing the
"public"-socialization into America's civic culture-with "educa-
tion"-giving students the intellectual tools they need to be func-
tional, productive members of that society.
Privatization is also seen as an attempt to erode the strength of
public authority and the trust in government to address pressing
social concerns, such as the corrosive impact of poverty. Anti-
privatization advocates view the spread of EMOs as part of a wide-
spread effort to undermine the capacity of American "public insti-
tutions to carry out important social functions. 233
These notions of the public sphere-education as a force for pro-
gress and civic virtues-a common core culture that will raise the
capacity for citizenship and participation in society-encounter
several harsh realities. America's neighborhood schools are strati-
fied by race and income so that the demographics requisite to the
common school experience no longer exist. Public schools keep
the children of poor parents trapped in neighborhood inner-city
schools. These schools are unable to meet the challenge of provid-
ing inner-city students with a sound education, universally ac-
knowledged as the way to a better life. Many lack a mastery of the
basics (reading, writing, math, history, and science) as well as a
sense of punctuality and discipline. A need exists for K-12 schools
to effectively educate students in the academic basics, the solid
tried and true educational practices, while maintaining orderly
classrooms and enforcing socially acceptable codes of behavior. To
fill this void, enter for-profit (as well as an array of non-profit)
schools.
Opponents of privatization are suspicious of (and even hostile
to) anyone trying to make a profit from America's supposedly
232. See, e.g., Henry A. Giroux, Education Incorporated?, 56 EDUC. LEADERSHIP
12, 12 (1998).
233. Gardner, supra note 231, at 44.
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egalitarian K-12 education system. Those with this mindset find it
hard to accept shareholders seeking a return on their investment as
legitimate stakeholders in their children's education. For-profit
EMOs are seen as putting their bottom line ahead of solid educa-
tional practices, concerned more with making money for their
shareholders by cutting costs than attaining improvements in stu-
dents' reading and math skills. Education entrepreneurs will, at
least the argument goes, exploit children to maximize profits by
hiring inexpensive teachers, offering low quality cafeteria meals, ig-
noring special needs children, and using huckster-type advertising
to attract more revenues.234 In short, any savings extracted from
the current system should benefit students, not shareholders or
corporate executives.
There are two answers to these allegations. Student achieve-
ment and the ability of EMOs to make profits are linked. Chubb
has noted that the tension between generating profits for share-
holders and spending funds in schools "can be a healthy one. In a
number of critical ways, the pressure to make profits has forced...
[Edison] to improve the service it offers communities, not compro-
mise it."'235 The need to achieve equilibrium between the interests
of Edison's shareholders and its students is "a delicate balance
[Edison threads] every day .... ." Whittle has stated, "[w]e under-
stand that our number one concern should be that we run good
schools for kids. If we don't do that, we're not going to be in busi-
ness, and in many respects, that's the whole point of this, is that
kind of accountability makes us run good schools. '236
The most successful education management firms will enable
their students to learn the most at the lowest cost. Absent corrup-
tion or one-sided contracts, for-profit firms will (and must) be held
accountable by the school districts, charter boards, or other public
authorities that will not renew their contracts if they do not deliver
on their promises. Parents who select Edison's independent char-
ter schools operating outside local district control may, if dissatis-
234. See, e.g., Jonathan Kozol, Kids As Commodities: The Folly of For-Profit
Schools, 84 Bus. Soc'y REV. 16 (1993); Kozol, supra note 231, at 272. See generally
JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
(1991) (illustrating such practices); Phyllis Vine, To Market, To Market... The School
Business Sells Kids Short, NATION, Sept. 8, 1997, at 11 (describing political and busi-
ness motivations behind the Edison and charter school movements).
235. Chubb, supra note 105, at 113.
236. Christopher Whittle, Speech at National Press Club Luncheon (June 28, 2000);
see Interview with Christopher Whittle, 9 TECHNOS: Q. FOR EDUC. & TECH., Spring
2000, at 4.
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fled, remove their children from an Edison school. Other Edison
parents may also select other educational arrangements.237 In sum,
if for-profit firms cut costs to the detriment of quality, they will
ultimately lose customers, whereas, if they spend to increase qual-
ity, they may go out of business.
Public authorities, whether school reform commissions, school
districts, or charter boards, must focus on the contracting process
to harness competitive forces in the public interest.238 Public bod-
ies need to attract a reasonable number of bidders who are re-
quired to conform to a set of specifications. Contracts must set
rigorous obligations, including accounting for expenditures and
meeting measurable educational performance outcomes, both the
quantitative indicators (scores on standardized and customized
tests) and the qualitative factors (student and parent perceptions
about the school climate), with success rewarded and failure penal-
ized. Contracts also need to ensure that students receive a learning
experience beyond simply raising test scores (in other words, make
EMOs more than teach the test) and that those who need extra
attention to succeed receive costly instruction. Contracts must
contain termination provisions with costs and responsibilities
clearly delineated. For example, on termination what happens to
computers and other equipment an EMO has installed? Contracts
must require financial guarantees from EMOs. Public bodies must
be prepared to fire for-profit firms that fail to meet contractual
educational performance and other specified standards. Con-
versely, an agreement must allow an EMO to terminate a contract
if it does not receive the required payments or if the public body
fails to adhere to the firm's recommendations for personnel or
other contractual matters. Contracts must also contain termination
provisions with clearly delineated costs and responsibilities.
Second, critics of for-profit firms maintain that low-income, dis-
advantaged, uneducated parents are not capable of making sound
educational decisions, thereby jeopardizing their children's fu-
tures.2 39 They assert that many of these parents do not understand
school "quality," including issues such as teaching methods, curric-
ulum, and administrative policies. Thus, a number of parents might
237. Chubb, supra note 93, at 90, 96; see Whittle, supra note 236.
238. Max B. Sawicky et al., Implications for Policy, in CRAIG E. RICHARDS ET AL.,
RISKY BUSINESS: PRIVATE MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS 183-89 (1996). For an
overview of the contracting process between one school board and Edison, see Rob-
ert S. McCord, Edison Comes To Town, 188 AM. SCH. BOARD J. 24 (2001).
239. See, e.g., ASHER ET AL., supra note 227, at 15-16.
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fail to inform themselves about these criteria or base their deci-
sions on "incorrect" criteria, such as race or ethnic composition, or
other factors considered inappropriate by the education elite.
These critics, therefore, feel that educational choices must be left
to the experts, school administrators, and government agencies.
The empirical data, however, indicates that poor parents with
limited formal education do choose schools based on rational
grounds, such as teacher quality, school resources, and academic
achievement rates.24° Parents want "good' (i.e., soundly perform-
ing) schools for their children where they will acquire basic skills in
an environment emphasizing discipline, yet staffed by teachers sen-
sitive to their children's needs. In sum, parents do not need the
well-meaning help provided by school administrators and govern-
ment agencies in making sound educational decisions for their
children.
Third, critics assert that EMOs will not be responsive to parent
and community concerns. Elected or appointed public officials are
viewed as more sensitive to community needs than the white, face-
less, far-off executives of for-profit firms.241 Parents and politicians
also fear losing control over local schools. Privatization would, in
other words, threaten to diminish community or parental power
and reduce the community's role in directing the management and
operations of the school district.
Once again, reality conflicts with an idealistic vision. The num-
ber of public school districts in the United States has declined sig-
nificantly from more than 119,000 in 1937 to fewer than 15,000
today.242 As parents and community members grow more distant
from educational decision makers, whether local school boards or
(increasingly) state administrative bodies, the spiraling bureau-
cracy lessens the ability of parents to influence educational deci-
sions, basically rendering citizens powerless to affect school policy.
If parents are dissatisfied with their children's education, they must
"initiate a complex political dynamic (influence the school board,
affect the outcome of a local election, initiate a court battle)
against great odds to induce providers to change. ' 243 In contrast,
240. See, e.g., Valerie Martinez & Kay Thomas, Who Chooses and Why: A Look at
Five School Choice Plans, 75 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 678 (1994).
241. Farrell, Jr. et al. supra note 5, at 72.
242. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2000,
at 95 tbl. 87 (2001).
243. Herbert Gintis, The Political Economy of School Choice, 96 TCHRS. C. REC.
492, 509 (1995).
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the competitive delivery of education services may enable parents
to short-circuit the current, rather cumbersome process of change.
B. Arguments in Favor of Privatization
Forty years ago, Milton Friedman argued that public schools,
monopolistic, inefficient, and sluggish, were inherently incapable of
reforming themselves.244 Viewing a governmental monopoly in the
delivery of education as promoting waste, curtailing innovation,
and facilitating mediocre performance, stagnant in the form and
content of instruction, as well as indifferent to the needs of chil-
dren and parents, he called for opening K-12 education to market
forces. By enhancing efficiency and performance, competition
would elevate the overall level of educational quality in schools
and stimulate public schools to reform themselves or risk oblivion.
From a slightly different angle, public choice theorists also saw
the need for outside catalysts to bring about change. 24 5 They pre-
mised their conclusions on the assumption that the current system
primarily serves the needs of its bureaucrats, specifically, the edu-
cation establishment consisting of teachers' unions and school ad-
ministrators. With these bureaucracies having no incentive to
improve and being incapable of reforming themselves, only private
enterprise could achieve innovation. A market-oriented approach
would, unless sabotaged by rigid regulation, produce a much wider
range of alternatives. Furthermore, for-profit firms would be held
accountable by external standards (profitability) and would be far
more likely to be output (results-oriented) driven.
In a widely read, influential book, Politics, Markets and
America's Schools, 246 published in 1990, two social scientists,
Chubb and Terry M. Moe, called for the establishment of an educa-
tional marketplace where schools would compete for students.
Anticipating the charter school movement of the 1990s, they rec-
ommended a variety of loosely regulated, publicly-funded schools.
They also advocated allowing parents to use public funds to send
their children to private schools. Most importantly, they main-
244. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 85-107 (1962). Friedman ar-
gues that education could be delivered more efficiently through vouchers given to
parents as they would give schools incentive to develop better educational programs
and would involve parents as participants. Friedman also argues that socialization
goals would be attained to a greater extent, as schools would not be as segregated by
wealth (or race).
245. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN ET AL., TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-
SEEKING SOCIETY (1980).
246. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 58, at 189.
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tained that competition would undermine the public sector's bu-
reaucratic education monopoly, introducing innovation, increasing
quality, and reducing costs. The fiscal pain brought about by the
loss of students to charter schools and for-profit managers would
force public systems to quickly adapt to parents' needs. A cus-
tomer-driven educational system would weed out substandard
schools far more quickly than relying on change in the traditional
public system. In place of an educational system captured by pub-
lic sector bureaucracies, competition would create incentives for in-
novation, facilitate research and development, and give parents
real options while promoting effective teaching and learning, espe-
cially for inner-city students.
Increased competition in K-12 education has fostered innovation
in teaching and learning. For example, Edison has introduced in-
novative ideas and offers educational advantages for its students: a
longer school day and year, art or music every day, a foreign lan-
guage beginning in kindergarten, a computer for home use.247
These developments and others by Edison have led to the creation
of an alternative model for public school operations-a model that
has thus far demonstrated considerable success.
According to privatization proponents, competition will also
generate more research and development, thereby increasing inno-
vative and more effective learning tools for K-12 students. As
EMOs strive to offer the "best" education, they will invest more
money in research and development. Today, less than .03 percent
of our nation's public school expenditures is invested in K-12 edu-
cational research and development. 248 In contrast, some for-profit
firms spend one-hundred times that percentage amount.2 49 Fur-
thermore, beyond the dollars expended, most publicly funded K-12
research and development is currently undertaken by university-
based researchers with their own academic agendas. Relatively lit-
tle application (development) occurs to take this research into
practice.
In addition to research and development focused on the class-
room, for example, student achievement, curriculum, instruction,
technology, and assessment, for-profit firms will likely direct funds
to previously under-researched areas, such as school management
and organization systems (for example, asking whether teams with
247. See supra notes 138-148 and accompanying text.
248. John E. Chubb, The Private Can Be Public, EDuc. NEXT: J. OPINION & RES.
Spring 2001, at 7.
249. Id.
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senior teachers accountable for supervision and evaluation are
more effective than administrators who supervise and evaluate).
EMOs could also research compensation arrangements, including
the pros and cons of merit pay, school-wide performance bonuses
and increased pay for math and science teachers who are in short
supply but high demand.
Not all experts, however, see competition as promoting innova-
tion across the board.2 50 These dissenters see competition, specifi-
cally, the widespread management of K-12 schools by for-profit
firms, as facilitating innovation in organization, not in classroom
practice. These theorists, who move from the premise that eco-
nomic markets are producer-oriented, not consumer-oriented, per-
ceive standardizing tendencies resulting from competition and
consumer choice. Providers are seen as shaping consumer prefer-
ences through marketing campaigns. Furthermore, the choices of
parents as consumers may limit curricular options with innovation
being a low priority for many parents. Rather, most parents will
choose the school that produces the education they value, typically,
academic achievement and discipline. EMOs may limit experimen-
tation as well as research and development efforts in response to
what parents consider a real school characterized by orderly behav-
ior and high test scores as the uniform goals for students.
Beyond these theoretical arguments, pioneering empirical stud-
ies have concluded that competition increases public school pro-
ductivity.251 Assuming test scores serve as a reasonable measure of
education output, some argue that educational productivity rises if
parents have more choice among diverse educational options.
School choice can take the form of private schools (for-profit and
non-profit), charter schools, vouchers for private schools, and in
metropolitan areas with many school districts, parents moving to
another town within the same area. By comparing test scores in
areas with and without choice, these studies indicate that in areas
where there is competition, the public schools are more effective.
250. See CHRIS LUBIENSKI, NAT'L CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF PRIVATIZATION IN
EDUC., OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 26: THE RELATIONSHIP OF COMPETITION AND
CHOICE To INNOVATION IN EDUCATION MARKETS: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH ON
FOUR CASES 4-5 (2001); see COOKSON ET AL., supra note 153, at 42.
251. See, e.g., Caroline M. Hoxby, How School Choice Affects the Achievement in
Public School Students, in CHOICE WITH EQUITY, supra note 93; Caroline M. Hoxby,
Rising Tide, EDUC. NEXT: J. OPINION & RES., Winter 2001, at 68 (2001); see also
CAROLINE M. HOXBY, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, CONFERENCE ON THE
ECONOMICS OF SCHOOL CHOICE: SCHOOL CHOICE AND SCHOOL PRODUCTIVITY (OR
COULD SCHOOL CHOICE BE A TIDE THAT LIFTS ALL BOATS?), (2001) (on file with
author); Making Schools More Efficient, Bus. WK., May 20, 2002, at 28.
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Public schools facing the most severe competition raised student
test scores more than schools facing little or no competition. The
gains were particularly dramatic for African-American and Latino
students in these schools. Faced with competition, public schools
improved by focusing time and attention on students, unifying the
work of instructional personnel, and replacing teachers who would
not cooperate with the program.
What seems clear is that competition from EMOs, such as
Edison, has advanced the reform agenda within public school sys-
tems by shaking-up entrenched practices. It places pressure on
public schools to change, to raise curriculum standards, and to op-
erate more efficiently. A review of forty-one empirical studies test-
ing the impact of competition on a variety of outcomes, including
academic test scores, graduation/attainment, expenditures/effi-
ciency, and teacher quality, concluded that a sizable majority of the
studies report beneficial effects of competition across all
outcomes.252
Competition opens the opportunity for reformers within the
public school system to introduce (or at least, gain a hearing) for
new approaches and programs.253 Competition will help convince
local politicians and school administrators that an alternative way
of addressing perceived problems exists. Public officials will be
challenged to explore (and hopefully implement) educational mod-
els that may not require massive new funding, but yet have the
potential to invigorate stagnant public education systems.
With more diverse schools and a multiplicity of potential schools
to teach at, competition enables teachers to choose where and how
they want to teach. Privatization will help introduce new school
managers and teaching methods into the education marketplace.
With these options, instructors will be able to pick and choose
which program best matches their teaching styles, thereby promot-
ing greater job satisfaction, and, ideally, resulting in greater enthu-
siasm and enhanced classroom performance. Although some
teachers do not want to work longer hours and more days, describ-
ing the Edison approach as "discouraging and overwhelming,
254
252. CLIVE R. BELFIELD & HENRY M. LEVIN, THE EFFECTS OF COMPETITION ON
U.S. EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES: A REVIEW OF U.S. EVIDENCE (2002).
253. See, e.g., Matthew Miller, Why Not Give Edison Schools a Chance?, SAN DI-
EGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 1, 2002, at B6 (noting the statement of West Covina, Califor-
nia, Superintendent of Schools Steve Fish that Edison's example "has moved my
reform agenda ahead four or five years here."); see Snyder, supra note 200, at Al.
254. Miller, supra note 215, at 11-113, 147-48, 157, 161-62.
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talented teachers will receive more freedom, greater professional-
ism, and higher compensation. 5
Competition will offer low income, inner-city families the same
opportunities afforded to the middle class suburbanites. Edison
has been criticized for profiteering from poor students. As one
commentator wrote, "[a]t bottom, what's most questionable about
Edison-and what the critics most dislike-is simply the idea that
somebody is trying to turn public education into a profit-making
enterprise and that it tries to do that primarily on the backs of the
poorest and neediest kids." '256
Most students enrolled in Edison schools are children of color
from low-income families. Over eighty percent of Edison's stu-
dents, nationwide, are from minority groups, with sixty-four per-
cent of its students being African-American and seventeen percent
being Latino. Seventy percent of the students at the average
Edison school receive free or reduced cost lunches, a proxy roughly
corresponding to some degree of poverty.257
All of Edison's schools offer the same educational benefits. Par-
ents appear happy with the fact that Edison improves the learning
environment by increasing academic standards, raising test scores,
and improving discipline and security at its schools. 25 8 It also in-
troduces technology into poor communities, offering parents home
computers training and internet access. 259 Edison schools also
work with communities offering programs that match neighbor-
hood needs. Therefore, children are not only getting more atten-
tion and better services that level the playing field but parents and
the community at large are also enhanced by the introduction of
Edison schools.
The quest to provide low-income, minority families with the op-
portunity to send their children to effective schools where they can
attain at least a basic education encounters two major obstacles-a
child's home and her community and peers.2 a° Some parents do
255. ERIC A. HANUSHEK & STEVEN G. RIVKING, DOES SCHOOL COMPETITION AF-
FECt TEACHER QUALITY? (2001) (on file with author); Caroline M. Hoxby, Changing
the Profession, EDUc. NEXT 57 (2001); Caroline M. Hoxby, Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Would School Choice Change the Teaching Profession? (2000) (unpub-
lished Working Paper 7866).
256. Schrag, supra note 35, at 23.
257. Chubb, supra note 93, at 92.
258. See supra notes 200-208 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 148, 206 and accompanying text.
260. See, e.g., Paul D. Houston, Making Watches or Making Music, 76 PHI DELTA
KAPPAN 133, 134 (1994); Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, America's Next
Achievement Test, 9 AM. PROsPECT 47 (1998); James Traub, What No School Can Do,
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not exert much effort to advance their children's educational at-
tainment. Where parents have little or no post-high school educa-
tion, their homes are often devoid of cultural advantages gained by
an emphasis on the importance of education in a child's life. When
parents never read to their children, books do not gain much re-
spect. A lack of interest in educational achievement on the part of
parents filters down to their children who find their natural curios-
ity squashed. Children spend the vast majority of time (perhaps as
much as ninety percent) from birth to age eighteen outside of
school, and only about ten percent in school. 261 The difficulties stu-
dents bring to school have a significant impact on their education.
These difficulties, ranging from broken homes to drugs, family de-
composition, crime, chaotic neighborhoods, and tawdry values pro-
moted by entertainment, are hard to overcome. It is difficult for
any type of education reforms to overcome the ways parents raise
their children and these pervasive, corrosive social forces.
CONCLUSION
For-profit education, on its face, may seem contradictory. All
jurisdictions in the United States provide children with a free, uni-
versal twelve-year education. For some, a for-profit corporation
offering K-12 education seems like an inherently bad concept.
Ironically, Edison's for-profit educational model has not produced
a profit, yet it has improved education. Despite incurring losses
every year since it began managing schools in 1995, Edison has in-
creased students' standardized test scores, offered more opportuni-
ties for parents to get involved, and improved teacher morale. To
their credit, Whittle, Schmidt, and Chubb have revolutionized K-12
education through the Edison Model.
Edison's successes have the public school establishment-the
teachers' unions and administrators-worried. They oppose the
large-scale reformation of K-12 education necessary to induce
competition into a moribund system, and are particularly hostile to
methods of doing so that are embedded with a profit motive. Be-
yond philosophic and policy arguments supporting education as a
public function, their self-interest is blatant. They have a direct fi-
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2000, § 6 (magazine), at 52; see also Brent Staples, Fighting the
Culture of Poverty in a Worst-Case School, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2002, at A20 (summa-
rizing the harsh reality Edison met in taking over nine out of ten Chester Upland,
Pennsylvania schools, and in particular the Chester High School).
261. George F. Will, Broken Families and School Performance, WASH. POST, Jan. 6,
2002, at B7.
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nancial stake in continuance of the public school monopoly that
pays money for showing up and rewards seniority, rather than
achievement by students or teachers. Blind attachment to the pub-
lic sector as the solution for the ills afflicting America's K-12 edu-
cation system reflects an elitist, anti-business, pro-government bias,
and a misguided devotion to traditional ways of doing things.
In the future, public sentiment may shift in a more pragmatic,
less ideological direction-to a greater focus on what works, not
the source of the solution. The U.S. may open itself to market-
oriented educational reforms. As public schools continue to fail
our youth, privatization may help chart a new course for America's
public schools and offer hope for inner-city youth. The system can
change through the use of market forces coupled with rigorous,
contractual standards of accountability and greater parental in-
volvement. The coming decades may witness an economic and so-
cial transformation potentially impacting millions of lives.
FROM EQUITY TO ADEQUACY:
THE LEGAL BATTLE FOR INCREASED STATE
FUNDING OF POOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS
IN NEW YORK
Brian J. Nickerson*
and Gerard M. Deenihan**
INTRODUCTION
Lawsuits challenging New York State's public elementary and
secondary school funding formulas have followed, in several re-
spects, the school finance litigation trends in other state and federal
courts. The most notable linkage lies with New York plaintiffs' in-
corporation of doctrinal developments from successful litigation at-
tacking public school funding systems in other states. As this
Article demonstrates, the first New York school finance case,
Board of Education, Levittown Union Free District v. Nyquist1
("Levittown") commenced after victorious public school funding
cases in California, Serrano v. Priest,2 and New Jersey, Robinson v.
Cahill.3
The Serrano and Robinson cases provided a useful litigation
blueprint for raising legal challenges to state public elementary and
secondary school funding systems based largely upon "equity"
principles and arguments.4 Equity-based challenges in school fi-
nance litigation rely primarily upon state constitutional equality or
equal protection provisions.5 The most typical equity argument
raised by plaintiffs is that a state public school funding system,
* Director, The Edwin G. Michaelian Institute for Public Policy and Manage-
ment; Associate Professor of Political Science and Public Administration, Dyson Col-
lege of Arts and Sciences, Pace University; J.D., Pace University; Ph.D., Suny-
Albany.
** Research Associate, The Edwin G. Michaelian Institute of Public Policy and
Management, Pace University; J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law,
2003; M.A., Fordham University, 2001.
1. See generally 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982).
2. 487 P.2d 1241, 1266 (Cal. 1971).
3. 303 A.2d 273, 298 (N.J. 1973).
4. See Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1252 (discussing plaintiff's argument "that there is a
correlation between a district's per pupil assessed valuation and the wealth of its re-
sidents"); see also Robinson, 303 A.2d at 291-93 (discussing state statutes' creation of
an equitable school system).
5. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1249-55; Robinson, 303 A.2d at 288-98.
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which relies largely upon local property taxes, is inherently unfair
or impermissibly disadvantages poorer school districts.6 Plaintiffs
also frequently point to specific provisions within state financing
practices benefiting wealthier public school districts at the expense
of allocating more funds to poorer districts.7
Although the Levittown litigation was eventually unsuccessful,8
in 1989, school finance reform advocates and interest groups were
encouraged by three successful cases in Montana, 9 Kentucky, 10 and
Texas.11 These cases provided a related, but newer, legal argument
revolving around a theory of "adequacy" to challenge state public
elementary and secondary school finance practices. 2 Adequacy-
based challenges revolve around the interpretation of education ar-
ticles or guarantees found in respective state constitutions whereby
plaintiffs argue that children in poorer school districts are deprived
of a legally "adequate" level of education. 13 Plaintiffs frequently
cite numerous inadequacies in education services, such as school
facilities, lack of textbooks and qualified teachers, inferior com-
puters, etc., to bolster claims that a state fails to meet its burden of
providing an adequate public education to all school children in a
given state.14 Consequently, plaintiffs commonly assert that more
state funding needs to be diverted to poorer school districts to ad-
dress any inadequacy. 5
Both the development in the 1989 cases and the New York Court
of Appeals' recognition in Levittown that they could entertain fu-
ture claims of a "gross and glaring inadequacy" in public education
currently provides New York education finance reform groups with
a new angle from which to challenge the state's public school fund-
ing formulas.' 6
6. See, e.g., Robinson, 303 A.2d at 293 (discussing New Jersey's school system).
7. Professional educators often refer to this as an "input" problem whereby
money is considered one of the key input variables resulting in improved educational
services or "outputs" within a school district. Id. at 277.
8. Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369-70 (N.Y. 1982).
9. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 685 (Mont. 1989).
10. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215-16 (Ky. 1989).
11. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 498-99 (Tex. 1991).
12. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 219; Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1, 769 P.2d at 690;
Kirby, 804 S.W.2d at 496-97.
13. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 190-96; Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1, 769 P.2d at
688-90; Kirby, 804 S.W.2d at 495-98.
14. See, e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 198 (discussing the disparity between school dis-
tricts in poor and affluent neighborhoods).
15. See, e.g., Kirby, 804 S.W.2d at 496-97 (stating that inequality will be solved
only by diverting more funds to poor school districts).
16. Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369 (N.Y. 1982).
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Part I of this Article evaluates the influence of federal courts'
school finance cases on the New York school finance groups' deci-
sion to litigate in the New York courts. Particular attention is paid
to the holding, rationale, judgment, and legal claims of interest
groups in relevant school finance cases decided by the United
States District Court and the United States Supreme Court in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,17 which effec-
tively closed the federal courts' door to school finance claims.
Part II analyzes the importance of other states' legal precedents
in school finance cases as a factor influencing interest groups in
New York to challenge the state's public education funding
formulas.
Part III discusses in detail the progression of public elementary
and secondary school funding formula litigation in New York, be-
ginning with Levittown, up to the most recent case, Campaign for
Fiscal Equities, Inc. v. State of New York.1 8 The discussion focuses
on the legal arguments raised by various interest group-plaintiffs
and traces the development of those arguments to school finance
cases in other states. Finally, the conclusion highlights the poten-
tial course of school finance reform in New York State.
I. FEDERAL SCHOOL FINANCE CASES
The equity ideas upon which the first public school finance cases
relied upon begins in some respects with the decision handed down
by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.19 During the 1950s, "Jim Crow segregation" laws discrimi-
nated against African-Americans in places of public
accommodation, including public schools. 20 During the early
1950s, a number of African-American students in Delaware, Kan-
sas, South Carolina, and Virginia, through their legal representa-
tives-the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
Persons ("NAACP")-filed suit in order to racially integrate pub-
lic schools using the argument that segregated schools violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. 21 A
three-judge panel of the United States District Court denied the
relief sought by the plaintiffs, relying on the "separate but equal"
17. 411 U.S. 1, 24-28 (1973).
18. 655 N.E.2d 661, 663-64 (N.Y. 1995) (arguing that the state's public school fi-
nancing system was unconstitutional).
19. 347 U.S. 483, 496 (1954).
20. Id. at 487.
21. Id. at 486.
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doctrine established in 1896 by the Supreme Court in Plessy v.
Ferguson.22
All four state cases made their way to the United States Su-
preme Court and were heard together.2 3 In delivering the unani-
mous opinion of the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Earl Warren began by recognizing both the importance of public
education to society and trial evidence demonstrating inequality in
facilities, curricula, and salaries of teachers between African-
American schools and white schools.2 4 The Court determined that
segregation of public schools based upon racial classifications vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause. It is generally understood that
Brown served as a catalyst for many civil rights cases, including
education reform litigation involving school finance in state and
federal judiciaries.
In the summer of 1968, Demitro Rodriguez and a group of other
Mexican-American parents-whose children attended elementary
and secondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School Dis-
trict (an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas)-filed a law-
suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas against the Board of Education, the Commissioner of Educa-
tion, the Attorney General of Texas, the Bexar County Board of
Trustees, and seven local school districts in the San Antonio metro-
politan area.26 At trial, a great deal of evidence was introduced
surrounding the Texas system of school finance, the foundation of
which was traced back to the late nineteenth century.27
The Texas Constitution provides for the establishment of a sys-
tem of free schools.2 8 The constitution was amended in 1883 to
empower local school districts to levy ad valorem real property
taxes with the consent of local taxpayers for the maintenance of the
free system of public schools.2 9 Locally raised funds were supple-
mented by revenue from the Available School Fund, a state-run
program funded through a state ad valorem property tax and other
state taxes. 30 The Texas legislature responded in 1947 to growing
disparities in the value of assessable property between local dis-
22. 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896).
23. Brown, 347 U.S. at 486-89.
24. Id. at 493-94.
25. Id. at 495.
26. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973).
27. Id. at 6-14.
28. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
29. Id. art. VII, § 3; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 6-7.
30. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 7.
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tricts. 31 They appointed an eighteen-member committee composed
of legislators and educators, to explore alternative systems used in
other states and to propose a funding scheme guaranteeing mini-
mum educational services to each child in Texas that would over-
come interdistrict disparities in taxable resources.32 The efforts of
the committee resulted in the enactment of the Gilmer-Aikin bills
establishing the Texas Minimum Foundations School Program,33
which was the system challenged by the plaintiffs in Rodriguez.34
The Texas program provided for local and state contributions to
a fund earmarked for teacher salaries, operating expenses, and
transportation costs. 35 The State, which supplied funds from its
general revenue, financed approximately eighty percent of the pro-
gram's cost, while the local school districts, acting as a single unit,
financed the remaining twenty percent.36 The latter's share, re-
ferred to as the Local Fund Assignment, was apportioned among
the school districts under a complex formula designed to reflect the
relative local real property taxpaying ability of each district.37
The plaintiffs challenged this system on the ground that it vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion by discriminating against school children residing in poorer
districts, while favoring those residing in more affluent districts.38
At trial, the petitioners compared their neighborhood, the
Edgewood Independent School District (one of the poorest in the
San Antonio area), with the Alamo Heights Independent School
District (one of the most affluent in that area).39
Approximately 22,000 students, of which ninety percent were
Mexican-American, were enrolled in twenty-five elementary and
secondary schools within Edgewood Independent School District
at the time of the trial.40 The average assessed property value per
pupil was $5,960 and the median family income was $4,686.41 As a
result, Edgewood district taxpayers contributed only twenty-six
dollars per pupil for the 1967-68 school year.42
31. Id. at 9.
32. Id.
33. S. 115-117, 1949 Leg., 50th Sess. (Tex. 1949).
34. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 9.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 10.
38. Id. at 69.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 11-12.
41. Id. at 12.
42. Id.
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On the other hand, approximately 5,000 students, who were pri-
marily white, attended the six elementary and secondary schools
within Alamo Heights Independent School District.4 3 Only ap-
proximately eighteen percent of the student population was of
Mexican-American descent. 4 The average assessed property value
per pupil at that time exceeded $49,000 and the median family in-
come was approximately $8,001. 45 As a result, the district contrib-
uted $333 to the education of each child for the 1967-68 school
year, which was $307 more than the Edgewood District.46
The plaintiffs relied upon an affidavit submitted by Professor
Joel S. Berke of Syracuse University's Educational Finance Policy
Institute; Professor Berke is a well-known advocate of school fi-
nance reform.47 His affidavit was based upon a survey of ten per-
cent of the school districts in Texas and it demonstrated: 1) that a
positive correlation existed between the wealth of school districts,
measured in terms of their assessable real property wealth per pu-
pil, and their levels of education expenditures per pupil; and 2) that
a positive correlation existed between the wealth of each district
and the personal wealth of its residents.48
In December 1971, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas rendered its judgment in a per curiam
opinion using a standard of strict scrutiny to judge the Texas school
funding system.49 The court found that personal wealth represents
a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution, and furthermore, that education is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the United States Constitution. °
Consequently, the court determined, in light of the evidence sub-
mitted at trial, that the Texas school finance system operated to the
disadvantage of school children residing in poorer districts and in-
terfered with the exercise of the fundamental right to receive an
education.5'
After the court rendered its judgment, the State of Texas ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court, which issued a writ of
43. Id. at 12-13.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 13.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 25.
48. Id. at 26.
49. Id. at 6.
50. Id. at 18.
51. Id.
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certiorari and heard oral arguments on October 12, 1972.52 It
should be noted that the Attorney General and other public offi-
cials from a number of other states filed amicus curiae briefs be-
cause they feared the prospects of similar lawsuits in their own
states, and urged the Supreme Court to reverse the decision of the
lower court.53 Several interest groups-the American Civil Liber-
ties Union ("ACLU"), the NAACP Legal Defense and Education
Fund, and the National Education Association-filed amicus cu-
riae briefs urging the Supreme Court to affirm the decision of the
district court.54
The Supreme Court on March 21, 1973, in an opinion by Justice
Lewis Powell, held that it was not a proper case in which to ex-
amine a state's laws under standards of strict scrutiny because the
plaintiffs had not shown that the Texas system discriminated
against any definable class of "poor" people and, thus, was not
shown to discriminate against any suspect classification. Addi-
tionally, the Court found that the Texas system did not interfere
with the exercise of any fundamental right protected by the United
States Constitution, because education does not represent such a
right and the case involved the issues of local taxation, fiscal plan-
ning, education policy, and federalism; issues beyond the Court's
proper scope of authority. 6 Consequently, the Court used the less
stringent standard of deferential scrutiny in judging whether the
Texas school funding system constitutional.57
With respect to the assertion that the Texas system discriminated
against some "suspect classification," the Supreme Court noted
that this case contained "no definitive description of the classifying
facts or delineation of the disfavored class."58 The Supreme Court
reasoned that only those whose income falls below the poverty
level might constitute a suspect classification.59 Since the plaintiffs,
however, made no effort to demonstrate that the Texas system op-
erated to the peculiar disadvantage of any class fairly definable as
indigent or as composed of persons whose incomes were beneath
any designated poverty level, the Court could not find the exis-
52. Id. at 1.
53. Id. at 3.
54. Id. at 5.
55. Id. at 2.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 19.
59. Id. at 19-20.
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tence of a suspect class.6" Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate that a "lack of personal resources had occasioned an
absolute deprivation of the desired benefit," i.e., education.61
In considering the plaintiffs' fundamental right argument, the
Court noted its belief, as previously articulated in its decision in
Brown, that education represents one of the most important ser-
vices provided by the various states.62 The Court added that the
importance of a service provided by the various states does not
determine whether it represents a fundamental right protected by
the United States Constitution, and at no time had the Court rec-
ognized education as such a right.63 Consequently, the Court
opined that it could not be said that the Texas system of school
finance interfered with the exercise of a "fundamental right" guar-
anteed by the United States Constitution.64
Finally, the Court concluded that the case represented "a direct
attack on the [manner] in which Texas [chose] to raise and disburse
state and local tax revenues. ' 65 The Court believed that it was
"asked to condemn the State's judgment in conferring on [its] po-
litical subdivisions the power to tax local property to supply reve-
nue for local interests. '66 This political question represents an area
in which the Court has traditionally deferred to states' legisla-
tures. 67 Therefore, the Supreme Court determined that the Rodri-
guez case did not represent a proper case in which to strictly
scrutinize a state's laws.68
Hence, the Court utilized the standard of deferential scrutiny in
its examination of the constitutionality of the system established
under the Texas Minimum Foundations School Program.69 Under
this standard, the Texas system bore a rational relation to two in-
terrelated "legitimate governmental interests": 1) ensure a basic
education for every child in Texas; and 2) permit and encourage a
large measure of local voter participation in and control over each
district's schools. 0 The Supreme Court reversed the decision of
60. Id. at 25.
61. Id. at 23.
62. Id. at 29 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
63. Id. at 35.
64. Id. at 37.
65. Id. at 40.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 44.
69. See id. at 41-44 (refusing to apply strict judicial scrutiny because these were
matters that the legislature was more familiar with).
70. Id. at 49.
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the district court and determined the system established under the
Texas Minimum Foundations School Program was constitutional.71
The Rodriguez decision closed the federal courts to school fi-
nance challenges based upon the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution and, consequently, shifted the public
school finance litigation's emphasis to state government.72 School
finance equity advocates who wished to litigate had to turn their
efforts to state courts and use equal protection provisions or educa-
tion clauses of state constitutions.
In stressing the influence of federal school finance litigation on
New York cases, Daniel P. Levitt, lead counsel of the Levittown
and Reform Education Finance Inequities Today ("REFIT") coali-
tions in New York's education funding cases, emphasized that the
groups studied the progression of the Rodriguez, Serrano, and
Robinson cases because they were seen as seminal test cases for
school finance litigation.73 Levitt stated:
the idea for commencing the Levittown litigation actually began
in an advanced seminar on constitutional litigation at Columbia
Law School in 1974 whereby the class drafted model pleadings
for a school finance case as an academic exercise. The Rodri-
guez decision had come down a year earlier and we [the class]
were well aware of the procedural and doctrinal implications for
future school finance litigation.74
The Campaign for Fiscal Equities ("CFE") coalition also
stressed that their decision to commence a public school finance
suit in New York State court was due to the unfavorable (to school
finance reformers) decision rendered in Rodriquez as well as suc-
cessful state cases in Montana, Kentucky, and Texas.75 Jessica Gar-
cia of CFE noted "we view the federal courts as mostly closed to
substantive school finance claims, but we include a federal claim
71. Id. at 55.
72. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT EDUCATION CASES 248-59 (Steve McEllis-
trem ed., 10th ed. 2002). The United States Supreme Court, however, still decides
cases affecting public schooling, such as ones involving school prayer and free speech.
E.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001) (discussing
whether a denial of the use of school grounds for after school use was a free speech
violation); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294-95 (2000) (discussing
whether student led prayers prior to football games are a violation of the Establish-
ment Clause).
73. Interview with Daniel P. Levitt, Lead Counsel, Levittown Coalition, in Scar-
sdale, N.Y. (June 27, 2001) (emphasis added).
74. Id.
75. Telephone interview with Jessica Garcia, Outreach Coordinator, Campaign for
Fiscal Equity, Inc. (June 25, 2001).
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under Title VI to preserve a federal right of appeal in the event of
an unfavorable decision by the New York Court of Appeals."76
Thus, the Levittown and Campaign for Fiscal Equities77 litigations
in New York have been directly influenced by the Supreme Court
decision in Rodriquez.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL DOCTRINE IN STATE
SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION
This Part analyzes legal precedents established in key school fi-
nance cases in California, New Jersey, Montana, Kentucky, and
Texas. These cases/states are chosen because the California and
New Jersey litigants were the first to use equity-based legal claims
successfully, while the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas litigants
were the first to use adequacy-based legal claims successfully.7 8
Analysis of these cases is followed by a detailed evaluation of
school finance cases in New York.
Legal challenges to public school finance systems have been an
active area of state court litigation since 1971, when plaintiffs suc-
cessfully challenged California's public school funding system in
Serrano v. Priest.79 The litigants, a group of parents of school chil-
dren in the Baldwin Park school district in Los Angeles County,
claimed that the state aid portion of the local property tax-based
school finance system violated the United States Constitution's
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and the Califor-
nia State Constitution's provision requiring that "all laws of a gen-
eral nature have uniform operation."80 The parents submitted
evidence demonstrating that, despite paying a tax rate less than
one-half of that of Baldwin Park, Beverly Hills residents were able
to spend twice as many dollars per student as were the residents of
Baldwin Park and, consequently, Beverly Hills schools provided a
superior education.81
The California Supreme Court held that education is a funda-
mental right 82 and that children residing in California's poorer dis-
tricts represented a "suspect" class under the Equal Protection
Clause.83 The court agreed with the plaintiffs' position by conclud-
76. Id.
77. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995).
78. Telephone interview with Jessica Garcia, supra note 75.
79. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1266 (Cal. 1971).
80. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 16.
81. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1248.
82. Id. at 1258.
83. Id. at 1250-52.
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ing that the State's reliance on local property taxes to fund public
education produced significant per-pupil expenditure disparities
between school districts and resulted in real property wealth as the
primary determinant of the quality of a child's education. 84 Conse-
quently, the court applied a standard of "strict judicial scrutiny"
requiring the state to demonstrate that the funding system fur-
thered a compelling governmental interest; because the court
found no such interest, however, it declared the California school
funding system unconstitutional. s5
School finance reform advocates in other states understandably
were optimistic about the possibility of achieving funding policy
changes through equity-based litigation after the Serrano decision,
and filed at least thirty similar equal protection based claims
against public education funding systems in various state trial
courts in the subsequent eighteen months.86 The Serrano plaintiffs'
success also fueled the attempt by reformers to use the United
States Supreme Court to challenge the Texas public school funding
system in the Rodriguez case.
The highest courts in most states have heard and decided an im-
portant school finance case since the Serrano decision, including
Robinson v. Cahill87 in New Jersey, decided approximately two
weeks after Rodriguez in 1971.88 The cities of Jersey City, Patter-
son, Plainfield, and East Orange challenged the constitutionality of
the state's school funding system, which permitted wide variations
in per-pupil expenditures from district to district.8 9
The Robinson plaintiffs alleged that wealth-based disparities de-
prived city students of a "thorough and efficient" education in vio-
lation of the New Jersey Constitution that required the state
legislature to "provide for the maintenance and support of a thor-
ough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction
of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eigh-
84. Id. at 1263.
85. Id.
86. William Evans et al., Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses after Ser-
rano, 16 J. PoL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 10, 11 (1997).
87. 303 A.2d 273, 295-98 (N.J. 1973) (holding that New Jersey's existing system of
financing schools was unconstitutional).
88. Evans et al., supra note 86, at 11; Douglas Reed, Twenty-Five Years After Rod-
riguez: School Finance Litigation and the Impact of the New Judicial Federalism, 32
LAW & Soc. REV. 176, 176-77 (1998). By 1999, thirty-six state high courts have ren-
dered a decision in a school finance case and at least forty-three states have rendered
some decision in the lower courts. Evans et al., supra note 86, at 11; Reed, supra, at
176-77.
89. Robinson, 303 A.2d at 276.
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teen."9 The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the state fund-
ing system was unconstitutional. 91 It interpreted the wide
disparities in per-pupil expenditures as violating the state constitu-
tional based-requirement that all students be provided equal edu-
cational opportunity, which the court viewed as critical to the
effective preparation of children for citizenship and for the
workforce.92 The Robinson decision restored equity proponents'
optimism that state court litigation could mandate public school fi-
nance reform.93
This renewed optimism was also apparent in New York State
when the Levittown School District and twenty-six other school
districts spending less than the state average on public education
challenged the state funding system as unconstitutional. 94 The Lev-
ittown plaintiffs adopted the arguments of the Serrano litigants,
claiming that the New York State system impermissibly allowed
school expenditures to vary with property wealth, which, in turn,
affected the educational opportunity available to students.95 Even
though the New York Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs' eq-
uity arguments, reform advocates continued to use the New York
courts to challenge the state funding system.96
The general state trend in school funding litigation after Serrano
and Robinson and prior to 1989 primarily focused on the use of
state constitutional guarantees of equality to challenge school
funding practices. 97 Plaintiffs mostly used equity-based arguments
by claiming that state financing systems, relying heavily upon reve-
nues from local property taxes, discriminated against students in
low-wealth property districts because of the relatively lower values
of taxable property per student. 98 State courts, however, consist-
ently required a clear showing by plaintiffs that either a use of
wealth classifications for the distribution of state educational funds
90. Id. at 285; see N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
91. Robinson, 303 A.2d at 295.
92. Id. at 294 (quoting Landis v. Ashworth, 31 A. 1017 (N.J. 1895)).
93. A comprehensive assessment of the Robinson case and its impact is provided
by RICHARD LEHNE, THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL FINANCE
REFORM 165-73 (1978).
94. Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 361-63 (N.Y. 1982).
95. Id. at 361-62.
96. Id. at 366.
97. William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and
Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. &
EDUC. 219, 222-32 (1990).
98. Id.; see Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and
the Demise of School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Alterna-
tive Explanation, 32 GA. L. REV. 543, 572-77 (1998).
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automatically was discriminatory and, therefore, more deserving of
heightened judicially scrutiny, or that the finance system in ques-
tion was not reasonably related to a legitimate state function.99
The state court equity-based cases after Robinson had mixed re-
sults for plaintiffs because of the substantial evidentiary burden of
proving government sponsored educational discrimination and the
difficulty in establishing a precise standard defining legal equity.
A new trend in state court school finance litigation emerged af-
ter 1989 and was led by important state court decisions in Mon-
tana, Kentucky, and Texas. 10 The Montana State Supreme Court,
in Helena Elementary School District No. 1 v. State of Montana,
adjudicated a class-action lawsuit challenging the constitutionality
of the Montana system of school finance. 1°' During the 1985-88
school year, Montana used a foundation system to fund local
schools whereby the State provided funds for basic operations.
10 2
Most local school districts, however, had budgets that exceeded the
funds provided under the state foundation system and thus, were
forced to generate supplemental revenue through local real prop-
erty taxation. 03 Since many property-poor local school districts
were unable to generate a sufficient amount of supplemental reve-
nue, they allegedly were unable to provide their students with an
adequate education mandated by the Montana Constitution.1
0 4
The Montana Supreme Court, on February 1, 1989, relying upon
the Education Clause of the Montana Constitution, delivered its
unanimous opinion that "equality of educational opportunity is
guaranteed to each person of the state."'1 5 The court subsequently
ruled that the State's foundation system failed to provide sufficient
funds to achieve even a minimal level of quality, and that it had
failed to provide a system of public education where each student
could enjoy the equal educational opportunity guaranteed under
the Education Clause of the Montana Constitution.1
0 6
The Kentucky Supreme Court, in Rose v. Council For Better Ed-
ucation Inc., heard a similar class action lawsuit challenging the
99. Id. at 574-76.
100. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215-16 (Ky. 1989); He-
lena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 685 (Mont. 1989); Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 498-99 (Tex. 1991).
101. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1, 769 P.2d at 685.
102. Id. at 686.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 687-89.
105. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(1).
106. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1, 769 P.2d at 690.
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constitutionality of the school finance system that used a combina-
tion of state funds, federal funds, and district revenue generated
through local real property taxation to satisfy the mandate of the
Kentucky Constitution."°7 On June 8, 1989, the Kentucky Supreme
Court held that all Kentucky school children have the right to an
adequate education under the Kentucky Constitution. 0 8 The court
found that Kentucky's school finance system violated the state con-
stitutional right of children residing within many property-poor lo-
cal school districts because they were not receiving an education of
adequate quality, especially compared to the education provided
by wealthier districts.' 0 9
The Texas Supreme Court, in Edgewood Independent School
District v. Kirby, also heard a similar class action lawsuit. 110 By the
mid-1980s, there existed an even larger real property wealth gap
between certain districts than during the Rodriguez litigation."'
On October 2, 1989, the Supreme Court of Texas ruled that the
Education Clause of the Texas Constitution mandates that the
Texas State Legislature provide an "efficient" system of free public
schools and that the legislature had failed to meet this
obligation112
These state cases are important because the plaintiffs success-
fully raised questions as to whether the respective state was "ade-
quately" fulfilling its obligation under the education provisions of
its constitution, rather than using equality arguments as the plain-
tiffs did in the Serrano and Robinson cases.1 1 3 This adequacy-
based argument focuses on the quality of education, in contrast to
the equality of funding, provided to children in poor districts and
can be used to demonstrate that inadequate educational services
violate a state's constitutional obligation to provide for a basic or
sound education to its citizens. 4 It also incorporates an attack on
state funding systems relying heavily upon local property tax-based
107. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Ky. 1989). The
constitutional mandate was that the Kentucky General Assembly shall "provide an
efficient system of common schools throughout the state." Id.
108. Id. at 206, 212.
109. Id. at 215.
110. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. 1991).
111. Compare id. at 496, with San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 74-75 (1973).
112. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; Kirby, 804 S.W.2d at 498.
113. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215-16; Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769
P.2d 684, 685-86 (Mont. 1989); Kirby, 804 S.W.2d at 498-99.
114. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215-16; Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1, 769 P.2d at
690; Kirby, 804 S.W.2d at 498-99.
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financing primarily because plaintiffs have been able to establish
that states do not provide poor districts with proper levels of fund-
ing to achieve an adequate level or quality of education.115 In a
sense, the adequacy argument focuses on the outcomes of allegedly
inequitable funding of education as opposed to exclusively arguing
that the funding, per se, is inequitable.1 16 The adequacy argument
also avoids plaintiff groups' reliance on the federal equal protec-
tion doctrine, avoiding the difficulty and courts' apparent reluc-
tance to precisely define equity.117
Most state court litigation throughout the 1990s has been shifting
away from equity-based legal doctrine to an adequacy-based legal
doctrine because of the plaintiffs' successes in Kentucky, Montana,
and Texas, and the ostensibly more well-received legal claims.
Plaintiffs launched a broader attack on a variety of educational
practices, including funding issues, with a higher degree of suc-
cess.1 1 8 Post-Levittown school finance litigation by reform groups
in New York State has followed this trend of moving away from the
direct use of equity arguments towards the use of more promising
adequacy arguments.
III. NEW YORK SCHOOL FINANCE CASES
Different interest group coalitions advocating greater school fi-
nance equity since 1974 initiated legal challenges to New York
State's school funding formula in the state courts. The involved
interest groups are the Levittown Group, REFIT, and the Cam-
paign for Fiscal Equity.
A. Board of Education, Levittown Union Free
School District v. Nyquist
A coalition of twenty-seven local school districts throughout the
state, led by the Levittown district, filed a cause of action in New
York State Supreme Court, Nassau County, in 1974, and argued
significant differentials in district per pupil property wealth re-
sulted in unacceptable differences in per pupil expenditures,
thereby violating the Equal Protection Clause and Education Arti-
115. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 228-29; Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1, 769 P.2d at
688-89; Kirby, 804 S.W.2d at 497-98.
116. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 196-99; Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1, 769 P.2d at
687-89; Kirby, 804 S.W.2d at 495-96.
117. E.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 201; Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1, 769 P.2d at
685.
118. Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 104-15
(1995).
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cle of the New York State Constitution.' 19 In particular, the school
districts claimed that the New York school finance system was un-
constitutional because the system discriminated against students in
low real property-wealth districts by making the allocation of edu-
cational resources largely a function of the local real property
wealth of the school districts. 120 The plaintiffs stressed the random-
ness of local property wealth distribution as the primary factor de-
termining allocation of the state's public education funds.12'
Prior to the commencement of the trial, local boards of educa-
tion, resident taxpayers, and students in New York City, Buffalo,
Rochester, and Syracuse, together with a host of local parent-
teacher associations in the City of New York, joined the lawsuit. 122
Without objection by any of the original parties, they joined as in-
tervenor-plaintiffs on the grounds that the issues raised by the orig-
inal plaintiffs did not address the unique problems faced by urban
school systems.123 The intervenor-plaintiffs, however, relied gener-
ally on the same legal basis as the original plaintiffs.124
At the time of trial, the New York school finance system con-
sisted of a combination of state aid, federal funds, and local reve-
nue generated by local real property taxation. 125 The New York
State Legislature provided each local school district with a uni-
form, minimum per-pupil grant purportedly to ensure that a basic
education was provided to every student attending a public school
within the State. 2 6 This grant amounted to $1,885 per pupil during
the 1974-75 school year. 12 7
A key piece of evidence submitted at trial by the original plain-
tiffs was a detailed report prepared by two expert witnesses, Joel S.
Berke, a school finance expert whose affidavit comprised the heart
of the plaintiffs' case in Rodriguez, and Jay H. Moskowitz, who
used a large volume of official New York State education finance
data.' 28 Berke and Moskowitz first demonstrated the existence of
a substantial disparity among New York's 708 local school districts
119. Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 609 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
120. Id. at 610.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 608.
123. Id. at 619-20.
124. Id. at 608.
125. Id. at 614.
126. Id. at 613.
127. Id. at 615.
128. JOEL S. BERKE ET AL., POLITICIANS, JUDGES, AND CITY SCHOOLS: RE-
FORMING SCHOOL FINANCE IN NEW YORK 32-33 (1984).
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in the distribution of taxable real property. 2 9 There existed more
than $412,000 worth of taxable real property per student in the
richest district.1 30 In contrast, there existed less than $9,000 worth
of real taxable property per student in the poorest district.'
3
'
Berke and Moskowitz also found the variation in taxable wealth
per student during the year 1974-75 ranged from more than $86,000
to less than $21,000 (a ratio of approximately four-to-one) when
considering only the median eighty percent of all districts above
the ten percent and below the ninety percent per pupils pending. 32
Other evidence in Berke and Moskowitz's report demonstrated
a very strong correlation between the assessed value of the real
property contained within each local school district and the amount
of education funds expended per student by each district.133 While
the highest spending local school district in New York raised $4,200
through local real property taxation, the lowest spending district
raised less than $1,000 per student during the 1974-75 school
year. 1
34
Moreover, Berke and Moskowitz established that the real prop-
erty wealth of each local school district was linked directly to the
per-pupil education expenditures of each district.135 In other
words, the wealthier districts exhibited greater per-pupil education
expenditures, while the poorer districts exhibited smaller per-pupil
education expenditures. Berke and Moskowitz contended that this
correlation was "direct, positive, and significant. 1 36 They stopped
short, however, of arguing that interdistrict disparities in property
value caused or brought about interdistrict disparities in per-pupil
education expenditures. 137
Finally, the report concluded that the interdistrict disparities in
per-pupil education expenditures had a "regular, direct, and dis-
criminatory impact upon the educational opportunities afforded to
the various public school children" within the State of New
York.138 While those children residing in property-rich local school
districts received an education of a comparatively higher quality,
129. Id. at 32.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 32-33.
134. Id. at 33.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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those residing in property-poor local school districts received an
education of a comparatively lower quality.139 Berke and Mosko-
witz found, for instance, a strong positive correlation between a
local school district's per-pupil education expenditures and its abil-
ity to attract teachers and professional staff members with superior
qualifications.14 °
The remainder of the original plaintiffs' case consisted of lengthy
testimony given by various administrators, teachers, parents, and
students from many of the twenty-seven local school districts that
filed the lawsuit. 141 The purpose of such testimony, according to
the lead counsel, was to put a "human face" on the statistics re-
ported by Berke and Moskowitz.' 42 The plaintiffs also offered tes-
timony by the superintendents of a number of property-rich local
school districts, such as Great Neck and Scarsdale, in order to
demonstrate the educational benefits associated with greater per
pupil expenditures. 143 Finally, the plaintiffs offered a number of
plans to eliminate the inequities existing within the system, that
could be exacted by the state legislature.14 4
Therefore, according to the plaintiffs, because property-poor lo-
cal school districts were less able to generate local revenue through
local real property taxation than were property-rich local school
districts, the education of students residing in property-poor dis-
tricts was not equivalent to that of students residing in property-
rich districts. 145 This inequality was in violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clauses of the New York Constitution and the United
States Constitution, as well as the Education Article of the New
York Constitution. 46
Intervenor-plaintiffs representing four big city school districts-
Buffalo, New York, Rochester, and Syracuse-underscored the
special concerns of large urban districts. 147 They argued that citi-
zens' greater demands for increased municipal services prevented
the cities from funding education more fully, and that a school fi-
nance system that fails to compensate for this municipal overbur-
139. Id. at 33-35.
140. Id. at 33-34.
141. Id. at 35.
142. Interview with Daniel P. Levitt, supra note 73.
143. BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 35.
144. Id. at 38-39.
145. Id. at 33-35.
146. Id. at 39-41.
147. Id. at 35-41.
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den was unequal and, therefore, unconstitutional.148 The cities'
central position was that the state aid formula overstated the abil-
ity of urban districts to support education from local real property
tax revenues because the state ignored the differences between
large urban districts and non-urban ones in fiscal capacity, educa-
tional needs, and school operating costs. 14
9
The intervenor-plaintiffs presented four overburdens unique to
large urban districts in New York that allegedly constrained the
ability of such districts to finance public schools:
1. The Municipal Services Overburden
Due to the great needs of urban populations for police, fire, san-
itation, and welfare services, which impose a massive burden on
the fiscal resources of major cities, urban school districts are un-
able to devote a high percentage of their revenue towards edu-
cation. These service requirements are necessary given the
nature of large cities and do not simply represent the "tastes" of
their residents.
2. The Cost Overburden
Due to higher teacher salaries and higher costs of operation, the
costs of education are unavoidably higher in large cities than in
other non-urban districts. The urban tax dollar, therefore, buys
fewer educational services than does the suburban tax dollar.
3. The Absenteeism Overburden
The formula utilized by the State in measuring fiscal capacity
and distributing education funds counts students by attendance
instead of enrollment. This system penalizes urban school dis-
tricts due to the greater rates of absenteeism that typically exist
within such districts. The effect of this system is to reduce the
amount of aid received by urban school districts at the same
time that greater absenteeism raises remedial services costs.
4. The Education Overburden
Despite the higher concentration within urban school districts of
students with special needs, such as handicapped and non-En-
glish-speaking students, who are far more expensive to educate
than typical students, urban school districts receive lower per-
pupil aid to meet these needs than do other local school
districts.15°
148. Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 362 (N.Y. 1982); BERKE ET AL., supra
note 128, at 39.
149. BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 38-39.
150. Id. at 38-39.
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In essence, the cities contended that the state aid system was dis-
criminatory because it did not give any consideration to the unique
overburdens faced by cities. 1
In response, the State attempted to demonstrate the constitu-
tionality of the New York school finance system despite its ac-
knowledged imperfections. 52 First, the State argued that the
education aid formulas were an inappropriate subject for judicial
consideration because educational funding must be balanced
against the State's many other needs and interests, such as health
and public protection.15 3 The State contended that such balancing
is an appropriate subject only for legislative and executive
decisions. 154
Moreover, the State argued that it had met its constitutional re-
sponsibility by providing public schools with adequate levels of
state aid, including more than three billion dollars during the 1974-
75 school year.15 5 The State argued that no specific level of
achievement is guaranteed to any student under the Education Ar-
ticle of the New York State Constitution.'56 The Education Article
guarantees only a basic minimum standard for education, a stan-
dard that New York had met under any reasonable financial mea-
sure.'5 7 At the time, the $1,885 foundation guarantee level was
approximately equal to the average per-pupil expenditure for all
fifty states within the United States. 58
The State also argued the school finance system had reduced sig-
nificantly the disparities in local real property tax resources among
local school districts. 59 The system functioned to provide a greater
amount of aid to poorer districts and to close the gap between the
per-pupil education expenditures of districts at the tenth percentile
of wealth to about one-half that of the districts at the ninetieth
percentile of wealth. 6 °
151. Id. at 38-41.
152. Id. at 41-42.
153. Id. at 41.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 616-17 (Sup. Ct. 1978); see NAT'L
CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE DIGEST OF EDUCATION STA-
TISTICS 1996/TABLE 166: TOTAL AND CURRENT EXPENDITURE PER PUPIL IN PUBLIC
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS: 1919-20 TO 1995-96 (1996), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs/d96/D96T166.html (last visited May 15, 2003).
159. BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 41-42.
160. Id. at 42.
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Finally, the State relied upon the testimony of a number of state
legislators and school superintendents to demonstrate a rational
basis for the maintenance and operation of the New York school
finance system. 16' The State argued that the system sought to pre-
serve local control of education while providing a minimum level
of state educational funding. 162
On June 23, 1978, presiding New York State Supreme Court Jus-
tice, L. Kingsley Smith, delivered his decision.1 63 Using the ra-
tional means test, Justice Smith found that the State failed to
demonstrate a compelling governmental interest in maintaining the
New York school finance system and that the original plaintiffs had
established a violation under both the Equal Protection Clause and
the Education Article of the New York Constitution.1 64 Justice
Smith, moreover, determined that the intervenor-plaintiffs, repre-
senting the four large cities outside of New York City, had estab-
lished a violation by the state officers under the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution. 65 The judge placed
great weight on the compelling nature of the claimants' evidence
and the critical importance of providing education to New York's
children. 166
Following the trial court's decision, the State appealed to the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, which al-
lowed the State the opportunity to improve the factual record on
which the New York Court of Appeals would eventually decide the
case. 167 The Appellate Division reasoned that because the original
trial had taken place over the course of nearly four years, a number
of subsequent hearings and stipulation submissions were required
in order to ensure the record accurately reflected the situation on
appeal, especially since a number of reforms had been imple-
mented through legislation. 68
On October 26, 1981, the Appellate Division handed down its
unanimous decision modifying the trial court's judgment.169 The
Appellate Division refused to utilize the standard of strict scrutiny
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 48.
165. Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 642 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
166. Id. at 612-16.
167. BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 42. It is important to note that the Appellate
Division is a finder of fact as well as of law, which allowed the State to add to the
factual record.
168. Id. at 42-43.
169. Id. at 43.
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against the State, and employed the less stringent intermediate
scrutiny standard in determining the validity of the New York sys-
tem of school finance. 170 The court found the original plaintiffs
had, despite the reforms enacted during the interim, established vi-
olations under both the Equal Protection Clause and the Educa-
tion Article of the New York Constitution.171 The court, however,
determined the intervenor-plaintiffs had failed to establish a viola-
tion under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Con-
stitution. 172 Subsequently, the State and the intervenor-plaintiffs
appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.173
Attorney General Robert Abrams argued the case for the State
and Daniel P. Levitt, Edward H. Rosenthal, and Miriam R. Best
argued the case for the original plaintiffs.174 The Public Education
Association, the Educational Priorities Panel, and the New York
Civil Liberties Union filed amicus curiae briefs in support of the
original plaintiffs' claim with the Court of Appeals.175 The Council
of Churches for the City of New York, the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, and the New York Metropolitan Council of
the American Jewish Congress also filed a joint-brief. 76 A joint
amicus brief, supporting the State's contentions, was also filed on
behalf of eighty-five suburban local school districts and the New
York State Senate majority leader.' 77
Judge Hugh R. Jones delivered the opinion of the Court of Ap-
peals on June 23, 1982 and noted, "No claim is advanced in this
case ... by either the original plaintiffs or the intervenors that the
educational facilities or services provided in the school districts
that they represent fall below the statewide minimum standard of
educational quality and quantity fixed by the Board of Regents.' '1 78
The lack of such a claim, according to the court, was the fatal flaw
in the plaintiffs' case.' 79
Relative to the claims advanced by the original plaintiffs and in-
tervenor-plaintiffs, the court first addressed the argument that the
New York school finance system violated the Equal Protection
170. Id. at 47.
171. Id. at 48.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 43.
174. Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 645 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
175. BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 43.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 647-48; BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 47-48.
179. BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 48.
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Clause of the United States Constitution.18 ° Judge Jones noted
that the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez had ruled that
in adjudicating such a claim the least stringent judicial standard of
deferential scrutiny should be used in assessing the legality of any
state's school funding system. 181 The New York Court of Appeals
determined that New York did provide a minimum level of funding
to each local school district and allowed for the maintenance of
local control over education, which constituted a legitimate govern-
mental interest. 182 Thus, applying the standard of deferential scru-
tiny, the court rejected the notion the New York system of school
finance violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution. 183
The Court of Appeals responded, relative to the intervenor-
plaintiffs' argument about the municipal overburden problem, that
the inequalities existing in large cities are the result of intrinsic
demographic, economic, and political factors not attributable to
the action or inaction of the New York State Legislature. 184 Judge
Jones, quoting the Supreme Court of the State of New York,
added:
"It is beyond the power of the court ... to determine whether
the appropriations of the intervenor-plaintiffs have been wisely
directed or reasonable applied, or whether their budgets are
fairly divided in terms of priority of need between the compet-
ing services, such as police, fire, health, housing and transporta-
tion, and it is, equally, beyond the power of this court to
determine whether the resources of the intervenor-plaintiffs can
otherwise be employed so that their educational needs can be
met."'185
Therefore, the court rejected the claim advanced by the inter-
venor-plaintiffs with respect to the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution. 86
The Court of Appeals next addressed the claims of the original
plaintiffs and the intervenor-plaintiffs, that the New York school
finance system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the New
180. Id. at 46.
181. Id. at 48.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 364-66 (N.Y. 1982).
185. Id. at 365 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843, 871 (Sup. Ct.
1981)); BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 49-50.
186. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 365-66; BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 48.
2003] 1363
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
York Constitution.'87 Relying upon the logic utilized by the United
States Supreme Court in deciding Rodriguez, the New York Court
of Appeals again used the less stringent deferential scrutiny stan-
dard and reasoned that:
[t]he circumstances that public education is unquestionably high
on the list of priorities of governmental concern and responsibil-
ity.., does not automatically entitle it to classification as a "fun-
damental constitutional right" triggering a higher standard of
judicial review for the purposes of equal protection analysis.' 88
Based on this standard, the court determined that the State had
demonstrated a rational basis for the maintenance of a program
fulfilling a legitimate governmental interest; thereby, rejecting the
claim that the New York system of school finance violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the New York State Constitution. 189
Regarding the claim advanced by the original and intervenor-
plaintiffs that the school finance system violated the education arti-
cle of the New York Constitution, the Court of Appeals ruled that:
[the] constitutional language ... makes no reference to any re-
quirement that the education to be made available be equal or
substantially equal in every district, [nor does it include] any
provision either that districts choosing to provide opportunities
beyond those that other districts might elect or be able to offer
be foreclosed from doing so, [or any provision] that local control
of education, to the extent that a more extensive program were
locally desired and provided, be abolished.1 90
Based upon this reasoning, the court concluded that the only re-
quirement placed upon the state legislature under the Education
Article is to provide for the maintenance and support of a system
of free public schools; a requirement the state legislature clearly
met.19
The New York Court of Appeals left its doors open for possible
future legal challenges by noting that proof of a "gross and glaring
inadequacy" in the education system might give the court cause to
mandate higher priorities for public funds to education.1 92 Addi-
tionally, the majority attributed significance to the absence of a
claim by plaintiffs that educational services in the state fell below a
187. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 365-66; BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 47.
188. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 365-66; BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 50.
189. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 365; BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 49.
190. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 368.
191. BERKE ET AL., supra note 128, at 49-52.
192. Id. at 48.
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minimum standard of quality fixed by the Board of Regents.' 93 Al-
though the court rejected plaintiffs' equity-based arguments under
the Equal Protection doctrine, it expressly recognized that New
York courts legitimately could entertain adequacy-based legal
arguments. 94
B. The 1995 Cases
The New York Court of Appeal's recognition of the state's obli-
gation to provide an adequate education in the 1982 Levittown de-
cision, and the successes of school finance litigation in Kentucky,
Montana, and Texas in 1989, prompted several additional lawsuits
by school finance reformers in New York.195 The plaintiffs in more
recent New York cases differ from the Levittown litigants by incor-
porating and focusing legal arguments around claims the State is
failing to meet its burden under the state constitution of providing
an adequate level of public elementary and secondary education.' 96
Daniel P. Levitt, lead counsel and litigator for the Levittown and
REFIT coalitions, noted that the Reform Educational Financing
Inequities Today litigation raised, in essence, many of the same
claims made in Levittown. 97 He remarked, "the big difference,
however, was that REFIT was making the argument the State pub-
lic school finance system created a 'gross and glaring inadequacy'
between school districts and, therefore, violated the standard an-
nounced in Levittown.' '198
The Campaign for Fiscal Equities coalition, on the other hand,
has been influenced by plaintiffs' successes in Kentucky, Montana,
and Texas.199 Jessica Garcia of CFE stressed that the organization
carefully tracks national trends in school finance cases, and that the
plaintiffs' successes were "extremely" influential in CFE's decision
to commence litigation and in shaping its legal claims.2 00 As shown
below, the CFE coalition has emphasized many of the adequacy-
based arguments found in suits from other states.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 51.
195. E.g., Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.) v. Cuomo, 655 N.E.2d
647, 648 (N.Y. 1995) (stating an equal protection claim and violation of the Education
Article of the New York Constitution).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Interview with Daniel P. Levitt, supra note 73.
199. Telephone interview with Jessica Garcia, supra note 75.
200. Id.
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In response to several post-Levittown lawsuits, the New York
Court of Appeals issued three decisions in June 1995 concerning
the State's public school finance system: City of New York v. State
of New York;2 ' Reform Educational Financing Inequities Today
(R.E.F.I. T) v. Cuomo2 °2 ("REFIT"); and Campaign for Fiscal Eq-
uity, Inc. v. State of New York.2 °3 The plaintiffs in City of New York
were the New York City Mayor, Board of Education, and boards
of several city community school districts who sought issuance of
an injunction against the State on behalf of the city's school chil-
dren. °4 The plaintiffs alleged that the State school finance system:
1) denied New York City school children their educational rights
guaranteed by the Education Article of the New York Constitution
by producing a gross and glaring inadequacy with respect to public
education within the city; 2) provided separate and unequal treat-
ment for the public schools within the city in violation of the Equal
Protection Clauses of the New York and the United States Consti-
tutions; and 3) disadvantaged New York City schoolchildren who
were members of racial and ethic minorities in violation of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.205
At trial, the State moved for dismissal on the grounds of sover-
eign immunity, claiming that a state cannot be sued by one of its
political subdivisions.0 6 The State's motion was granted and the
court dismissed the lawsuit without ruling on the substantive merits
of the plaintiffs' arguments.2"7 The City of New York appealed the
decision to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the Supreme
Court ruling.208
The City of New York subsequently appealed to the New York
Court of Appeals and advanced several arguments.20 9 First, the
City asserted that the Levittown decision constitutes a controlling
precedent in favor of the City's capacity to sue because the New
York Court of Appeals allowed school districts to sue the State.2'
The Court of Appeals, however, responded that Levittown does
not represent a controlling precedent favoring the City's capacity
201. 655 N.E.2d 649, 654 (1995).
202. 655 N.E.2d at 647.
203. 655 N.E.2d 661 (1995).
204. City of N.Y., 655 N.E.2d at 650.
205. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2001); City of N.Y., 655 N.E.2d at 650-51.
206. See City of N.Y., 655 N.E.2d at 649, 651-53 (discussing the court's response to
the State's argument that a municipality cannot sue its state).
207. Id. at 651.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 652.
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to sue the State because the opinion did not address specifically
sovereign immunity, as it was not raised by the State as a de-
fense.211 The Court of Appeals added that, in the absence of ex-
press authority to bring the specific action in question, the plaintiff
must establish intent on the part of the state legislature to confer
such capacity by inference, which the City failed to due in this
case.
2 12
The City also argued that a municipality's lack of capacity to sue
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies only to statutory
restrictions on a municipality's power and state-mandated expendi-
tures.2 13 The Court of Appeals responded that this contention ig-
nored long-established precedent by which the lack of capacity to
sue doctrine was extended to a wide range of state actions that
have various adverse impacts upon municipal governing bodies and
their constituents. 1 4
Finally, the City of New York argued it should be allowed to sue
the State because of challenged legislation adversely affecting New
York City's proprietary interests in the State's funding formulas.215
The court replied that the City failed to point to any specific fund
in which they were entitled to a proprietary interest and sought
only a greater portion of the general State funds than the state leg-
islature chose to appropriate for public education.216
Judge Levine of the New York Court of Appeals concluded that
a state could not be sued by one of its political subdivisions. 21 7 This
general incapacity of a municipality to sue flows from the notion
that a state's political subdivisions are created by the state for the
convenient administration of the state's governmental policies. 21 8
As purely creatures or agents of the state, the court continued, a
political subdivision may not contest the actions of its creator af-
fecting them in their governmental capacity or on behalf of its in-
habitants. 219 Therefore, the Court of Appeals upheld the decisions
of the Supreme Court and the Appellate Division, which dismissed
the City's action based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity, con-
211. Id.
212. Id. at 653.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 654.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 651.
219. Id. at 651-52.
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tending that the plaintiffs failed to establish claims falling within
any recognized exceptions to the doctrine. 220
In Reform Educational Financing Inequities Today (R.E.F.I. T.) v.
Cuomo, a coalition of taxpayers, parents, students, principals, and
superintendents in sixty-one low-wealth suburban school districts
throughout the state filed suit in New York State Supreme Court
against the State of New York. 221 The plaintiffs specifically alleged
that the New York public school finance system violated the Edu-
cation Article of the New York State Constitution and the Equal
Protection Clauses of the New York State and United States
Constitutions.222
The plaintiffs' primary argument was that the New York State
school finance system had changed so drastically since the Court of
Appeals delivered its Levittown decision that there developed a
gross and glaring inadequacy of education funding within certain
property-poor local school districts.223 Levitt, the lead litigator for
REFIT, stressed that the driving force behind the commencement
of litigation was the "feeling among school superintendents and
boards in low-wealth districts that things had gotten much worse
than they were when Levittown was decided and elected officials in
Albany were paralyzed to reform the system. ' '224
REFIT contended that the disparity among a number of local
school districts within Suffolk County with respect to real property
wealth allegedly had grown from approximately 17-1 to approxi-
mately 330-1 in the years after the Levittown decision.225 Further-
more, the plaintiffs asserted that the disparity among these local
school districts with respect to per pupil education expenditures
ranged from approximately $7,000 to approximately $43,000.226
The Supreme Court, however, responded that disparities among
certain local school districts with respect to per-pupil education ex-
penditures were not solely the result of interdistrict disparities with
respect to real property wealth.227 The court found other factors
had contributed to the alleged gross and glaring inadequacy of edu-
cation funding such as a significant increase in non-English speak-
220. Id. at 654.
221. Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.) v. Cuomo, 578 N.Y.S.2d 969,
969 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
222. Id. at 969-70.
223. Id. at 970.
224. Interview with Daniel P. Levitt, supra note 73.
225. Cuomo, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 971-72.
226. Id. at 972.
227. Id.
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ing students, a proliferation of expensive State mandates, and the
disproportionate impact of recently reduced State appropriation on
the budgets of property-poor local school districts. 228 The New
York State Supreme Court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to state
a cause of action because the plaintiffs did not specifically allege
that the quality of the education provided to the students residing
within property-poor local school districts fell below a minimum
standard.229
The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Appellate Division,
which affirmed the decision of the trial court and added that the
New York school finance system was constitutional. 230 The plain-
tiffs subsequently appealed to the New York Court of Appeals
where Levitt again argued the case for REFIT.231 The Puerto Ri-
can Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Campaign for Fiscal
Equality, Inc., the plaintiffs in the City of New York case, the
American Civil Liberties Union, and the New York State Associa-
tion of Small City School Districts filed amicus curiae briefs in sup-
port of the plaintiffs.232
The New York Court of Appeals echoed the Levittown rationale
and rejected the plaintiffs' equal protection argument because the
court reasoned that the desire to maintain local control of educa-
tion was a sufficient rational justification for the state school fund-
ing system.233 The court, however, refused to endorse the
Appellate Division's determination that the school aid formula was
per se constitutional.234 The Court of Appeals limited its holding
to the specifics of the case and directly noted, as it had in the Levit-
town ruling, that evidence of gross and glaring inadequacies in the
state's provisions of a sound education to children could support a
court declaration of unconstitutionality.235
An important aspect of the REFIT case, similar to Levittown,
was the plaintiffs' use, and the Court of Appeal's consideration, of
the Education Article of the New York State Constitution which
mandates: "the legislature shall provide for the maintenance and
228. Id.
229. Id. at 976.
230. Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.) v. Cuomo, 606 N.Y.S.2d 44,
45 (App. Div. 1993).
231. Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.) v. Cuomo, 655 N.E.2d 647,
647 (N.Y. 1995).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 648-49.
234. Id. at 649.
235. Id. at 648.
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support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the chil-
dren of this state may be educated. 2 36 The REFIT plaintiffs
claimed that substantial spending disparities between property-rich
and property-poor districts per pupil constituted a violation of the
Education Article. 237 The court responded that the claim of ex-
treme spending disparities alone could not satisfy the "gross and
glaring inadequacy" standard established in Levittown.238 The
Court of Appeals reasoned that although the state constitution's
Education Article required the state legislature to provide a state
system of free schools and an adequate education to the state's
children, the constitution did not expressly mandate equal educa-
tional opportunity. 239 Acknowledging the gross spending dispari-
ties between school districts in the state, the court opined that such
disparities did not establish students in low-wealth and urban dis-
tricts were receiving less than a "sound basic education" in viola-
tion of the New York State Constitution.24 ° Consequently, all
claims against the State of New York were dismissed in the REFIT
case.
241
The Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York was initi-
ated in New York State Supreme Court by a coalition of fourteen
of New York City's thirty-two community school districts, individ-
ual citizens, various parent advocacy groups, and New York City
public school students and their parents, against the State of New
York, the New York State Senate Majority Leader, and the Assem-
bly Minority Leader.242 The plaintiffs alleged that the State school
finance system violated the Education Article, 243 the Anti-discrimi-
nation Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the New York
Constitution,244 the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution,245 and Title VI of the Federal Civil Rights Act of
1964.46
At trial, the defendants brought a motion to dismiss the claims
contending certain plaintiffs lacked standing to sue and that the
plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a cause of action that could be
236. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
237. Cuomo, 655 N.E.2d at 649.
238. Id. at 648-49.
239. Id. at 648.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 649.
242. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 663 (N.Y. 1995).
243. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
244, Id. art. 1, § 11.
245. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
246. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2001).
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adjudicated properly.247 The Supreme Court granted the defend-
ants' motion in part by dismissing all claims asserted by the local
school districts based on sovereign immunity precedent, which pre-
vents any municipal subdivision from suing the state.248 The court
also dismissed the equal protection claims and Title VI claims filed
by CFE and the individual parents and students for failure to state
a cause of action.2 49 The court ruled, however, that the plaintiffs'
complaint raised prima facie claims under the Education Article
and Anti-Discrimination Clause of the New York Constitution as
well as under Title VI's implementing regulations.
The plaintiffs appealed and the Appellate Division modified the
order of the Supreme Court by granting the State's motion to dis-
miss.y The Appellate Division ruled that the plaintiffs' argu-
ment-that reduced resources have interfered with the opportunity
of New York City public school students to receive a minimally
adequate education-embodied a theory almost identical to the
one advanced and ultimately rejected by the Court of Appeals in
Levittown.252 Furthermore, the Appellate Division ruled that Title
VI's prohibition against methods of administration that disadvan-
tage racial and ethnic minorities was not violated by the State's
education aid to the New York City school system.253
The CFE coalition subsequently appealed the Appellate Divi-
sion decision's regarding claims under the Education Article and
the Equal Protection Clause of the New York Constitution, the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, and Ti-
tle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to the New York Court of
Appeals. 4 The plaintiffs did not appeal the decision of the Appel-
late Division with respect to the anti-discrimination clause of the
New York Constitution.255 Michael A. Rebell, lead counsel and
Executive Director of the CFE coalition, argued the case for the
plaintiffs. 6 The American Civil Liberties Union and the New
York State Association of Small City School Districts, filed briefs
of amicus curiae in support of the position of the plaintiffs.2 5 7
247. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 655 N.E.2d at 664.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 663-64.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 664 n.2.
256. Id. at 663.
257. Id.
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The Court of Appeals first addressed the issue of whether the
plaintiffs properly stated a cause of action under the Education Ar-
ticle by claiming that the State's school finance system deprived
public school students within New York City of a sound basic edu-
cation.258 The Education Article, according to the Court of Ap-
peals, requires the State to offer all of its students the opportunity
to receive a sound basic education which; "should consist of the
basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable chil-
dren to eventually function productively as civic participants capa-
ble of voting and serving on a jury. ' 259 The court found that the
plaintiffs' complaint relied upon the minimum statewide educa-
tional standards established by the Board of Regents and the Com-
missioner of Education and, therefore, the plaintiffs properly
stated a cause of action under the Education Article. 260 The court
reinstated the plaintiffs' Education Article claim.261
The court, however, could not adjudicate the merits of plaintiffs'
arguments because there was no factual record developed by the
lower courts, but it did articulate a standard for assessing whether
the State has met its constitutional obligation as follows:
If the physical facilities and pedagogical services and resources
made available under the present system are adequate to pro-
vide children with the opportunity to obtain these essential
skills, the State will have satisfied its constitutional obligation
... The trial court will have to evaluate whether the children in
plaintiffs' districts are in fact being provided the opportunity to
acquire the basic literacy, calculating and verbal skills necessary
to enable them to function as civic participants capable of voting
and serving as jurors ... In order to succeed in the specific con-
text of this case, plaintiffs will have to establish a causal link
between the present funding system and any proven failure to
provide a sound basic education.262
The Court of Appeals addressed the allegations advanced by the
plaintiffs that the State school finance system violated the Equal
Protection Clauses of the New York and the United States Consti-
tutions.263 Although the court recognized that the financial circum-
stances of the school districts might have changed during the
course of the case, the court dismissed the allegations because its
258. Id. at 664-68.
259. Id. at 666.
260. Id. at 666-67.
261. Id. at 667-68.
262. Id. at 666-67.
263. Id. at 668-69.
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interpretation of the equal protection arguments had not changed
since Levittown.264
Finally, the Court of Appeals dealt with the plaintiffs' claims that
the state school finance system violated Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and its implementing regulations, which provide that,
"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance. ' 265 The court con-
cluded the instant complaint contained no showing of intentional
discrimination and, as a result, the plaintiffs' Title VI claim was
dismissed.266
The implementing regulations, nonetheless, contained within Ti-
tle VI provide that recipients of federal funding may not utilize
methods of administration that disadvantage individuals because of
their race, color, or national origin.267 A successful claim under
Title VI's implementing regulations need only demonstrate dis-
criminatory effect, as opposed to discriminatory intent, and estab-
lish that the challenged practice disadvantages individuals
belonging to a racial minority group and that the practice is not
adequately justified. 68
Once a prima facie case is established, the burden of proof shifts
to the defendant, who must demonstrate that a legitimate nondis-
criminatory basis exists for maintaining the challenged practice.269
If the defendant is able to meet its burden and shows that the chal-
lenged practice is justified or necessary, the plaintiff still has the
opportunity to prevail by demonstrating that less discriminatory al-
ternatives exist.2 70 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals found such a
prima facie case in plaintiffs' allegations and reinstated the plain-
tiffs' claim that the State school finance system violated the imple-
menting regulations contained within Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act. 27
1
In reviewing the court's reasoning in school finance cases, it is
apparent that the New York Court of Appeals currently refuses to
264. See id. (finding that case law requires intentional discrimination to constitute
an equal protection violation).
265. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2001).
266. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., 655 N.E.2d at 669.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 670.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 670-71.
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entertain equity-based claims under equal protection doctrine.272
It has, however, accepted the validity of adequacy-based challenges
to the State's education system and to funding formulas as the ar-
guments relate to achieving a sound basic education mandated by
the state constitution's education article.273
The plaintiffs' claims were litigated at a trial that commenced on
October 12, 1999 in New York State Supreme Court.27 4 On Janu-
ary 9, 2001, Judge Leland DeGrasse rendered his opinion declaring
the State's school funding system unconstitutional because it de-
prived New York City school children of a "sound basic education"
guaranteed in the state constitution.275 In particular, Judge
DeGrasse held: 1) the State failed to ensure that New York City's
public schools received adequate funding to afford its students the
"sound basic education" guaranteed by the education article of the
New York Constitution; and 2) the State's funding mechanisms had
an adverse and disparate impact upon New York City's minority
public school students in violation of the implementing regulations
of Title VI of the federal Civil Rights Act.276
Regarding the plaintiffs' Education Article claim, the court em-
phasized that differences in spending among school districts do not,
standing alone, establish that students in the lower-spending dis-
tricts receive less than a "sound basic education" in violation of the
Education Article.277 Nonetheless, the "sound basic education"
standard mandated by the Education Article of the State Constitu-
tion consists of the foundation students need to become productive
citizens capable of civic engagement and sustaining gainful employ-
ment.278 Judge DeGrasse also stressed that children are entitled to
at least minimally adequate physical facilities and classrooms pro-
viding enough light, space, heat, and air to permit children to
learn.279
272. See id. at 666-67 (discussing adequacy arguments instead of equity arguments
in analyzing equal protection arguments).
273. Id.
274. Abby Goodnough, Major Court Challenge on How State Allocates School
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1999, at B1 [hereinafter Goodnough, Major Court
Challenge].
275. Abby Goodnough, The Ruling in the Schools: The Overview; State Judge Rules
School Aid System is Unfair to City, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2001, at Al [hereinafter
Goodnough, State Judge Rules].
276. See id. (stating that "the school financing system also violated federal civil
rights law because it disproportionately hurt minority students").
277. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 484 (Sup. Ct.
2001).
278. Id. at 485-86.
279. Id. at 501.
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Applying the "sound basic education" standard to the facts of
the case, Judge DeGrasse found: 1) the quality of New York City's
public school teachers, as measured by the number of uncertified
teachers teaching in New York City public schools, teachers' scores
on certification examinations, and the quality of teachers' under-
graduate education, in the aggregate, was inadequate;280 2) a sub-
stantial number of school facilities required major infrastructure
repair and many more were plagued by overcrowding, poor wiring,
pock-marked plaster and peeling paint, inadequate climate control,
and other deficiencies; 281 3) there was a causal link between New
York City's poor school facilities and the performance of stu-
dents;2 82 4) instruments of learning such as desks, chairs, pencils,
and reasonably current textbooks were minimally adequate;28 3 and
5) evaluative examinations indicated New York City's schools were
not imparting the requisite minimum educational skills are indica-
tive of a sound basic education.2 84
Consequently, Judge DeGrasse held that the State is primarily
responsible for the persistence of such educational inadequacies. 85
He also emphasized that the school aid distribution system is un-
necessarily complex and opaque and is based on an array of often
conflicting formulas and grant categories as understood by only a
handful of officers in State government. 86 He found, moreover,
that the evidence at trial demonstrated that the formulas do not
operate neutrally to allocate school funds, but rather, are manipu-
lated to conform to political budget agreements reached by the
Governor, the Speaker of the Assembly, and the Senate Majority
Leader. 287 Based on these findings, Judge DeGrasse concluded the
State failed to ensure New York City's public schools received ade-
quate funding to afford students the "sound basic education" guar-
anteed by the Education Article of the New York State
Constitution.288
Relative to the plaintiffs' Title VI claim, the court agreed that
money is a crucial determinant of educational quality, and receipt
of less state educational funding per pupil by minority students is
280. Id. at 492.
281. Id. at 501.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 491.
284. Id. at 491-92.
285. Id. at 529.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 533.
288. Id. at 540.
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an adverse, disparate impact as contemplated by Title VI regula-
tions.2 89 The court found that comparisons of New York City's
funding with average school district funding in the rest of the State
can be an accurate and legitimate indicator of a disparate impact
based on race because seventy-three percent of the State's overall
minority student population reside in the City of New York and
eighty-four percent of the city's public school children are mem-
bers of minority groups.29 °
Judge DeGrasse also placed emphasis on the fact that New York
City receives less funding per pupil, on average, than other districts
in the rest of the State.291 The court found that from 1994-95 to
1999-2000, New York City consistently received less total state aid
than its percentage share of total enrolled students. 292 During
those years, New York City had approximately thirty-seven per-
cent of the State's enrolled students, yet received a percentage of
total state aid ranging from 33.98 percent to 35.65 percent.293
Judge DeGrasse concluded that these figures are also clear evi-
dence of disparate impact.294
The State advanced several broad justifications for the distribu-
tion of public elementary and secondary school aid. First, the State
argued that the school funding formula is redistributive in nature
and since New York City is a relatively affluent school district it
should not expect a percentage of state funding to exactly match
the percentage of school children in the State attending New York
City schools.295 Second, the State asserted that a funding formula
based upon each district's average attendance, rather than enroll-
ment, is related to the State's legitimate objectives of encouraging
districts to maintain high attendance while discouraging inflation of
enrollment figures.2 96 Next, the State contended that distributing
transportation and building aid on a reimbursement basis is fiscally
prudent since school districts must first demonstrate a local finan-
cial commitment of facility construction. 97 Finally, New York as-
serted that the funding formulas take student need into account.298
289. Id. at 541.
290. Id. at 542.
291. See id. at 542, 543 n.46 (discussing New York City's per pupil spending).
292. Id. at 543.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 547.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
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In response to the State's assertions, the court found redistribu-
tion, when properly implemented, can be a valid goal for state
school aid, but the State's measure of wealth is inaccurate because
it does not account for differences in regional costs and, therefore,
the measure does not further a substantial legitimate purpose.299
Additionally, Judge DeGrasse held that the basing of school fund-
ing on districts' average attendance is unnecessarily punitive in di-
recting state aid away from districts with large numbers of at-risk
students.30 0 The court reasoned that the State neither quantified
the effects of building and transportation aid, nor established how
the system of reimbursement is related to classroom education.30'
Consequently, the court found unpersuasive the State's justifica-
tions for the adverse disparate racial impact caused by the distribu-
tion of state aid, and concluded that the plaintiffs established a
violation of the relevant Title VI implementing regulations.0 2
On the appropriate remedy issue, Judge DeGrasse ruled that the
New York State Legislature, rather than the courts, would be given
the first opportunity to reform public school financing system
which failed to provide the opportunity for a sound basic education
to New York City public school students and had an unjustified
disparate impact on minority students in violation of federal law. 3
The court reasoned that the New York State Legislature is in a
better position to gauge the effects of reform on the state as a
whole, and is better positioned to work with the governor in re-
forming the current educational system.30 4
In response to Judge DeGrasse's decision, Governor George E.
Pataki announced, one week after the ruling, his intention to direct
the State Attorney General to appeal the decision to the Appellate
Division of the New York State Supreme Court.30 The Gover-
nor's announcement was made despite his calls for revamping the
State's school funding system in his January 3, 2001, State of the
State address.30 6 The State filed its appellate brief with the Su-
299. Id. at 548.
300. Id. at 548-49.
301. Id. at 549.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 549-50.
304. Id.
305. Richard Perez-Pena & Abby Goodnough, Pataki to Appeal Decision by Judge
on Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2001, at Al.
306. Id.; see Abby Goodnough, New Formula for Schools: More Money and Lee-
way, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2001, at Bi [hereinafter Goodnough, New Formula].
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preme Court, Appellate Division on August 13, 2001, and the State
and plaintiffs presented oral arguments on October 25, 2001.307
On appeal, the State argued that the plaintiffs failed to meet
their burden of demonstrating that: 1) students in urban school dis-
tricts are not receiving a "sound basic education"; and 2) the edu-
cation funding formula utilized by the State is the cause of this
problem.30 8 First, addressing the issue whether New York City stu-
dents are receiving a "sound basic education," the State argued
that the "State of New York ranks third in the nation in education
spending, and that the New York City Board of Education [ ] has
more money per pupil than nearly any other urban school district
in the entire nation. ' 30 9 Moreover, the State argued that New York
City schools receive less funding overall than schools in several
other districts throughout the State because the city does not con-
tribute its fair share to its own public schools and because some of
the Board of Education's resources are wasted through misman-
agement and fraud. 310 The State, therefore, cannot be held ac-
countable for such shortcomings.
Additionally, while the State conceded that the plaintiffs demon-
strated several pressing concerns facing schools in New York City,
the education available in the city's schools, nonetheless, exceeds
the constitutional standard of a "sound basic education. "311 The
State noted that the city's schools have one of the lowest pupil-
teacher ratios among large school districts throughout the nation,
and according to the city's own evaluation system, nearly all of its
teachers are rated as "satisfactory" or better.3t 2 The city's educa-
tional materials and supplies rank at or near the "exemplary" level
and "[s]chool facilities are in fair condition or better, and are suffi-
cient to permit children to learn, as required by the Education
Article. '313
The State next relied on the performance of the New York City
students themselves pointing to statistics showing that "[ninety-
two] percent of the City's eleventh-graders demonstrate graduation
307. Brief for Defendants-Appellants filed by Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of
the State of New York at 1, Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d
475 (Sup. Ct. 2001) (No. 93-111070); Telephone interview with Jessica Garcia, supra
note 75.
308. Brief for Defendants-Appellant's at 2, 6, Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. (No.
93-111070).
309. Id. at 1.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 3.
312. Id.
313. Id.
1378
FROM EQUITY TO ADEQUACY
competency in basic skills" and that New York City students "score
near or above the national average in tests [that compare] their
achievement in reading and math to other students across the
United States. ' 314 The State thus characterizes the New York City
school system, despite its many documented flaws, as one of the
best large urban public school systems in the nation.315
The State asserted that the trial court simply ignored such fac-
tors.31 6 "Instead, the trial court measured the constitutional ade-
quacy of New York City's schools, [especially] the quality of its
teachers, against the resources and performance of wealthy" subur-
ban schools in neighboring districts, despite the fact that the Court
of Appeals has twice held, in both Levittown and REFIT, that this
type of comparative evidence has no relevance to an Education
Article claim.317
In addressing the question of whether any failure to provide a
constitutionally adequate education was caused by the State's edu-
cation funding mechanism, the State argued that the trial court ig-
nored three key factors.31s The court failed to adequately examine:
1) whether the total funding available to New York City's schools
was "sufficient to provide a sound basic education, (even if it was
not actually being used to that effect)"; 2) "whether available re-
sources are squandered due to local mismanagement and corrup-
tion"; or 3) "whether any shortfall in funding is attributable to the
City's failure to make an adequate local contribution. '319 Instead,
the trial court held that such factors were not germane to the in-
quiry because the responsibility to provide a constitutionally ade-
quate education rests squarely with the State.32 °
The State contended, however, that had the trial court ade-
quately examined these factors, the answer to the question of
whether any failure to provide a constitutionally adequate educa-
tion was caused by the State's education funding mechanism would
have been an emphatic "no."'3 21 The State points to statistics show-
ing that "New York City spends more than almost all other urban
school districts across the country-$9,500 per student (based on
Fiscal Year 2000 data)"-and that "[many] schools in New York
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 3-4.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 4.
321. Id.
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City, including those in Community School District [ ] 2 and local
Catholic schools, provide excellent education with significantly less
funding. '322 Moreover, even if these resources are not adequate,
the blame for such insufficiency rests squarely with New York City
and its Board of Education and not with the State's funding
formula.323
Finally, the State noted that, since the present "lawsuit was com-
menced, the State Legislature has dramatically increased education
funding for New York City on its own accord. '324 On the other
hand, New York City has "dramatically decreased the proportion
of the cost of public education [ ] that it absorbs. ' 321 "At the same
time, the [New York City Board of Education] has wasted vast
sums of money through mismanagement and corruption. "326
In its reply, CFE disputed the State's depiction of the quality of
the education available to New York City school children.327 In
order to illustrate the State's failure to provide a constitutionally
adequate education, CFE examined the group of New York City
students scheduled to graduate high school in 1999.328 CFE con-
tended that only "[sixty percent] of the Class of 1999 who entered
the ninth grade would receive a high school diploma. ' 329 Of those
receiving diplomas, many will take as many as seven years to do so
and most will find that they are unprepared for the demands of
citizenship or a productive workplace.33 °
CFE next examined the conditions under which the members of
the Class of 1999 were forced to learn. "In 1988, when the Class of
1999 was in second grade, the system was short 100,000 seats."'331
The state legislature, in fact, declared that New York City's schools
"were in such 'deplorable physical condition' that they were 'a seri-
ous impediment to learning.' ,,332 "In 1995, when the Class of 1999
was in ninth grade, a blue-ribbon commission [declared that the
New York City school system was in] a state of 'imminent calamity'
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 4-5.
326. Id. at 5.
327. Brief for Plaintiffs-Respondents at 1, Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State,
719 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. 2001) (No. 93-111070).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 2.
332. Id.
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and described overcrowded schools that lacked adequate heat,
light and air. 333
According to the CFE, unprepared and unqualified teachers
taught the Class of 1999. 3 1 "When the Class of 1999 was in ele-
mentary school, at least one in ten teachers lacked the minimum
credentials required for certification by the State [and] one of four
elementary teachers had failed the basic teacher competency exam
at least once. '335 "As [these students] moved [up] through junior
and senior high school, [they were] taught by at least 1,500 uncerti-
fied math and science teachers, [compared with] only a handful of
uncertified teachers in the rest of the state. '336 "More than [forty]
percent of the math teachers, [thirty-seven] percent of the biology
teachers, and [twenty-four] percent of the chemistry teachers failed
the certification tests in their subject matter at least once. 337
Finally, CFE focused on other substantial inadequacies within
the New York City school system. 338 For several years, many
schools lacked up-to-date textbooks, libraries, a sufficient number
of computers together with enough teachers who understood how
to use them, and a sufficient supply of basic classroom necessities,
such as pencils and paper.339 Overall, the "Class of 1999 suffered a
collective and cumulative denial of adequate resources, collective
because the multiple inadequacies reinforced each other and cu-
mulative because the inadequacies continued year after year, with
the effects snowballing. "340
The consequences of these inadequacies, according to the CFE,
were devastating.341 "When the Class of 1999 took its first stan-
dardized literacy test in the third grade, [approximately] one-third
of the class, [or about] 20,000 children, was judged to be function-
ally illiterate. '34 2 "By the time the Class reached junior high
school, it ranked last in the state in social studies and science com-
petence.'343 "In 1999, just one-half of the members of the Class of
1999 that entered the ninth grade graduated on time. ' 344 By way
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 2-3.
337. Id. at 3.
338. Id. at 4.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 4-5.
342. Id. at 4.
343. Id. at 4-5.
344. Id. at 5.
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of comparison, more than eighty percent graduated on time in the
rest of the State.345 "By the year 2002, when the Class of 1999 is no
longer eligible for free education, [CFE projected that] only an-
other [ten] percent will have graduated. '346
"The history of the Class of 1999 [illustrates] overwhelming sup-
port for the trial court's finding that the [quality of the] 'education
provided to New York City students ... falls well below the mini-
mum constitutional standard.' ,,347 The gross inadequacies plaguing
the New York City school system are directly attributable to the
unmitigated failure of the state education funding mechanism.348
On June 25, 2002, the Appellate Division, First Department, is-
sued a ruling reversing the decision of the trial court.349 Judge Ler-
ner delivered the opinion of the court.350 Beginning with basic
principles, Judge Lerner stated that, while the "sound basic educa-
tion" standard pronounced by the Court of Appeals requires the
State to provide a minimally adequate educational opportunity, it
does not guarantee some higher, largely unspecified level of educa-
tion. 1 Instead, children are entitled to physical facilities and class-
rooms that provide sufficient light, space, heat, and air so as to
permit children to learn.35 2 In addition, children must be given ac-
cess to minimally adequate instrumentalities of learning, such as
desks, chairs, pencils, and reasonably up-to-date textbooks. 3  Fi-
nally, children are entitled to minimally adequate teaching of basic
curricula, such as reading, writing, arithmetic, science, and social
studies, by personnel that are adequately trained to teach those
subjects.354
Judge Lerner then focused the court's analysis to the issue of
minimally adequate facilities. 5 Although there was evidence that
some schools lack science laboratories, music rooms, or gymnasia,
the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that these conditions were so
pervasive as to constitute a system-wide failure.356 Moreover, the
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. (citations omitted).
348. Id.
349. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 744 N.Y.S.2d 130, 134 (Sup. Ct.
2002).
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 135.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 139-40.
356. Id.
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plaintiffs certainly failed to demonstrate the existence of a failure
that was caused by the educational funding system or of one that
can be cured only by way of reforming the system.357
Furthermore, the evidence at trial established that class sizes for
kindergarten through the eighth grade average between 23.8 and
28.72 students per class.358 While experts testified that student per-
formance is superior in a class of twenty or fewer children, there
was no indication that students could not learn in classes consisting
of more than twenty pupils. 359 The plaintiffs, in fact, conceded that
the city's Catholic schools outperform the city's public schools de-
spite having larger classes. 360 Thus, the trial court's holding that
classes consisting of greater than twenty students is unconstitu-
tional is unsupported and erroneous.361
Judge Lerner next turned attention to the issue of minimally ad-
equate instrumentalities of learning.362 The plaintiffs conceded
that recent increases in funding have alleviated the shortage of
textbooks and were able to offer only anecdotal evidence regarding
alleged shortages of chalk, paper, desks, chairs, and laboratory sup-
plies.363 Although the average number of books per student in the
city's schools lags behind the rest of the State, and the State allo-
cates only $4 per student for library materials, such factors do not
demonstrate the city's libraries are inadequate.364 Moreover, the
plaintiffs' assertion the books are inadequate with regard to quality
was based solely on certain superintendents' opinions that most of
the books were antiquated and did not address multicultural
themes.365 Judge Lerner rejected such a standard, holding that a
library consisting of classics does not deprive students of a sound
basic education.366
He then addressed the issue of minimally adequate teachers.
The trial court held that teachers in the city's public schools were
unqualified based predominantly on a comparison with teachers in
the rest of the state on teacher certification status, scores on certifi-
cation tests, experience, turnover rate, quality of the institutions
357. Id. at 140.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 140-41.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 141.
365. Id.
366. Id.
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the teachers themselves attended, and the percentage of teachers
holding a Master's Degree or higher.367 Judge Lerner, however,
held that the city's teachers cannot be deemed inadequate simply
because they have lower qualifications than teachers in the rest of
the state.368
The focus was then shifted to the issue of student perform-
ance. 369 The trial court relied primarily upon poor student per-
formance on standardized tests such as Regents Exams and on the
determination of a City University of New York Task Force that
most graduates of city high schools need remediation in one or
more basic skills in holding that students in the city's schools were
being deprived of a sound basic education.370 Judge Lerner, how-
ever, ruled that a minimally adequate education consists only of
those skills necessary to enable students to become productive civic
participants capable of voting and serving on a jury, not to qualify
them for advanced college courses or even attendance at an institu-
tion of higher education.371
Finally, the plaintiffs' case was addressed as a whole.372 In order
to prevail in this case, the plaintiffs would have to demonstrate a
causal link between the present funding system and any proven
failure to provide a minimally adequate educational opportunity.373
Judge Lerner, however, characterized the plaintiffs' position as a
form of res ipsa loquitur-the fact that thirty percent of city stu-
dents drop out and an additional ten percent obtain only a GED,
must mean the funding mechanism utilized by the State has de-
prived city students of a sound basic education.374 Under the cor-
rect constitutional standard, however, "the State must [simply]
offer all [students] the opportunity of a sound basic education. '375
The State is under no obligation to ensure students actually receive
such.376 "[T]he mere fact that some students do not achieve a
sound basic education does not [by itself demonstrate] that the
State has defaulted on its obligation ... as the State [cannot] be
367. Id.
368. Id. at 142.
369. Id. at 142-43.
370. Id. at 142.
371. Id. at 142-43.
372. Id. at 143-48.
373. Id. at 144.
374. Id. at 143.
375. Id.
376. Id.
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faulted when students fail to avail themselves of the opportunities
[provided]. 377
Judge Lerner held, therefore, that the plaintiffs failed to demon-
strate that students in New York City's schools were not being pro-
vided with the opportunity to receive a sound basic education.378
Moreover, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that any failure on
the part of the city's students to receive a minimally adequate edu-
cational opportunity is the result of the funding mechanism utilized
by the State.379 As a result, the decision of the trial court was
reversed.
The plaintiffs represented by the Campaign for Fiscal Equity co-
alition filed a Notice of Appeal with the New York Court of Ap-
peals on July 22, 2002, citing a major issue of the state
constitutional interpretation thereby requesting an appellate re-
view as a matter of right.3 ° Under procedural rules of the Court of
Appeals, the plaintiff's brief was due by September 20, 2002 and
the State's reply brief due by November 4, 2002, with oral argu-
ments potentially occurring as early as the winter of 2003.381
C. Other School Finance Cases Originating in New York
In Algier Ceaser, Jr. v. George E. Pataki, a group of thirty-three
students and their parents or guardians filed a class action lawsuit
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York against New York Governor George Pataki and other
state officials and entities on behalf of approximately 80,000 stu-
dents attending "high-minority public schools" (defined as schools
with over eighty percent minority enrollment) across New York,
excluding New York City.382 The plaintiffs alleged a violation of
regulations enacted under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and sought injunctive relief to remedy the "unlawful discrimination
that pervades the education that New York State officials are pro-
viding" to the proposed class.383
The plaintiffs cite, in support of their complaint, data published
by the State Education Department showing the academic achieve-
377. Id.
378. Id. at 144.
379. Id.
380. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief at 1-6, 9-10, Campaign For Fiscal Equity,
Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995) (No. 93-111070).
381. N.Y. CT. App. R. 500.4, 500.5, 500.7.
382. Algier Ceaser, Jr. v. George E. Pataki, No. 98 Civ. 8532, 2000 U.S. Dist. WL
1154318, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2000).
383. Id.
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ment of students in high-minority public schools in New York
State, excluding New York City, is much lower than students in
other non-minority schools across the State. 84 The data showed
great disparities in student performance on several state-adminis-
tered standardized exams, in the awarding of Regents Diplomas,
and in dropout rates.385 The plaintiffs further alleged high-minor-
ity schools have fewer educational resources than other schools
due to the methods of administration the State has utilized in its
operation of its school system, which have disparately effected stu-
dents in high minority schools.386
According to the plaintiffs, such methods of administration in-
clude the discriminatory manner in which the State complies with
and enforces: 1) teacher certification; 2) remedial instruction; 3)
access to suitable and appropriate buildings and grounds; 4) access
to appropriate libraries; 5) the opportunity to take Regents courses
and to earn Regents diplomas; and 6) monitoring of educational
services.387 With this lawsuit, the plaintiffs seek to enjoin these
methods of administration.388
In response to the plaintiffs' complaint, the State filed a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.389 On August 14, 2000, United States District Court Judge
McKenna issued a Memorandum and Order denying the defend-
ants' motion. 9° Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 "prohibits any recipient of federal financial assistance from
discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin in any
federally funded program ' 391 The Civil Rights Act also prohibits
only intentional discrimination, but does bar actions that dispa-
rately impact upon minorities.392 Title VI, however, delegates the
authority to federal agencies to enact regulations incorporating a
disparate impact standard.393 In their complaint, the plaintiffs re-
lied upon a regulation enacted by the former Department of Hous-
ing, Education and Welfare, the predecessor to the current
Department of Education.394
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id. at *2.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. at *1.
390. Id.
391. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2001).
392. Ceaser, 2000 WL 1154318, at *2.
393. Id.
394. Id. at *3.
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Plaintiffs need only plead sufficient allegations to put the de-
fendants on notice of what they intend to prove at trial to survive a
motion to dismiss.395 In this case, Judge McKenna ruled that the
plaintiffs satisfied this burden and that the defendants' motion to
dismiss was denied.396 The trial, thus, moved forward, the conclu-
sion to which has yet to be reached.
In Amber Paynter v. State of New York, a group of fifteen stu-
dents in the Rochester City School District ("RCSD") and their
parents or guardians filed a lawsuit in New York State Supreme
Court, individually and on behalf of approximately 37,000 other
students in the RCSD.397 The suit was filed against New York
State and several state officers and entities, alleging that students
are being deprived of a sound basic education, in violation of the
New York Constitution, in light of the concentration of poor and
minority students within the Rochester City School District.398
Moreover, the plaintiffs alleged an intentional discrimination
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,399 a disparate impact
claim under regulations implementing Title VI, 40 and a claim for
violation of those regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.401
The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin
the State to provide them with constitutionally adequate education,
educational opportunities on par with those provided to students in
the other school districts in Monroe County, a racially diverse
learning environment not characterized by high concentrations of
poverty, and an educational system that does not impose a racially
disparate impact.4 °2 In response, the State filed a motion to dismiss
all claims.40 3 The Supreme Court granted the State's motion in
part, dismissing the cause of action under the Education Article,
but not the cause of action alleging an intentional discrimination
claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the disparate
impact claim under regulations implementing Title VI, and a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violation of those regulations.40 4
395. Id. at *4.
396. Id.
397. Amber Paynter v. State, 735 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (Sup. Ct. 2001).
398. Id.
399. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2001).
400. 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2000).
401. Paynter, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id.
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The plaintiffs appealed the ruling to the Appellate Division,
Fourth Department, and the State cross-appealed.40 5 The State
contended that the lower court erred in not dismissing the plain-
tiffs' complaint in its entirety. 4 6 The plaintiffs contended that the
cause of action under the Education Article should be rein-
stated.4 °7 On December 21, 2001, the Appellate Division issued its
ruling.40 8
With respect to their Education Article claim, the court noted
that the plaintiffs do not challenge the sufficiency of State funding,
nor do they challenge the adequacy of the educational services and
facilities being provided.40 9 Instead, the court explained that the
plaintiffs focus solely on the "wholesale academic future" of the
students in the RCSD, which they attribute to the high concentra-
tion of poor and minority students within the district as well as the
system of public education mandating that students attend schools
only within the district in which they live.410
The plaintiffs went on to allege that but for this residency re-
quirement, the demographics of RCSD would be greatly different,
the quality of education would be far better, and they would re-
ceive the sound basic education they are entitled to under the Edu-
cation Article. 411 They argued that they stated a viable cause of
action under the Education Article by virtue of their allegations of
"wholesale academic failure" alone.412
The Appellate Division, however, disagreed. 413 Academic fail-
ure as measured by students' performance on standardized tests
does not, by itself, represent a constitutional violation.414 Aca-
demic failure may be the result of a variety of causes that are be-
yond the scope of State control.415 A constitutional violation arises
only when such academic failure is the result of the State's failure
to provide for the maintenance and support of the public school
system. 416 The obligation imposed upon the State under the Edu-
cation Article is satisfied as long as the physical facilities and edu-
405. Id.
406. Id. at 340-41.
407. Id. at 341.
408. Id. at 337.
409. Id. at 343.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
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cational resources made available under the current system are
adequate to provide students with the opportunity to obtain a
sound basic education.41 7 In light of the plaintiffs' failure to allege
that minimally adequate educational services and facilities were
provided in the RCSD by the State, they failed to state a claim
under the Education Article for which relief can be granted. 18
The Appellate Division next addressed the plaintiffs' additional
claims.4 19 Under the regulations established by the United States
Department of Education, programs that receive federal funds are
prohibited from using methods of administration that impose a dis-
parate impact upon individuals because of their race, color, or na-
tional origin.42 This proscription applies to determinations
regarding the types of services, financial aid, or facilities that are
provided under such programs or the class of individuals to whom
such services are to be provided.421
The Appellate Division rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the
residency-based system of education provided for under New York
Education Law section 3202422 has exacted a racially disparate im-
pact upon the students in the RCSD.42 a Moreover, even assuming,
arguendo, such a system does have a racially disparate impact, the
Appellate Division held that it did not violate 34 C.F.R. section
100.3(b)(2) as long as it is uniformly applied because the State has
a substantial interest in imposing bona fide residency requirements
in order to maintain the quality of local public schools.424 Thus,
because the plaintiffs failed to allege that Education Law section
3202 is not being uniformly applied, they did not state a cause of
action under 34 C.F.R. section 100.3(b)(2) for which relief can be
granted.425 Therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court was
modified and the Appellate Division granted the State's Motion to
Dismiss in its entirety.426
In March of 2001, the New York Civil Liberties Union
("N.Y.C.L.U.") filed a class action lawsuit, New York Civil Liber-
ties Union v. State of New York, in the Supreme Court in Albany
417. Id.
418. Id. at 343-44.
419. Id. at 344.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3202 (McKinney 2003).
423. Paynter, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 344.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 344-45.
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County against New York State and several State officers and enti-
ties on behalf of parents and children in "failing schools" through-
out the State.427 Building on the decisions in Campaign for Fiscal
Equity and relying upon the Education Article of the New York
Constitution, this is a school-based litigation that seeks to supple-
ment the remedy requested in Campaign for Fiscal Equity and
seeks judicial supervision of a school by school analysis of the roots
of failure and the particular remedies for each failing school to be
provided by the State.428
A substantial number of students, the plaintiffs argue, in each of
these "failing schools" are unable to perform at the minimum stan-
dards established by the New York State Department of Education
on standardized tests in the areas of reading, writing and math.429
These "failing schools" tend to generally possess some or all of the
following characteristics: a highly transient teaching staff, unquali-
fied teachers, textbooks and computers that are inadequate in both
quality and quantity, crumbling facilities, overcrowding, inade-
quate focus on the core-curriculum, poor administrative leadership,
class sizes far too large for the many "high need" children in the
classes, no sense of community, inability to involve parents in
school activities, and insufficient programs for art, music, and
athletics.430
The plaintiffs also assert student performance in these "failing
schools" is terrible. 431 A large number of students read below
grade level and many fail to perform well enough on standardized
tests in reading, writing, and math to demonstrate even basic skill
levels.432 Students at the high school level rarely receive Regents
diplomas, as most are suspended or drop out at a staggering rate.433
The plaintiffs charge that the New York State Department of
Education is keenly aware these schools are failing.434 Nonethe-
less, the State has failed to take adequate measures to remedy the
deficiencies plaguing these "failing schools. '435 Those students
427. Brief for New York Civil Liberties Union at 1, NYCLU v. State (Sup. Ct.
2001) (No. 01-1778).
428. Id. at 1-4; see Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 661-65
(N.Y. 1995).
429. Brief for New York Civil Liberties Union at 68, NYCLU (No. 01-1778).
430. Id. at 140.
431. Id. at 3-4, 27.
432. See id. 29-30, 88-91 (discussing programs to remedy the significant amount of
students reading below level and students substandard performance on tests).
433. Id. at 199-200.
434. Id. at 191-92.
435. See id. at 193-200 (discussing the states remedy to inferior education).
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who, by reason of race, residency or economic status, are consigned
to these failing schools are being denied the opportunity to receive
a "sound basic education. ' 436 These students, according to the
plaintiffs, are at serious risk of failing to acquire the basic skills
necessary to become productive citizens capable of civic engage-
ment and of sustaining competitive employment.4 37 As of the writ-
ing of this Article, the trial has yet to take place.
CONCLUSION
The Unites States Supreme Court decision in Rodriguez, in ef-
fect, forced public school finance reformers to litigate their claims
against state education funding schemes in state courts. 438 Efforts
of reform-minded plaintiffs in state courts resulted in two distinct
litigation and doctrinal trends-equity and adequacy. Although
equity theory showed some promise in the earlier state cases of
Serrano4 39 and Robinson,441 legal challenges based on arguments
for greater equity proved difficult to substantiate because the
courts were not willing to hold states to substantial or strict scru-
tiny standards for their public elementary and secondary school
funding systems. The New York Court of Appeals in Levittown
particularly emphasized that the State is only required to provide a
sound basic education, not to provide an equitable distribution of
funding to public schools. Consequently, equity-based legal argu-
ments resulted in few litigation victories in other states and have
been de-emphasized by New York school finance reform
plaintiffs.44'
Successful litigation in Montana, Kentucky, and Texas, however,
has demonstrated the efficacy of adequacy-based legal arguments
and offered renewed and real hope of litigation success for plain-
tiffs challenging state public school financing systems. Adequacy
theory in school finance litigation is predicated on the use of state
constitutional provisions requiring a state to provide a minimally
adequate public education to its schoolchildren. Plaintiffs have
been able to convince state high courts that poor educational out-
puts, such as high failing percentages on statewide tests and high
436. See id. at 6 (discussing the inadequacies and disadvantages that these students
encounter).
437. Id.
438. Supra notes 26-76 and accompanying text.
439. Supra notes 79-93 and accompanying text.
440. Supra notes 79-93 and accompanying text.
441. Supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
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dropout rates, and lack of sufficient education tools including text-
books, classrooms, and teachers, together constitute a failure of a
state to meet its constitutional burden of providing adequate public
education.
Accordingly, adequacy theory offers a potentially greater chance
of success to the plaintiffs in the Campaign for Fiscal Equity case
because plaintiffs have little difficulty citing numerous shortcom-
ings of the public schools, especially in poor urban districts, to sup-
port their arguments that the state is failing to provide a sound,
basic education. This litigation strategy cleverly avoids the prob-
lem of focusing too much attention upon only the levels or equity
of funding New York is providing to public education, instead em-
phasizing the numerous inadequacies of public elementary and sec-
ondary schools which are exacerbated by lack of sufficient state
funding. The remaining difficult legal challenge is convincing the
New York Court of Appeals that the daunting problems of poor
public schools establishes a "gross and glaring inadequacy" and,
consequently, a failure of the state to provide a sound basic educa-
tion as required by the state constitution.
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IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION:
STRATEGIES FOR INCREASING LATINO
LAW SCHOOL ENROLLMENTS
William Malpica*
and Mauricio A. Espafia**
INTRODUCTION
Increasing minority representation in the legal profession has
concerned the bar since the civil rights movement. Yet the num-
bers remain appallingly low.' In 1999, William G. Paul, the former
President of the American Bar Association, noted that while thirty
percent of Americans were members of racial or ethnic minorities,
a full ninety-two percent of the nation's lawyers were white.2 He
predicted that, if current trends continue, the legal profession's eth-
nic mix would fall even further behind in the next fifty years.
Three years later, the gap has already widened. Minorities now
* Member of the New York City Commission on Human Rights; Member of the
Committee on Recruitment and Retention of Lawyers of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York; Associate, Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw; J.D., Fordham
University School of Law, 2000. The Author would like to thank Mauricio Espafia for
agreeing to take on this project and Professors Jenny Rivera and Terry Smith for their
insightful comments. Mr. Malpica is also grateful to the law firm of Mayer, Brown,
Rowe & Maw, in particular, the members of its Diversity Committee led by Hector
Gonzalez, David Goldman, Nicole Berman-Fong, and James Carlson, as well as key
members of the firm's administration, including Linda Bushlow and Marc Kadish for
their commitment to diversifying our small corner of the law and for supporting many
of the efforts discussed herein.
** J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2003; Associate, Mayer,
Brown, Rowe & Maw (as of September 2003). 1 would like to thank everyone who
supported and encouraged me as I strived to carry on my endeavors. I would like to
express special gratitude to Sylvia Mamani, my mother, father, and family for their
unending support, tolerance, and understanding.
1. Minorities comprised 7.45 percent of the profession in 1990. Geoffrey A.
Campbell, Slow Progress for Minorities in Law, 84 A.B.A. J., Sept. 1998, at 82. The
American Bar Association states that, in 2001, the last year for which data is availa-
ble, 7,443 minorities (19.6 percent of total enrollment) received a J.D. degree. AM.
BAR Assoc., J.D. DEGREES 1984-2001 (TOTALJWoMEN/MINORITIES) [hereinafter
J.D. DEGREES 1984-2001], at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/jd.html (last vis-
ited May 15, 2003).
2. New ABA Head Decries Lack Of Diversity, 222 N.Y. L.J., Aug. 11, 1999, at 2
[hereinafter ABA Head].
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constitute twenty-five percent of the total population,3 yet they
make up only 7.5 percent of entire legal profession. Even several
Presidents of the United States have weighed in on the need for
diversity. As far back as 1963, President John F. Kennedy sum-
moned the nation's lawyers to combat racism and increase diver-
sity.' In 1996, President William J. Clinton created an Advisory
Commission on Educational Excellence for Hispanic Americans
that "[called] upon the nation to improve education for Hispanic
Americans."' 6 In 1999, President Clinton called upon the nation's
lawyers to help America's poor and minorities share in modern
American prosperity and urged the legal profession to take steps to
diversify the profession.7
Latino representation is particularly alarming. Although Latinos
constitute 12.5 percent of the American population, and have be-
come the largest minority group in the United States,8 they re-
present only 2.2 percent of the nation's lawyers.9 Moreover, Latino
representation is, in fact, decreasing. In 1998, while Latinos com-
prised 11.7 percent of the total population, they represented 2.49
percent of the nation's lawyers.10 The number of Latinos enrolled
in the first year of law school-the focus of this Essay-has risen
steadily since the 1960s, but remains dismal. The number of Latino
first-year law students as a proportion of the total first-year popu-
lation went from 1.1 percent in 1969-70, to roughly three percent
3. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PERCENT OF POPULATION
FOR ONE OR MORE RACES: THE HISPANIC POPULATION: 2000, at 1 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter CENSUS, HISPANIC POPULATION], available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001
pubs/mso01-hp.pdf (last visited May 15, 2003).
4. N.Y. COUNTY LAWYERS' ASS'N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE TO INCREASE
DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 3 (2002) [hereinafter REPORT TO INCREASE
DIVERSITY], available at http://www.nycla.org/publications/taskforce.html (last visited
May 15, 2003).
5. Id. at 1.
6. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMM. ON EDUC. EXCELLENCE FOR HISPANIC AMS.,
OUR NATION ON THE FAULT LINE: HISPANIC AMERICAN EDUCATION 13 (1996).
7. Clinton Issues Call To Nation's Lawyers, 222 N.Y. L.J., July 21, 1999, at 2. In
response to the President's call, a number of proposals have surfaced. ABA Head,
supra note 2, at 2. The ABA plans to create a scholarship fund to help more racial
and ethnic minorities go to law school. Id. More than $300,000 has been pledged to
the fund, which the group hopes will reach $1 million during the first year. Id. The
ABA will also organize a group of law school deans to examine diversity in law
schools by looking at admission tests. Id.
8. CENSUS, HISPANIC POPULATION, supra note 3, at 1.
9. Jenny B. Davis, Grande Opportunity: Hispanic Lawyers Gain Influence and
Fight to Clean Up the System in an Area Where Law and Politics Are Inextricably
Linked, 88 A.B.A. J., Dec. 2002, at 36.
10. Sophia Angeli Nelson, Bringing Meaning to Equal Opportunity: Law Schools
Still Fail to Mine Minority Talent, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 7, 1998, at S45.
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during the 1980s. 1 Currently, Latinos make up approximately 5.8
percent of all students in American Bar Association ("ABA")
accredited law schools and 8.4 percent of total law school
applicants. 12
The benefits of increased participation in the legal profession are
undisputed. A lack of lawyers limits the group's ability to advocate
for its interests, and otherwise denies that group full political
power.13 Additionally, cultural and linguistic barriers often inhibit
Latinos from consulting non-Latino lawyers, limiting access to vital
legal services and, to the extent Latino entrepreneurs fail to seek
services, limiting the community's economic growth. 4 In addition,
a legal career is generally a ticket out of the lower class.' 5 As such,
a law school education can be a tool for socioeconomic change. 16
An increase in the number of Latino lawyers can have a multiplier
effect, enhancing upward mobility for Latinos generally by expos-
ing more Latino children to professional role models.17
Participation in the legal profession as an attorney is ultimately
dependent upon admission to the bar. Before crossing that finish
line, future lawyers must overcome a series of hurdles including
law school admission, retention, graduation, and bar passage.' 8 In
addition, true participation in the profession requires gainful em-
ployment as an attorney.
This Essay explores how Latinos have fared in the law school
admissions process-a hurdle that the group has yet to overcome-
and evaluates current efforts to bolster Latino enrollment. Part I
11. Dannye Holley & Thomas Kleven, Minorities and the Legal Profession: Cur-
rent Platitudes and Current Barriers, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 299, 306 (1987).
12. REPORT TO INCREASE DIVERSITY, supra note 4, at 51. It is fair to mention that
Latinos' enrollment rate has increased since 1990. Compare J.D. DECREES 1984-
2001, supra note 1, with AM. BAR Ass'N, MINORITY ENROLLMENT 1971-2001 (2002),
at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/minstats.html (last visited May 15, 2003).
This increase, however, is not significant when considering that since that time Lati-
nos have become the largest minority. CENSUS, HISPANIC POPULATION, supra note 3,
at 1.
13. For example, in addition to being a prerequisite for judicial appointments, a
law degree is a common background for election to legislative office. Mary Kay
Lundwall, Increasing Diversity In Law Schools And The Legal Profession: A New
Approach, 14 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 147, 148 (1994). Government administrative
and regulatory agencies are also staffed with decision makers that often are law
school graduates. Id.
14. Id. at 148.
15. Interview with Roberto G. Lebron, former President of the Puerto Rican Bar
Association, in New York, N.Y. (Jan. 7, 2003).
16. Id.
17. Holley & Kleven, supra note 11, at 304-05.
18. REPORT TO INCREASE DIVERSITY, supra note 4, at 49.
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examines the underlying conditions that contribute to low Latino
enrollment in law schools. This Section reveals the primary obsta-
cles to Latino admissions: the limited pool of eligible Latino col-
lege graduates and current law school admissions policies that
emphasize Law School Admission Test ("LSAT") scores and grade
point averages.
Part II reviews a sampling of responses to low Latino law school
enrollment and concludes that the most effective strategies for in-
creasing Latino law school enrollments are those that specifically
aim to expand the pool of Latino applicants. 19 To do so, potential
law students must be identified early in their academic careers and
armed with the tools to help them graduate high school and college
with adequate credentials to gain admission to law school. In addi-
tion, interested parties must actively lobby law schools to rework
the traditional admissions criteria.
Finally, Part III describes a new effort initiated by the Author to
address the problem in light of the recommendations contained in
this Essay.
1. OBSTACLES To PARTICIPATION
A. Low High School and College Attainment Rates Limit the
Pool of Eligible Candidates
"A college degree is virtually a universal prerequisite now to en-
try into all ABA accredited law schools." 0 Accordingly, the first
obstacle to overcome in increasing Latino law school enrollment is
to expand the relatively small pool of Latino college graduates. In
1994, a study by Professor Michael A. Olivas provided a detailed
analysis of the shortage of Latinos in the legal community and
demonstrated that, despite an increasing Latino population, high
school and college completion rates had declined.21 Unfortunately,
this trend continues to progress with Latinos entering college at
higher rates, but graduating in relatively very small numbers.2 2
19. The list of described programs is not intended to be an inventory of all such
programs in existence; rather, it presents a survey of representative programs, particu-
larly those described in articles published in law journals and legal periodicals.
20. LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL & AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL
GUIDE To ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS 11-13 (2003) [hereinafter ABA-LSAC
OFFICIAL GUIDE]; Holley & Kleven, supra note 11, at 303.
21. Michael A. Olivas, The Education of Latino Lawyers: An Essay on Crop Culti-
vation, 14 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 117, 119 (1994).
22. RICHARD FRY, PEW HISPANIC CTR., LATINOS IN HIGHER EDUCATION: MANY
ENROLL, Too FEW GRADUATE 3-10 (2002), available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/
site/docs/pdf/latinosinhighereducation-sept5-02.pdf (last visited May 15, 2003); Press
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Although high school graduation rates for Latinos have gone
through significant changes in the last two decades, they remain
significantly low. 23 Between 1985 to 1998, the high school gradua-
tion rate for Latinos dropped from 62.9 percent to approximately
fifty-four percent.24 According to the most recent statistics, how-
ever, the graduation rate of Latinos had risen to 64.1 percent by
the year 2000.25 Nevertheless, Latinos' graduation rates are dispro-
portionately low when compared to performance by other
groups.26 The comparable rates for whites were 83.6 percent in
1985, 82.5 percent in 1990, and 82.4 percent in 2000.27 The rates for
African-Americans were 75.6 percent in 1985, seventy-seven per-
cent in 1990, and seventy-seven percent in 2000.28 While only a
small fraction of white adults (4.7 percent) have fewer than nine
years of schooling today, a full 48.9 percent of adult Latinos have
failed to reach even this minimal level.29
Even among those who graduate from high school, Latinos at-
tend college at lower rates.31 In 1990, twenty-nine percent of La-
Release, Pew Hispanic Center & Hispanic Scholarship Fund Institute, Latino High
School Graduates Enroll in College at Higher Rates than Whites, Yet Too Few Grad-
uate (Sept. 5, 2002), available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/site/docs/pdf/finaljoint
collegejrelease-suro-edit.pdf (last visited May 15, 2003). Richard Fry's report illus-
trates that there is a severe disproportion between the amount of Latino high school
graduates and those who actually graduate, the age difference between Latinos and
other race groups, and their choice of higher education. FRY, supra, at 3-10.
23. See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
24. JAY P. GREENE, BLACK ALLIANCE FOR EDUC. OPTIONS, HIGH SCHOOL
GRADUATION RATES IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2002), available at http://www.man-
hattan-institute.org/cr-baeo.pdf (last visited May 15, 2003); Olivas, supra note 21, at
119.
25. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATISTICAL ANAL-
YSIS REPORT: DROPOUT RATES IN THE UNITED STATES: 2000, at 19 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter DROP OUT RATES], available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2002/2002114.pdf (last
visited May 15, 2003).
26. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
27. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TBL. A-5. THE POPULA-
TION 14 TO 24 YEARS OLD BY HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE STATUS, COLLEGE ENROLL-
MENT, ATrAINMENT, SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: OCTOBER 1967 TO 2000, at
A-23 (2001) [hereinafter CENSUS, COLLEGE ENROLLMENT], available at http://www.
census.gov/population/socdemo/school/tabA-5.pdf (last visited May 15, 2003).
28. Id. at A-25.
29. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TABLE 1, EDUCATIONAL
ATTAINMENT OF THE POPULATION 15 YEARS AND OVER, BY AGE, SEX, RACE, AND
HISPANIC ORIGIN: MARCH 2000, at 4, 13 (2000) [hereinafter CENSUS, EDUCATIONAL
ATTAINMENT], available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/education/p20-
536/tabOl.pdf (last visited May 15, 2003).
30. ROSALIND R. BRUNO & ANDREA CURRY, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SCHOOL
ENROLLMENT-SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF STUDENTS: OCTOBER
1994, at xii-xiii (1996), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2/pop/p20/p20-487.pdf
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tino high school graduates went to college-a decrease from the
1980 level of 29.8 percent.3' Yet in 1990, 39.4 percent of white
graduates attended college, up from 31.8 percent in 1980.32 As of
the year 2000, the statistics have relatively improved.33 In 2000,
36.5 percent of Latino high school graduates attended college, a
significant increase from the 1990 percentage. 34  Even this im-
proved rate, however, remains low compared to 43.2 percent of
white graduates. Thus, while total Latino college enrollments
have increased significantly, from 443,000 to 1,232,000 in the years
between 1980 and 2000, their numbers as a percentage of total col-
lege enrollments only increased from 4.3 percent to 9.6 percent.36
The impact of this increase is lessened when considered alongside
several factors. First, between 1990 and 2000, the Latino popula-
tion increased by a staggering 57.9 percent.3 7 Second, Latinos at-
tend two-year and community colleges and enroll in college as
part-time students at a greater rate than any other comparable
group. 8 Third, although Latinos are entering college in higher
numbers, their graduation rates remain very low. 39
Naturally, to the extent that Latinos obtain college degrees in
lower numbers, it is expected to find fewer Latinos in law school.
Latinos comprise about 12.5 percent of the populace,4 ° yet consti-
(last visited May 15, 2003); CENSUS, COLLEGE ENROLLMENT, supra note 27, at A-23,
A-27.
31. BRUNO & CURRY, supra note 30, at xii-xiii; CENSUS, COLLEGE ENROLLMENT,
supra note 27, at A-23, A-27.
32. BRUNO & CURRY, supra note 30, at xii-xiii; CENSUS, COLLEGE ENROLLMENT,
supra note 27, at A-23, A-27.
33. CENSUS, COLLEGE ENROLLMENT, supra note 27, at A-23, A-27.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. During the 1999-2000 school year, Latinos constituted ten percent of the
entire undergraduate student body, with African-Americans representing twelve per-
cent, and whites comprising sixty-seven percent of the remainder of the student body.
Laura Horn et al., Student Financing of Undergraduate Education: 1999-2000, EDUC.
STAT. Q., Fall 2002, at 79-80, available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2003/2003604.pdf (last
visited May 15, 2003). Additionally, Latinos are more likely than other races to be
enrolled in two-year colleges. FRY, supra note 22, at 3-5.
37. CENSUS, HISPANIC POPULATION, supra note 3, at 1.
38. FRY, supra note 22, at 3-5, 21. In the category of eighteen to twenty-four year
old college students, forty percent of Latino students attend two year institutions
compared to about twenty-five percent of white and twenty-nine percent of African-
American students in that age group. Id. at 21. Moreover, almost eighty-five percent
of white college students in this same age category are enrolled full-time in college,
compared to seventy-five percent of Latino students. Id.
39. Id. at 9.
40. CENSUS, HISPANIC POPULATION, supra note 3, at 1.
1398
2003] EXPANDING LATINO PARTICIPATION 1399
tute only about one percent of all college graduates.4 Comparing
Latino college graduates with the proportion of Latinos in the pop-
ulation illustrates the primary-if not the single greatest-obstacle
to law school admission, that there is a significantly sparse number
of Latinos who are even eligible to apply to law school. 42
B. Law School Admissions Policies Emphasize Certain
Predictive Criteria that Exacerbate the Problem
The disproportionately low college graduation rate among Lati-
nos is not the only obstacle to law school enrollment. The criteria
currently used by law school admissions officers represents another
major hurdle for Latino representation.43 Although Latinos apply
to law school in proportionately greater numbers than other
groups,44 law schools admit them at a lower rate due to these poli-
cies.45 Professors Holley and Kleven concluded that "the admis-
sion[s] process operates to screen out [Latinos] at
disproportionately high rates."46 Whether or not these disparities
reveal an inherent unfairness, they support the call for more care-
ful scrutiny of those criteria.47
1. The Admissions Criteria
Most law schools improperly rely primarily on the Law School
Admission Test and undergraduate grade point average ("UGPA")
41. CENSUS, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT, supra note 29, at 1, 13.
42. See Holley & Kieven, supra note 11, at 306-07 (noting the small number of
college graduates in the Latino community).
43. At least one commentator has found that the primary reason for this under-
representation in law schools is attributable to current admission practices, and partic-
ularly to the heavy emphasis on the LSAT. E.g., Eulius Simien, The Law School
Admission Test as a Barrier to Almost Twenty Years of Affirmative Action, 12 T. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 359, 370-71 (1987) (discussing affirmative action's accomplishments
and downfalls in the last fifteen to twenty years).
44. See Holley & Kleven, supra note 11, at 307-08. From 1995 to 2000, Latinos'
application rate went from 5,761-7.5 percent of the total applicants, to 6,219-8.3
percent of total applicants, while Latinos account for 12.5 percent of the population.
REPORT TO INCREASE DIVERSITY, supra note 4, at 68.
45. Holley & Kleven, supra note 11, at 308. According to the ABA, from the
1990-91 school year to the 2001-02 school year, Latino first year enrollment went from
1,974 in 1990 to 2,666 in 2001. AM. BAR ASS'N, MINORITY ENROLLMENT 1971-2001
(2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/minstats.html (last visited
May 15, 2003).
46. Holley & Kleven, supra note 11, at 308.
47. Holley and Kleven assert that the numbers "demand[ ] a closer look than the
legal hierarchy has given it. Such disparities raise a suspicion of unfairness and is a
barrier directly within the control of the legal profession." Id. at 309.
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to make admissions decisions.48 Admissions officers have grown
more dependent on these measures, especially the LSAT, as a re-
sult of the steep rise in law school applications. 49 The LSAT, which
was originally used to merely exclude those who were thought in-
capable of the rigors of law school and, therefore, a tool for reduc-
ing first year attrition, is now used to choose among those who are
considered capable. 50 Regrettably, most schools have instituted a
policy of automatically rejecting students whose scores fall below a
predetermined cut-off.51 Under these circumstances, law school
admissions officers, not bar examiners, control the selection of fu-
ture lawyers.5 2
2. Questioning the Validity of These Criteria
The traditional admissions criteria have been criticized as poor
predictors of minority success in law school.53 Arguing that the
measures are racially biased, some critics point to evidence that,
even if the LSAT and UGPA are predictive of both first year
48. SUSAN E. BROWN & EDUARDO MARENCO, JR., LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS
STUDY 15-25 (1980) (discussing the LSAT's original intended purpose and how it is
misused by law schools by relying too heavily on it for admission's purposes); Lani
Guinier, From the Lessons of Admitting Students of Color, Law Schools Can Learn
How to Fix the Rules for Everyone, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 16, 2002, at 58 (discussing law
schools obsessive use of LSAT scores as a primary admission tool); Holley & Kleven,
supra note 11, at 308-09; Kate Schott, Officials Debate Withholding LSAT Scores, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Jan. 17, 2003, at 3 (discussing the LSAC's initiative to withhold
LSAT scores from law schools that use the scores improperly by basing admission
almost solely on them); Simien, supra note 43, at 371; Interview with Gloria Rivera,
Assistant Dean of Admissions, St. John's University School of Law, in New York,
N.Y. (Feb. 6, 2003).
49. See BROWN & MARENCO, supra note 48, at 16 (discussing the LSAT's develop-
ment); Simien, supra note 43, at 373.
50. BROWN & MARENCO, supra note 48, at 16. Originally, the LSAT was an effec-
tive predictor of students who would do better first year. Id. This use, however, was
effective until the 1960s when applications were not high. Id. In 1973, for the first
time in history, "every accredited law school denied admission to applicants who it
considered qualified for the practice of law." Simien, supra note 43, at 374.
51. Simien, supra note 43, at 374. Even admissions officers echo that sentiment.
Interview with Gloria Rivera, supra note 48.
52. Simien, supra note 43, at 371 (citing former ABA President Chesterfield
Smith).
53. Michael A. Olivas, Higher Education Admissions and the Search for One Im-
portant Thing, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 993, 997 (1999) (discussing a study of
admission criteria and asserting that the LSAT is a not an effective indicator of law
school success); Cathaleen A. Roach, A River Runs Through It: Tapping Into the In-
formational Stream to Move Students from Isolation to Autonomy, 36 ARIZ. L. REV.
667, 676-77 (1994) (stating that "traditional index numbers" such as the UGPA and
LSAT cannot be credible indicators of law school success unless they are considered
in connection with student's propensity for isolation).
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grades and overall performance in law school, they fail to account
for the fact that Latinos and other minorities, as a group, experi-
ence a greater improvement in their grades during the course of
law school as compared to white students.54 Such improvement by
Latinos during the second and third years in law school reveals that
the traditional criteria actually underpredict Latino students' per-
formance in law school overall.55 Instead, Latino performance is
ultimately best weighed by law school graduation and bar passage,
rather than performance during first year alone.
Even the use of graduation rates to assess the predictive value of
the LSAT and UGPA is misplaced to the extent that they compare
the law school graduation rates of minority students to those of
white students. 56 Although white and minority students with high
scores may graduate in comparably high numbers,57 many of the
minorities who fail to graduate do so for reasons that the admis-
sions criteria cannot measure or even take into account, such as
financial troubles or a greater difficulty in adjusting to the non-
academic elements of the law school environment.58 The Council
on Legal Educational Opportunity ("CLEO") Program's success
illustrates this point. 9 CLEO reports that over seventy percent of
the students, all of whom had scores substantially lower than the
general law school population, who participated in their program
between 1968 and 1979 had graduated by 1979.60
Some commentators have concluded that, of the two measure-
ments, the LSAT has a far greater negative impact on Latino ad-
61
missions. 1 Professors Holley and Kleven found that, compared to
54. Guinier, supra note 48, at 59 (stating that Latino students tend to excel in
certain key areas, such as leadership, professional success, and contribution to the
community); Holley & Kleven, supra note 11, at 315; Donald Powers, Differential
Trends in Law Grades of Minority and Nonminority Law Students, 76 J. EDUc.
PSYCHOL. 488, 490-91, 498-99 (1984) ("[T]he differential improvements of minority
students [by the end of their studies] would seem to provide further justification for
admitting minority and other disadvantaged students with lower admission
credentials.").
55. Holley & Kleven, supra note 11, at 316.
56. Id. at 315.
57. Id.
58. Andrea A. Curcio, A Better Bar: Why and How the Existing Bar Exam Should
Change, 81 NEB. L. REV. 363, 391-92 (2002). Professor Curcio goes further and as-
serts that Latinos' lower bar passage rate can also be explained by the fact that the
bar is very similar to the LSAT and, thus, she advocates a reform of the bar exam. Id.
at 391-93; Holley & Kleven, supra note 11, at 315; Roach, supra note 53, at 675-76.
59. See infra Part II.C.2.a, for a discussion of CLEO.
60. Simien, supra note 43, at 384.
61. BROWN & MARENCO, supra note 48, at 18; see Guinier, supra note 48, at 59;
William C. Kidder, Comment, Does the LSAT Mirror or Magnify Racial and Ethnic
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the exclusive use of the LSAT, Latino enrollments would double if
admissions were based instead on the exclusive use of UGPA.62 In
other words, "[r]egardless of how well students do in college, poor
scores on the LSAT" may deny them access to the legal
profession.63
The company that administers the LSAT, the Law School Ad-
mission Council ("LSAC"), and many schools that primarily rely
on the LSAT for admission, maintain that the test is not biased in
favor of white test takers and, instead, is a good predictor of law
school success.64 Their conclusions have been hotly contested.65
Critics note that the subject matter of LSAT questions, like those
of standardized tests generally, contain inherent cultural biases in
favor of majority test takers.66
There is also evidence that the LSAT favors wealthy test tak-
ers. 67 At least one study has demonstrated that "not only do the
wealthy do better than the poor on the LSAT, but the wealthy also
do better than the middle class on the test.''68 If the LSAT was, in
fact, biased against poorer students, Latinos would be among the
Differences in Educational Attainment?: A Study of Equally Achieving "Elite" College
Students, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1074-76 (2001) (discussing the impact the LSAT has
on African-American and Asian-Pacific Americans).
62. Using data compiled in a 1976 study, Holley and Kleven found that, for the
population sampled, if LSAT scores were used exclusively to determine admission
(and all applicants scoring 550 in old system were admitted), only 0.4 percent of the
total admittees would have been Latino. If the decisions had been based solely on
UGPA (and all applicants scoring 3.00 were admitted), however, Latino admission
rates would increase substantially to a full one percent. Holley & Kleven, supra note
11, at 310.
63. Simien, supra note 43, at 371; see Kidder, supra note 61, at 1073-75 (providing
an analysis of LSAT score discrepancies between white and minority students of simi-
lar academic backgrounds).
64. LSAC conducted a study in 1980 to verify the predictive capabilities of the
LSAT and to respond to charges that the LSAT was racially biased. Simien, supra
note 43, at 382. The study concluded that there was no "significant difference in the
correlation of the LSAT scores and first year averages of white and minority candi-
dates." Id. Ed Haggerty, spokesman for the Law School Admission Council, and
Dean David E. Van Zandt, Dean of Northwestern University School of Law, explic-
itly stated that the LSAT scores were designed and are used to predict first year
grades and that it is a vital step in their admission process. Schott, supra note 48, at 3.
65. Simien, supra note 43, at 382.
66. Kidder, supra note 61, at 1080-94, 1119-20; Simien, supra note 43, at 382.
67. Guinier, supra note 48, at 59; Simien, supra note 43, at 375; Linda F. Wight-
man, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Conse-
quences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 52-53 (1997); Abiel Wong, Note, "Boalt-ing" Opportunity?: Decon-
structing Elite Norms in Law School Admissions, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y
199, 231-34 (1999).
68. Simien, supra note 43, at 375.
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most affected. According to the most recent data from the United
States Census Bureau, although Latinos represent 12.5 percent of
the total population, they comprise 21.4 percent of the poor.69 Ad-
ditionally, critics note that LSAT scores may be affected by test
coaching, which is expensive or otherwise unavailable to lower in-
come students.70
Moreover, critics contend that even if the LSAT is not biased
against Latinos and other minorities, it is a weak predictor of law
school success in general for white students and non-white alike.7'
"Nationwide the LSAT is [nine] percent better than random [selec-
tion] in predicting first-year law school grades, and this is what the
test is [supposed to be] best at predicting. ' 72 Essentially, the LSAT
gauges an individual's intellectual qualities, such as analyzing and
manipulating abstract legal concepts.73 One expert test taker noted
that the LSAT merely measures how well a student takes the
LSAT-and little else and that, in fact, it "fails to admit the best
students. 74
There is even evidence that the LSAT correlates negatively with
many of the attributes of an effective lawyer. Many commentators
claim that the criteria not only "'bear no meaningful relationship
69. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PEOPLE AND FAMILIES IN
POVERTY BY SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS: 2000 AND 2001 (2002) [hereinafter CEN-
SUS, PEOPLE AND FAMILIES IN POVERTY], available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/
poverty/poverty0l/tables0l.html (last visited May 15, 2003).
70. Simien, supra note 43, at 383; Wong, supra note 67, at 232-34.
71. Holley & Kleven, supra note 11, at 315-17 (discussing a 1981 Columbia Law
School study showing a significantly lower correlation between "LSAT scores and law
school grades for whites and minorities separately than for the sample group as a
whole.").
72. Guinier, supra note 48, at 59.
73. Simien, supra note 43, at 384.
74. Kevin McMullin, Building a Better Legal Population; Schools Shouldn't Rely
so Heavily on Test Scores in Admissions, TEX. LAW., Nov. 23, 1998, at 22. Kevin Mc-
Mullin has been an instructor for The Princeton Review, a New York based test-
training company, since 1993 and is currently director of their public relations. Id.
Mr. McMullin has publicly expressed his concerns over the unreasonable emphasis
placed on the LSAT:
Imagine a student who dedicated years of study to challenging undergradu-
ate courses. She could spark intelligent discussion in the classroom. She
could be the kind of leader on her campus who motivates other students
around her to excel. She could volunteer in the community, perhaps intern-
ing at a firm that offers free legal aid to recent immigrants. Her letters of
recommendation could be shining, her academic record impeccable and her
yearning to bring her passion to law school unwavering. Most people would
agree that she would make a welcome addition to any law school.
But if she doesn't fill in enough bubbles correctly during the LSAT, her
chances of admission change dramatically.
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to intellectual merit,"' but also "'may [in fact] be inversely related
to important nonintellectual traits which are also necessary for
competent performance in the law.""' The critics claim that Lati-
nos and other minorities who enter the profession outperform their
white counterparts on the basis of factors that are central to the
legal profession, such as leadership, professional success, public in-
terest, and contribution to the community. 76
Whether or not the LSAT and the UGPA are adequate indica-
tors of the capacity to succeed in law school or not, the effect that
these admissions practices have had on Latino applicants is ines-
capable. Part II surveys several responses to the problem.
II. RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEM
A. Lobby for the Continuance of Threatened
Affirmative Action Policies
With the struggle for civil rights as a backdrop, many schools in
the late 1960s attempted to increase minority enrollment; unfortu-
nately, they found that the existing criteria posed a significant ob-
stacle to admittance for many minority candidates.77 In response,
some schools initiated affirmative action programs to set aside a
specified number of seats for minority students. 78 Attacked as "re-
verse discrimination, 719 these policies sparked immediate debate
over their constitutionality.80 The debate reached the United
States Supreme Court in 1978.81 In Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke,82 the Court held that strict racial quotas for
professional school admissions were unconstitutional.83 The Court,
75. Guinier, supra note 48, at 59; Simien, supra note 43, at 385 (quoting Barbara
Lerner, Equal Protection and External Screening: Davis, Defunis, and Bakke, Ad-
dress at Educational Measurement and the Law: Proceeding of the 1977 ETS Invita-
tional Conference (1977)); see infra note 67 and accompanying text, for a discussion of
relevant traits.
76. Guinier, supra note 48, at 59.
77. Lundwall, supra note 13, at 149; see supra Part I.B.
78. Id. at 149-52.
79. "Reverse discrimination" is commonly used to refer to an alleged "[t]ype of
discrimination in which majority groups are purportedly discriminated against in
favor of minority groups, usually via affirmative action programs." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1319 (6th ed. 1990). This claim has been primarily used by white appli-
cants who were denied admission to programs because they did not meet the qualify-
ing standards. E.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978)
(holding the use of quotas based on race as unconstitutional).
80. Lundwall, supra note 13, at 149.
81. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 289.
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however, upheld the use of race as one element in a range of fac-
tors a university may consider in attaining the goal of a diverse
student body.84
Recently, even this limited use of race in the admissions process
has come under attack. In 1995, the Regents of the University of
California voted to end affirmative action programs at all Univer-
sity of California campuses.85 Soon thereafter, in 1996, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Hopwood v. Texas,
prohibited the use of racial preferences by public schools in
Texas.86 That same year, a California ballot initiative, Proposition
209, banned the use of race as a factor in admissions to colleges
and graduate schools in that state. 87 The Supreme Court refused to
block or hear a challenge to Proposition 209.88 Due to these devel-
opments, local schools reported drastic reductions in minority
enrollment.89
For instance, at the University of California at Berkeley School
of Law, the number of African-American students admitted fell
from seventy-five in 1996 to fifteen in 1997.90 At the University of
Texas School of Law that same year, the number fell from sixty-
five to eleven.91 The Center for Individual Rights, the organization
that represented the plaintiffs in Hopwood, struck again in 1997 by
filing federal suits against the University of Washington School of
Law, and the University of Michigan, and its corresponding law
school.92 In Washington, citizens followed suit by passing Initiative
200, which banned affirmative action for higher education, public
contracting, and hiring. 93 In contrast, the United States Court of
84. Id. at 314.
85. Lucy Hodges, Not Simply a Black and White Issue; There is Nothing Wrong
with an Admissions Policy that Favours Minorities if it is Properly Targeted, Says Lucy
Hodges, INDEP., Nov. 16, 1995, at 14; Paul Craig Roberts, Quotas a Bad Idea Whose
Time Has Gone, Bus. WK., Sept. 11, 1995, at 23.
86. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996).
87. Cynthia Cotts, Texas Lawyers Round Up Cash for Minority LSAT Scholar-
ships, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 20, 1998, at A13.
88. Joan Biskupic, Justices Refuse to Block California Anti-Preference Law; High
Court May Rule on Constitutionality, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1997, at A3.
89. James Traub, The Class of Prop. 209, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1999, § 6 (Magazine),
at 44.
90. Cotts, supra note 87, at A13.
91. Id. In response to Hopwood, the Texas legislature enacted the Texas Ten Per-
cent Plan, which guaranteed the top ten percent of Texas high school students admis-
sion to the University of Texas and Texas A&M. Id.
92. Even Civil Rights Groups Pulled Their Punches on Affirmative Action, NAT'L
L.J., Dec. 29, 1997/Jan. 5, 1998, at B13.
93. WASHINGTON STATE CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE: INITIATIVE 200, available at
http://www.adversity.net/i200.htm#xxi200text (last visited May 15, 2003).
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Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in response to the University of
Michigan litigation, held that the use of race as one of many factors
in processing admissions to the University of Michigan's Law
School was constitutional.94 The Supreme Court subsequently
granted certiorari and the case was argued on April 1, 2003.95
Given the uncertain future of these affirmative action policies, the
need to open alternative avenues to bolster Latino enrollment is
now greater than ever.96
B. Advocate for Change in Admissions Criteria
The relatively low correlation between the LSAT/UGPA and law
school grades 97 suggests that many applicants, including Latinos,
who are denied admission due to low scores may, in fact, be better
suited than applicants who are admitted.98 Nevertheless, even
though many law schools concede the criteria's flaws, 99 they are
reluctant to abandon them, given the importance placed upon
them by U.S. News & World Report magazine in compiling its all-
important annual ranking of law schools.10
Even if the LSAT and UGPA were perfect predictors of the ca-
pacity to excel in law school, their systematic tendency to screen
out capable Latino candidates at a greater rate than they screen
out capable whites, 101 makes the near-exclusive use of these criteria
94. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 738-39 (6th Cir. 2002). The companion case
regarding the University of Michigan's undergraduate program, Gratz v. Bollinger,
123 S. Ct. 1777 (2003), remains imminent.
95. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 617, 618 (2002).
96. But see Barbara Bader Aldave, Hopwood v. Texas; Much Ado About Noth-
ing?, TEX. LAW., Nov. 11, 1996, at 43 (arguing that Hopwood is not a legitimate threat
to affirmative action policies).
97. See supra notes 48-76 and accompanying text.
98. See Gunier, supra note 48, at 59 (discussing how Latinos may, in fact, become
better lawyers); Holley & Kleven, supra note 11, at 309. In fact, both the LSAC and
ABA caution law schools against excessive reliance on the LSAT in admissions deci-
sions. Simien, supra note 43, at 390.
99. See Schott, supra note 48, at 3 (discussing the point of views from several law
school deans in regards to the use of the LSAT in the admissions process).
100. Opinion Inadmissible; Newton's Law, TEX. LAW., Feb. 2,1998, at 3 (citing for-
mer Texas Bar President W. Frank Newton); Schott, supra note 48, at 3 (discussing
the possibility of withholding LSAT scores from schools that improperly use LSAT
scores in order to boost their U.S. News & World Report rankings). According to U.S.
News & World Report, UGPA and LSAT scores play a twenty-five percent role in
their methodology for law school rankings. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., at http://
www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/grad/rankings/about/O4law-methbrief.php (last visited
May 15, 2003).
101. BROWN & MARENCO, supra note 48, at 18; Guinier, supra note 48, at 59; Hol-
ley & Kleven, supra note 11, at 310; Kidder, supra note 61, at 1073-76; Simien, supra
note 43, at 371.
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difficult to justify. Instead, admissions officers should revisit the
goals underlying the law school admissions process. The selection
process' legitimate goal is to produce competent lawyers who will
meet the current service needs of the society. 10 2 Unfortunately,
these current criteria do not best serve this function. They ignore a
host of other traits that are equally valuable, if not more so, to
lawyering including: motivation, perseverance, interpersonal sensi-
tivity, character integrity, and social responsibility.1 0 3 The current
need for legal services in Latino communities is also a legitimate
reason to modify the criteria in a way to allow admission of other-
wise qualified Latino lawyers. 4
The use of factors other than the potential for academic success
is nothing new to law school admissions decisions. Among other
things, schools often consider factors such as an applicant's
hometown, specific legal interests, and work experience. 1°5 State
schools often have different admissions standards for in-state and
out-of-state residents.0 6 Many schools even afford special prefer-
ences to offspring of faculty, alumni, and donors. 10 7
Fortunately, at least one law school has seen it fit to reform its
admissions policies. After minority enrollments plummeted in the
face of Hopwood-as much as eighty-five percent for some ethnic
groups-the University of Texas School of Law re-evaluated its ad-
missions policies.10 8 For the first time ever, the school interviewed
its applicants. The school considered leadership skills, community
service, success in overcoming adversity, and socioeconomic factors
in determining admission. At the same time, the school de-empha-
sized the LSAT and the UGPA as factors in admissions. As a re-
sult, African-American and Mexican-American acceptances at the
law school for 1998-99 were up from the previous year, though still
below pre-Hopwood levels. 0 9
102. BROWN & MARENCO, supra note 48, at 15-16; Holley & Kleven, supra note 11,
at 318.
103. Simien, supra note 43, at 384.
104. As professors at a predominantly minority law school, Holley and Kleven have
found that minority graduates are more likely than non-minority graduates to serve
these minority communities. Holley & Kleven, supra note 11, at 318.
105. ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE, supra note 20, at 11; Simien, supra note 43, at
390.
106. ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE, supra note 20, at 11; Simien, supra note 43, at
390.
107. ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE, supra note 20, at 11; Simien, supra note 43, at
390.
108. McMullin, supra note 74, at 22.
109. The pressure on schools to change their admissions policies can come from bar
associations. A number of Southern minority bar groups have recently joined to de-
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Supporters of the traditional criteria may suggest that to the ex-
tent that the current admissions criteria are, in fact, related to suc-
cess in the first year of law school, admitting students who fail to
meet those criteria should ultimately decrease the number of stu-
dents who graduate. 110 On the contrary, a study commissioned by
LSAC demonstrates that it is not necessarily true that students ad-
mitted with inferior scores will fail at a greater rate than do the
students admitted under the current criteria."'
C. Help Ensure that Current Latino Applicants Meet
Existing Admissions Criteria
In the meantime, while they advocate for fair admissions poli-
cies, interested parties may help to bolster enrollments now by en-
suring that those who are in the final stages of the admissions
process make it to the starting line.
1. Commercial LSAT Preparation
Given the role that the LSAT plays in the admissions process,
one important key to increased Latino enrollments lies in improv-
ing candidate LSAT scores. While evidence shows that commercial
preparation courses can improve candidates' scores," 2 the high
cost of commercial preparation, nearly $4,000,113 is a significant im-
pediment for many economically disadvantaged students. As such,
velop a proposal to encourage law schools to consider factors other than academic
record and admissions test scores for some of their admission offers. Opinion Inad-
missible; Newton's Law, supra note 100, at 3. The proposal would require schools to
report to the American Bar Association, which monitors and accredits law schools,
the numeric factors for only seventy-five percent of their admittees. Id. Proponents
assert that this would free the schools to consider factors such as leadership and com-
munity service for the other twenty-five percent of admittees. Id.
110. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
111. See LINDA WIGHTMAN, LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, NATIONAL LONGITU-
DINAL BAR PASSAGE STUDY ix, 80 (1998) (discussing how minorities that were ac-
cepted into law school with lower UGPA and LSAT score did not do substantially
different). But see Stephen Thernstrom, Diversity and Meritocracy in Legal Educa-
tion: A Critical Evaluation of Linda F. Wightman's "The Threat To Diversity in Legal
Education" 15 CONST. COMMENT. 11, 11-43 (1998) (challenging the results of Wight-
man's study).
112. According to Kaplan Test Centers, students who participate in their course
improve their LSAT scores, on average, by 7.2 points. Telephone interview with
Catherine Exa, Director of Public Relations, Kaplan Test Centers (May 8, 2000).
113. Kaplan Test Centers charge from $159 for a basic do-it-yourself course to
$3,999 that includes the classroom course and thirty-five hours of private tutoring.
Kaplan Website, at http://www.kaptest.com/repository/templates/Lev3InitDroplet.
jhtml?_jev3Parent=/www/KapTest/docs/repository/content/Law/LSAT (last visited
May 15, 2003).
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commercial LSAT preparation course providers can play a vital
role in increasing Latino enrollments by making their services
available to these students.' 14
The Minority Legal Scholarship Program, a partnership between
Texas Appleseed, a nonprofit organization of bar and civic leaders
that pursues public-interest issues, and Kaplan Educational Cen-
ters, was launched in 1998 and quickly showed results. 115 Just one
year later, sixty-one students participated in a thirty-hour Kaplan
LSAT preparation course.' 6 At the commencement of the pro-
gram, more than half of the students who participated had previ-
ously scored below 140 on the LSAT, "a [score] that would have
barred them from admission to most Texas law schools." 1 7 After
completing the program, eighty-two percent of the students who
took the test scored higher than 140, fourteen students showed sig-
nificant improvement by raising their scores by double-digits, rang-
ing from ten to twenty-two points, and four students scored in the
160 range.118
Nonprofit organizations can also provide alternative programs to
prepare students for the LSAT. For example, the Puerto Rican Le-
gal Defense and Education Fund ("PRLDEF") operates a six-
week LSAT preparation seminar for students who are unable to
afford the costs of the commercial courses and who meet specific
income qualifications. 19 PRLDEF also provides its participants
with on-site application advisement and assigns them to practicing
attorney mentors. 120
114. Id. Commercial course providers such as Princeton Review and Kaplan Test
Centers do provide discounted rates on a case by case basis for students who demon-
strate financial need.
115. Elizabeth Amon, A Post-'Hopwood' Diversity Plan Scores: Texas Firms Target
Minorities Through LSAT Prep Course, NAT'L L.J., June 14, 1999, at A16.
116. Id.
117. Id. According to the LSAC, the test score range for the LSAT is between 120
to 180. Law School Admission Council, at http://www.lsac.org/LSAC.asp?url=/lsac/
faqs-and-support-lsat.asp (last visited May 15, 2003).
118. Id.
119. Interview with Ileana Infante, Director of Education Programs, Puerto Rican
Legal Defense and Education Fund, in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 7, 2003). Moreover,
those familiar with the course argue that, because it is designed for, and attracts La-
tino and minority students, its value is independent of its price-accessibility because it
provides unique support and encouragement. Interview with Jenny Rivera, Professor
of Law, City University of New York School of Law, in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 6,
2003).
120. Interview with Ileana Infante, supra note 119; Interview with Jenny Rivera,
supra note 119.
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While LSAT coaching provides critical support for those stu-
dents who are in a position to benefit from it, nevertheless, its ef-
fect is limited by the size of the existing pool of eligible Latino
candidates that are interested in law school and will actually take
the test.121 Additionally, LSAT coaching alone will not prepare
otherwise poorly educated students for success on the LSAT.
2. Pre-Start Programs
Among the most common approaches to ensuring that those
who are admitted ultimately enroll is the pre-start program. Many
law schools and other institutions provide academic support ser-
vices to assist already admitted students who may be at risk of fail-
ing because of inadequate preparation or lack of confidence. 122
Some pre-start programs are designed as conditional admissions
devices12 3 and are thus particularly important in the context of in-
creasing enrollments. Pre-start programs are usually offered in the
summer before regular fall classes and can span from two days to
two months.2 4
a. Council on Legal Education
One of the oldest and most successful pre-start programs is the
Pre-Law Summer Institute sponsored by the Council on Legal Ed-
121. See REPORT TO INCREASE DIVERSITY, supra note 4, at 68 (providing a data
table of law school applicants from 1995 to 2000 and their credentials).
122. Lundwall, supra note 13, at 150.
123. Id. at 151.
124. As a summer associate at Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw ("MBR&M"), Wil-
liam Malpica, facilitated the creation of an annual orientation incoming for entering
Latino law students from the New York City area in 2000. The brainchild of Ileana
Infante, and now a joint project of PRLDEF and MBR&M, the day-long seminar
features workshops by Latino law students, professors, and other experts, who have
included Professor Jenny Rivera, Professor Solangel Maldonado, Professor Tanya
Hernandez, Steven Cordero, and Kenneth Padilla, geared to surviving the first year of
law school. The program, approaching its fifth year, utilizes materials from the Ford-
ham Academic Enrichment Program and the Academic Success Program at Brooklyn
Law School. MBR&M donates space, meals, and other conference services. In addi-
tion to the panelists, the program has benefited from the help of the members of a
volunteer committee, including Neysa Alsina, Dean Nitza Escalera, Mauricio Espafia,
Linda Feldman, Ileana Infante, Roberto Lebron, Jason Otafio, Sonji Patrick, Jose Pe-
rez, Gloria Yolanda Rivera, Sandra Rodriguez, and Patricia Yanez. The workshops
conclude with a reception where participants meet practicing lawyers, judges, and
other members of the New York City legal community and local Latino bar associa-
tions, including the Puerto Rican Bar Association, the Hispanic National Bar Associa-
tion, and the Dominican Bar Association. Later, PRLDEF matches participants with
mentors from its attorney network of bar volunteers. Program Will Help Latino Law
Students, 228 N.Y. L.J., Aug. 8, 2002, News, at 2.
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ucation. 125 CLEO institutes are six-week residential programs that
target economically and educationally disadvantaged students.2 6
CLEO is both a head-start program and an admissions program.12 7
It functions as a head-start program by introducing admitted stu-
dents to the law school environment, teaching methods, and
faculty.1 28 Law schools use CLEO as an admissions program by
conditioning admission to law school on the successful completion
of the program.1 29 The program has been successful in preparing
students for law school for over twenty-five years.130 Although
CLEO is funded in part by federal grants, students must pay a
$2,000 fee to participate.13' Low income, first generation college
graduates, however, are eligible for tuition assistance to cover tui-
tion, books, a living stipend, and some travel expenses for the dura-
tion of the program that would require only a payment of $200. 132
The CLEO program incorporates many of the program compo-
nents discussed below. 133
b. New York Legal Education Opportunity Program
The New York State Unified Court System has recently
launched a new pre-start program similar to CLEO.3 A rigorous
six-week residential program, the New York Legal Education Op-
portunity Program ("NYLEO") is designed to improve partici-
pant's analytical, writing, and basic law school study skills through
instruction in first-year law school core courses. In addition,
NYLEO provides students training in legal research, writing, and
125. For a more detailed discussion of the CLEO program, see generally Kenneth
J. Burns, Jr., CLEO: Friend of Disadvantaged Minority Law Students, 61 A.B.A. J.
1483 (1975) (discussing the creation of CLEO summer institutes); Council on Legal
Education Opportunity website, at http://cleoscholars.com (last visited May 15, 2003).
CLEO is discussed here because, unlike the programs in Part II.D, it targets already-
admitted students.
126. Burns, supra note 125, at 1483-84; CLEO Scholars, CLEO Pre-Law Summer
Institute, at http://cleoscholars.com/prelaw/incapply.cfm (last visited May 15, 2003).
127. Lundwall, supra note 13, at 151.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See supra notes 59-59 and accompanying text (regarding the CLEO graduation
rate).
131. American Bar Association, CLEO: The Council on Legal Education Opportu-
nity, at http://www.abanet.org/cleo/whatis.html (last visited May 15, 2003); CLEO
Scholars, supra note 126.
132. American Bar Association, supra note 131; CLEO Scholars, supra note 126.
133. American Bar Association, supra note 131; see infra Part II.D.
134. N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., JUDICIARY 2003-04 BUDGET REQUEST: Ex-
ECUTIVE SUMMARY vi (2002), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/budget/bgt03-
04/execsum0304gov.pdf (last visited May 15, 2003).
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analysis.135 Students will also visit courts in session and meet legal
professionals including members of the judiciary. 136
The program will be provided free of charge at the New York
State Judicial Institute, the court system's newly created judicial
education and training center located on the campus of the Pace
University School of Law. 137 It will also cover all expenses, includ-
ing courses, textbooks, dormitory, meals, and access to law school
library and computer facilities. 138
The program's stated mission is "to promote diversity within the
legal community by improving the probability of academic success
for minority, low income and educationally disadvantaged" indi-
viduals who will be attending law school. 139 To be eligible to par-
ticipate, students must, among other things, receive their college
degree by the start of the summer program, be accepted or have an
application pending at a New York law school, and agree to attend
a New York law school in the fall. 140
c. The Fordham University School of Law
A number of law schools also provide pre-start support.141 The
Fordham University School of Law operates a seven-week pro-
gram for admitted students during the summer prior to first year of
classes. 142 The Academic Enrichment Program ("AEP") is coordi-
nated by the school's dean of student affairs and run by an adjunct
135. N.Y. STATE JUDICIAL INST., NEW YORK LEGAL EDUCATION OPPORTUNITY
PROGRAM: NEW YORK LEO PROGRAM-PROMOTING ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE AND
DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL COMMUNITY (2003).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Letter from Robert G.M. Keating, Dean, New York State Judicial Institute, to
Prospective Applicants (2003).
140. N.Y. STATE JUDICIAL INST., supra note 135. For more information, contact
NYLEO toll free at 866-877-3121 or at nyleo@courts.state.ny.us.
141. Case Western Reserve University School of Law: Our Law School Commu-
nity, at http://lawwww.cwru.edu/community/studentServices.htm#academicEnrich
ment (last visited May 15, 2003); Georgia State University College of Law, at http://
law.gsu.edu/students/STU-aep.htm (last visited May 15, 2003); Academic Enrichment
at the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, at http://www.law.umkc.
edu/faculty/profiles/glesnerfines/umkc-enrich.htm (last visited May 15, 2003).
142. A number of schools run similar programs, including the Academic Success
Program at Brooklyn Law School, the Third World Orientation Program at CUNY
Law School, and the Minority Student Program at Rutgers Law School. Telephone
interview with Linda Feldman, Director of Educational Services, Brooklyn Law
School (July 13, 1999); Interview with Kenneth Padilla, Director of Minority Student
Program, Rutgers Law School, in New York, N.Y. (Aug. 10, 2002); Interview with
Jenny Rivera, supra note 119.
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manager. a4 3 In addition to the general immersion course, which is
open to all students, AEP is offered to self-identified "disadvan-
taged" students. 44 The program combines school professors and
current students as faculty and covers basic topics including legal
writing, case briefing, and time management, all in an effort to
equip participants with the tools necessary to survive the first
year.14 5 The program also provides students with simulated class
sessions to introduce students to the unique nature of the law
school class format.a4 6 Since students are able to meet their peers,
upper-class students, and faculty before classes begin, 47 the pro-
gram operates as an effective tool to combat the isolation encoun-
tered by many minority students in law school.
d. Limitations of Pre-Start Programs
While pre-start programs have undoubtedly assisted many La-
tino students in obtaining law degrees, they are not designed to
increase the pool of qualified minority applicants. 48 Instead, they
focus on assisting already admitted students for the demands of law
school. 14 9 The next Section considers existing efforts to increase
the pool by actively encouraging students to consider careers in the
law.
D. Recruit Greater Numbers of Potentially Successful
Candidates and Prepare Them to Succeed
If Latino enrollment in the legal community is to be increased, a
greater number of Latino students must be encouraged to consider
law. It is also important to ensure that those who apply possess the
143. Interview with Nitza M. Escalera, Assistant Dean of Student Affairs, Fordham
University School of Law, in New York, N.Y. (Aug. 29, 2002); E-mail from Cynthia
Juco, Assistant Director of Student Affairs, Fordham University School of Law, to
Mauricio Espafia, Cooper Editor, Fordham Urban Law Journal (Apr. 4, 2003, 09:16:06
EST) (on file with author).
144. Interview with Nitza M. Escalera, supra note 143; E-mail from Cynthia Juco to
Mauricio Espafia, supra note 143.
145. Interview with Nitza M. Escalera, supra note 143; E-mail from Cynthia Juco to
Mauricio Espafia, supra note 143.
146. Interview with Nitza M. Escalera, supra note 143; E-mail from Cynthia Juco to
Mauricio Espafia, supra note 143.
147. Interview with Nitza M. Escalera, supra note 143; E-mail from Cynthia Juco to
Mauricio Espafia, supra note 143.
148. See Lundwall, supra note 13, at 151 (discussing the purpose of pre-start
programs).
149. Id.
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qualifications necessary to attain admission to law school.15° This
latter proposition requires that advocates resist the temptation to
merely target those who are most likely to successfully apply to law
school in the future. On the contrary, to increase the numbers of
applicants, the legal community must reach beyond these "sure
bets" and identify and motivate students who have yet to fully real-
ize their academic potential, while they still have the time to do
SO.
15 1
"[M]any talented minority students fail to seriously consider le-
gal careers because they lack reliable information about the de-
mands of law school and the legal profession, and confidence in
their own abilities."'52 The problem, however, extends beyond the
mere lack of information and confidence.'5 3 As a result of the con-
tinuous pattern of poverty and a lack of professional role models,
many talented minority students are the first members of their
families to graduate from college.' 54 Undoubtedly, this alone is a
great achievement, but often these individuals are capable of much
greater feats. 55
This subpart samples existing efforts that serve as models of re-
cruitment and preparation strategies. The programs highlight the
various components that have proven effective in the effort to en-
hance enrollments, including pre-law advisement, academic sup-
port, mentorship, test preparation, and the demystification of the
profession.
1. Law Student Associations
Law students are uniquely positioned to recruit future law stu-
dents. Latino students at most law schools have organized Latin
American Law Student Associations ("LALSA"). 56 The LALSA
150. For example, in 1990 (of those who had both LSAT scores and grade point
averages on file) only twenty-nine percent of Latino applicants had both an LSAT
score in the forty-eighth percentile and a grade point average of 3.0 or above.
Lundwall, supra note 13, at 152 (citing LAW SCH. ADMISSION SERVS., MINORITY PAR-
TICIPATION IN LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE PROFESSION: A COMPENDIUM OF DATA
21 (1990)).
151. Interview with Jenny Rivera, supra note 119.
152. Lundwall, supra note 13, at 153.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Boston College School of Law, Latin American Law Students Associ-
ation, at http://216.239.33.100/search?q=cache:tg8LXJcalhUC:www.bc.edu/bc-org/
avp/law/st-org/lalsa/+LALSA&hl=en&ie=UTF-8 (last visited May 15, 2003); Boston
University School of Law, Latin American Law Students Association, at http://216.
239.33.100/search?q=cache:Kz-Isk9WXDAC:people.bu.edu/lalsa/+LALSA&hl=
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at the Fordham University School of Law conducts a recruitment
program to reach out to local colleges and high schools. 157 Mem-
bers of the association make presentations at area high schools and
colleges aimed at demystifying the process of applying to law
school. 158 The very act of presenting Latino role models helps pro-
spective applicants to envision themselves in the position of law
student.
The Fordham LALSA also arranges special visits to the law
school for those students interested in learning more. 159 Each visit
includes a combination of a tour of the school, attendance in live
class, and meetings with admissions and financial aid officers.1
60
The organization also schedules annual recruiting workshops at the
school. 161 Finally, LALSA members have teamed up with the
school's admissions department in order to provide a Latino pres-
ence at Law Fairs where the school recruits potential candidates.
62
2. National Minority Law Recruitment Month
The Law School Admissions Council, in 1998, unveiled a grant
program designed to increase the recruitment of minority law stu-
dents. 63 The program provides law schools with a $1,000 grant in
exchange for hosting an event during the month of February-the
program's designated National Minority Law Recruitment
Month-which targets potential minority law students. 164
<Eol>en&ie=UTF-8 (last visited May 15, 2003); Saint Louis University School of
Law, Latin American Law Students Association, at http://Iaw.slu.edu/organizations/
LALSA/ (last visited May 15, 2003).
157. Interview with Eric Medina, President, Fordham Latin American Law Student
Association, at Fordham University School of Law, in New York, N.Y. (Apr. 15,
2003); Interviews with Oscar Tobar, Chair of Recruitment, Fordham Latin American
Law Student Association, at the Fordham University School of Law, in New York,
N.Y. (Sept.- May 2000); Interview with Aimde Perez Valentfn, Chair of Recruitment,
Fordham Fordham Latin American Law Student Association, at the Fordham Univer-
sity School of Law, in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 26, 2003).
158. Interview with Eric Medina, supra note 157; Interviews with Oscar Tobar,
supra note 157; Interview with Aim6e Pdrez Valentfn, supra note 157.
159. Interview with Eric Medina, supra note 157; Interviews with Oscar Tobar,
supra note 157; Interview with Aim6e P6rez Valentfn, supra note 157.
160. Interview with Eric Medina, supra note 157; Interviews with Oscar Tobar,
supra note 157; Interview with Aim6e P6rez Valentfn, supra note 157.
161. Interview with Eric Medina, supra note 157; Interviews with Oscar Tobar,
supra note 157; Interview with Aimde P6rez Valentfn, supra note 157.
162. Interview with Eric Medina, supra note 157; Interviews with Oscar Tobar,
supra note 157; Interview with Aimde P6rez Valentfn, supra note 157.
163. Joseph Gulino, Area Law Schools Participate In Programs Promoting Diver-
sity, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 26, 1998, at 5.
164. Id.
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The program's first participants were the University of Penn-
sylvania School of Law and the Temple University School of Law,
which planned joint activities to expose high school and early col-
lege students to careers in the law.165 Through the "Pathways to
Law School Forum," the universities expected to reach approxi-
mately fifty local high school and college students over a three-year
period.166 Their effort included historical presentations about mi-
nority lawyers including their contributions to the field.167 College
admissions officers also discussed what colleges seek in prospective
students. 168 The students met with current law students and wit-
nessed a mock law school class. 169 Additionally, the program
matched students with local minority attorneys who acted as men-
tors on an indefinite basis.170 Many schools continue to carry out
this process within their perspective communities. 171
3. Law Introduction Programs
Programs aimed at fostering an interest in the law among high
school students play a special role. While these programs may not,
by design, actively groom future lawyers, by providing disadvan-
taged and minority youth with an early introduction to the law and
to potential mentors, they may have the potential effect of increas-
ing the pool of Latino law school candidates.
165. Id. Many other law schools followed in their steps and participate in the pro-
gram. E.g., Press Release, Davina Gould, Stetson University College of Law, Stetson
University College of Law to host Minority Pre-Law Conference (Jan. 29, 2003),
available at http://216.239.39.100/search?q=cache:gdOIK248QxQJ:www.law.stetson.
edu/new/Prelaw.htm+ % 22National+Minority+Law+Recruitment+Month %22&hl=en
&ie=UTF-8 (last visited May 15, 2003); Press Release, Frank Grosso, Columbus
School of Law Participates in National Minority Law Student Recruitment Month
(Feb. 15, 2000), available at http://216.239.39.100/search?q=cache:iUgj3YVbgBUC:
law.cua.edu/news/newsarchives/PR000215.cfm+ %22National+Minority+Law+Recruit
ment+Month%22&hl=en&ie=UTF-8 (last visited May 15, 2003); Press Release,
Glenda Pierce, Nebraska University School of Law, NU College of Law to Host Di-
versity Law Day (Feb. 15, 2002), available at http://www.unl.edu/pr/2003/0203/020303a
news.html (last visited May 15, 2003); Roger Williams School of Law, News & Events:
Diversity Day to be held at Roger Williams School of Law (Feb. 22, 2001), at http://
216.239.39.100search?q=cache:ortzWXsNSnAC:law.rwu.edu/NEWS/Spring20011pr-
feb22.htm+%22National+Minority+Law+Recruitment+Month%22&hl=en&ie=UTF-
8 (last visited May 15, 2003); Vanderbilt University Law School, VULS Hosts Minor-
ity Student Recruitment Event, at http://law.vanderbilt.edu/about/news/2003/02_15.
html (last visited May 15, 2003).
166. Gulino, supra note 163, at 5.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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a. Street Law, Inc.
Street Law, Inc. is a nonprofit organization dedicated to improv-
ing the lives of young people through law-related education. 172 By
providing model teaching texts and materials, the organization
"makes it simple for teachers in inner-city schools to motivate stu-
dents to consider topics in the law and, potentially, even careers in
the law.' 1 73 The program is geared towards providing substantive
information about law and democracy and promotes problem solv-
ing, critical thinking, and communication skills.1 74 In addition, the
program facilitates mock trials and legal internships with partner
organizations.175
b. Justice Resource Center
The Justice Resource Center is a public-private venture estab-
lished in 1988.176 The Martin Luther King Justice Resource Center
("Center"), has partnered with the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, numerous law firms, corporate law departments,
non-profit organizations, and many others to expose minority stu-
dents to the law, legal institutions and process, and the values on
which they are based.177
The Center administers numerous specially-tailored programs
based in over a dozen New York City Public Schools, each de-
signed to meet the needs of the school's unique student population
as well as to benefit from locally available resources. 178 For exam-
ple, as part of the Academy of Criminal Justice, students from Mar-
tin Luther King High School attend law and forensic science
classes at neighboring John Jay College of Criminal Justice.1
79
172. Charles N. Quigley, Civic Education: Recent History, Current Status, and the
Future, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1425, 1443 (1999).
173. Interview with J.C. Polanco, Teacher, Truman High School, in the Bronx, N.Y.
(Apr. 15, 2002). J.C. Polanco is also an evening student at the Fordham University
School of Law and a member of the advisory board of the PRLDEF High School
Initiative. See infra Part III.
174. Quigley, supra note 172, at 1443.
175. Curriculum Puts Students on Trial; Legal Internships Show Law Careers, EDU-
CATING FOR EMPL., Feb. 7, 2001, at 1. For more information about Street Law, Inc.,
visit the website, at http://www.streetlaw.org (last visited May 15, 2003).
176. Filling The Pipeline-Mentoring; Opening the Window of Opportunity-Justice
Resource Center and City Bar Mentor Program, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Jan.
2000, at 38 [hereinafter Filling the Pipeline].
177. Id.; Interviews with Debra Lesser, Executive Director, Justice Resource
Center, in New York, N.Y. (Mar. 13, 2000/Jan. 21, 2003).
178. Interviews with Debra Lesser, supra note 177.
179. Filling the Pipeline, supra note 176, at 39.
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One of the cornerstones of the Center's programming is its At-
torney Mentor Program, which pairs each participating high school
with a New York City law firm. 180 Participating lawyers visit stu-
dents in their classes and, in addition, the students visit the lawyers
at the firm. 81
Mentoring sessions are informal, ranging from discussion of cur-
rent events to classroom and pre-law subjects and can be effective,
particularly in cases where mentors take a personal interest in their
assigned students."8 2 "We have had relationships where mentor
lawyers take their mentees to visit colleges[,] ... tutored kids on
the SATs[,] and some who paid for the SAT courses. ''183
The program also conducts an annual citywide Moot Court Com-
petition, co-sponsored by the Fordham University School of
Law.'8 4 Lawyers from each of the over fifty mentor firms serve as
coaches for participants from the firm's assigned school.' 85 Finally,
the programs' experience-based learning features are supple-
mented by a comprehensive academic component: each participat-
ing student is enrolled in law-related courses in each grade from
ninth to twelfth and law concepts are also weaved into other parts
of their curriculum.' 86
c. DuPont Legal Department
The private sector, particularly in-house counsel and law firms,
can play a central role in reaching Latino students in high school
and beyond. "[F]rustrated by the scarcity of minority attorneys
and legal assistants,"' 87 the DuPont corporate law department
formed a "Pipeline Committee. ' 188 This committee composed of
Dupont's attorneys, legal assistants, and legal secretaries-minori-
ties and nonminorities-identifies potential future minority law-
yers, particularly African-Americans and Latinos, and helps them
to obtain the education and tools needed to enter college and ulti-
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Interviews with Debra Lesser, supra note 177.
183. Filling the Pipeline, supra note 176, at 38.
184. Id.
185. Interviews with Debra Lesser, supra note 177.
186. Id.; see Filling the Pipeline, supra note 176, at 38.
187. Stacey Mobley, Priming the Pipeline to Diversity in the Legal Profession, 19
ACCA DOCKET 79, 80 (2001). Mobley cited two primary challenges resulting in the
low representation of minority lawyers: the lack of legal role models for young minor-
ity children and the negative image of lawyers projected in the media. Id. at 82.
188. Id.
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mately apply to law school. 18 9 The committee's efforts are specifi-
cally targeted to middle school and high school students and are
designed to provide legal-professional role models and mentors,
and assist participants in mastering the skills, including communi-
cation, reasoning, reading, and computer technology skills, neces-
sary to enter the legal profession.19 0
4. Academic Institutes
a. The Western Washington University and Gonzaga
Law School Models
"Academic institutes" are programs that recruit students and
provide them with comprehensive support to ensure their success
as candidates. They are costly and, thus, not very common. Two
schools, one undergraduate, Western Washington University, and
one law school, Gonzaga University School of Law, have devel-
oped effective programs to identify viable college candidates and
prepare them for law school admission. 191 In addition to the com-
prehensive nature of these programs, they are effective because
they identify students early in their college years.
In 1991, Western Washington University developed "The Law
and Diversity Program" in response to the need to diversify the
legal profession. 192 The two-year intensive program is open to any
person who has a strong interest in issues of law, diversity and ac-
cess to the legal field for underrepresented groups.193 The program
seeks and recruits "non-traditional" students, individuals who lack
189. Id.
190. Id. at 83. Although DuPont initially established only two programs, a mock
trial program to expose many children to different types of legal careers and a com-
puter skills training program to address what the Committee considered a primary
problem faced by minority pre-law students, Dupont compiled a comprehensive menu
and discussion of specific programs, including: pre-law clubs, summer law camp/
schools, mock trial teams, debate teams, participation in school career days, participa-
tion in "Take Our Daughters to Work Day," job shadowing, internships, "Law Day"
presentations, computer skills training, presentation/communication skills training,
and outreach presentations at minority job fairs. Id. at 83-86. Significantly, they also
sponsor the American Corporate Counsel Association's Pipeline Kit, which provides
a road map of existing and model community outreach programs for use by private
institutions interested in encouraging minority youth to consider careers in corporate
law. Id. at 80, 89.
191. See infra notes 192-246 and accompanying text.
192. Lorraine K. Bannai & Marie Eaton, Fostering Diversity in the Legal Profes-
sion: A Model for Preparing Minority and Other Non- Traditional Students for Law
School, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 821, 824 (1997).
193. Id.; Law & Diversity Program, About the Law & Diversity Program, at http://
www.ac.wwu.edu/-ldp/about.html (last visited May 15, 2003).
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the traditional academic law school admission indicators, such as
an above-average UGPA and LSAT scores, but demonstrate their
potential to succeed in law school in other ways.1 94
Gonzaga University School of Law developed a six-week sum-
mer program ("Summer Fellowship") intended to persuade under-
graduate minority students to enter the legal profession. 195 In
1990, the school operated a program for twenty-eight students se-
lected from colleges around the country.!96 Students were selected
based on undergraduate grade point averages, letters of recom-
mendation, personal statements, and other factors as were consid-
ered relevant on a case by case basis.' 97 The program covered the
students' expenses including tuition, room, board, and
transportation. 98
i. Curriculum
During their junior and senior years of college, the Law and Di-
versity program participants partake in a two-year, interdiscipli-
nary course of study.199 The students are introduced to a variety of
courses that are specifically chosen to provide them with the
knowledge and skills necessary to face and conquer the challenges
of law school.2"' The curriculum focuses on all the essential skills
for the study of law, including reading, writing, research, and ana-
lytical and verbal skills.210 Among other things, the course in-
troduces students to the workings of the American legal system in
order to provide them with a familiarity of legal concepts and ter-
minology, and to help them understand the law in a larger social,
historical, and political context.20 2
The Summer Fellowship offers a similar, although less extensive
curriculum. It provides students with an introduction to the key
lawyering skills: analysis, research, and writing.2 3 The Gonzaga
faculty noted that, unlike many other programs, their focus is on
excellence, not survival.20 4 Students are also introduced to legal
194. Bannai & Eaton, supra note 192, at 824.
195. Lundwall, supra note 13, at 153.
196. Id. at 155.
197. Id. at 154-55.
198. Id. at 155.
199. Bannai & Eaton, supra note 192, at 825; Law & Diversity Program, supra note
11.
200. Bannai & Eaton, supra note 192, at 826.
201. Law & Diversity Program, supra note 11.
202. Id.
203. Lundwall, supra note 13, at 155.
204. Id. at 153.
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history, the court systems, and the general philosophies that under-
pin the American legal system. 0 5
The programs also offer students an introduction to the law
school classroom environment.2 °6 For instance, at the Summer Fel-
lowship, instructors expose students to the rigors of the first-year of
law school by giving them extensive cases to read and brief.20 7 In-
structors expect students to fully participate in classroom discus-
sions in the same manner as first-year law students.20 8 Instructors
also assign weekly research papers that are graded. 0 9 In the end,
the participants receive a final grade from both their weekly re-
search papers and essay-type exams.210
ii. Internships
The two-year Law and Diversity program also offers each stu-
dent an internship during her last quarter of the program.2 1 1 The
internship provides the participants with an opportunity to practice
in a work environment the skills that they have acquired at the
institute.2 12 This internship also exposes the student to legal work
that they might want to continue on after law school.2 13
iii. Pre-Law Advisement and LSAT Preparation
Both programs also assist students in navigating through the law
school application process. 2 14 At the Summer Fellowship, the di-
rector privately meets with every student to discuss their career
goals, to evaluate their transcripts, and to make suggestions about
their law school choices. 215 Both programs provide participants
Many minority head start programs send a subtle message of inferiority to
students when they focus on "survival tips." The assumption underlying sup-
port programs is often internalized by students as a prediction of failure.
From the first day, we wanted our program to emphasize the student's status
as a scholar within a community of scholars.
Id. at 153-54.
205. Id. at 155.
206. Id. at 156.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. Administrators noted that "all students expressed surprise (and some dis-
may) over the workload. Yet not a single student in either summer session dropped
out of the program." Id.
211. Bannai & Eaton, supra note 192, at 827.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 830-31; Lundwall, supra note 13, at 153-57.
215. Lundwall, supra note 13, at 157.
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with the opportunity to meet with admissions and financial aid per-
sonnel, and attend classes with current law students.216 Student
participants are also introduced to basic law school admissions re-
sources, including LSAT materials, law school catalogs, law fairs,
and fee waivers.217 Law and Diversity arranges for commercial
LSAT preparation course providers to make their courses available
to participants at a reduced cost.218  The program reported
"marked improvement in LSAT scores as a result of these
courses." 219 For instance, the students' mean score improved as
much as nine points.22°
iv. Support Network
The students in these programs often "face [] a wide range of
financial, personal, and academic issues arising out of their unique
and sometimes difficult socio-economic circumstances. ' 221 These
issues are significant because they are a constant threat to their
academic performance.222 "[T]o help students learn to cope with
adversity while achieving academic success[,] ... [p]rogram faculty
members make themselves available to students on a continuous
basis. '223 The Law and Diversity program recruits other depart-
ments within the university, such as, the Counseling Center, the
Financial Aid Office, and the Registrar to provide a comprehensive
safety net for their students.224 It also raises funds to provide
emergency loans, scholarships, and other financial assistance.225 At
the Summer Fellowship, current law students are on hand to moni-
tor reactions to the program and offer praise and encourage-
ment.226 Students in both programs provide each other with
personal and academic support.227
216. Bannai & Eaton, supra note 192, at 830; Lundwall, supra note 13, at 153, 157.
217. Bannai & Eaton, supra note 192, at 830; Lundwall, supra note 13, at 156-57.
218. Bannai & Eaton, supra note 192, at 831.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 832. "Some students struggled daily to find enough money on which to
live. Some dealt with parenting and other family issues. Many of the students had to
develop confidence in their own abilities after years of feeling marginalized and iso-
lated in other academic settings." Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 832; Lundwall, supra note 13, at 156.
224. Bannai & Eaton, supra note 192, at 832.
225. Id.
226. Lundwall, supra note 13, at 156.
227. Bannai & Eaton, supra note 192, at 826; Lundwall, supra note 13, at 156.
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v. Role Modeling
Both programs seek to provide the participants with strong role
models and realistic introductions to the type of work done by at-
torneys.228 Summer Fellowship administrators found that most
participants had no prior personal contact with attorneys and held
narrow perceptions of the legal profession based primarily on tele-
vision.229 The Fellowship, therefore, schedules a series of sessions
with prominent minority judges, practitioners, and scholars. 230 Ad-
ditionally, students shadow their mentors at a legal services office,
appellate courts, an office of the Internal Revenue Service, and the
state legislature.231 Mentors give talks to the group covering major
areas, including their personal backgrounds, present employment,
obstacles they had overcome, and their plans for the future.232
vi. Outcomes
As of 1997, of the twenty-nine students who participated in the
1991-92 Law and Diversity session, sixteen students applied to law
school, and twelve of those students were admitted.233 Of the
twelve students admitted to law school, two have graduated, seven
are in good academic standing in ABA accredited law schools, two
are expected to enter law school this fall, and one withdrew during
the first year due to personal and academic difficulties.234
The Summer Fellowship also reported encouraging, if not quan-
tifiable results.235 The program notes that it achieved its primary
goal of providing a positive legal experience and demystifying the
process of applying to law school. 236 In both programs, all stu-
dents, even those who decided that law school was not the right
path for them, gained a new sense of self-confidence.237 Significant
accomplishments included acquiring valuable skills that can be ap-
plied in a wide range of settings, as well as becoming better able to
assume leadership positions within their own communities.238 For
228. Bannai & Eaton, supra note 192, at 822; Lundwall, supra note 13, at 156.
229. Lundwall, supra note 13, at 156.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 157.
232. Id.
233. Bannai & Eaton, supra note 192, at 833.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 835; Lundwall, supra note 13, at 158.
236. Lundwall, supra note 13, at 158.
237. Bannai & Eaton, supra note 192, at 835; Lundwall, supra note 13, at 158.
238. Bannai & Eaton, supra note 192, at 835.
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many of these students, simply acquiring a college degree was a
significant achievement.239
b. Virginia State Bar Initiative: School-to-College Program
The Virginia State Bar has recently established a new initiative
aimed at high school students similar to the Western Washington
and Gonzaga models described above which target college stu-
dents.240 The School-to-College Program, which provides minority
high school students with a comprehensive introduction to the
American judicial and legal system in order to encourage them to
attend college and law school.241 The program, held on a local law
school campus, incorporates a faculty comprised of law school
professors, judges, and visiting guest lecturers.242 Bar association
members act as teaching assistants and student mentors.243 In ad-
dition to classes, the course curriculum includes mock trials, re-
search and writing competitions, test preparation, and field trips.244
Students also receive free access to a specially tailored SAT
preparation course and access to online test preparation resources,
lawyer-donated frequent flyer miles, food and lodging to enable
students to visit colleges and universities, and counseling by profes-
sional college counselors and trained volunteer attorney men-
tors.245 Finally, each student is paired with a lawyer mentor who
will assist the student through high school, college, and law
school.246 Since the program remains in its early stages, it has not
generated much material regarding its success rates.
III. THE PRLDEF HIGH SCHOOL INITIATIVE: PROOF THAT
ANYONE CAN Do SOMETHING
In light of the glaringly disproportionate number of Latinos ad-
mitted to law school, a group of recent law school graduates set out
to contribute to a solution. Their result was a program that would
identify a small number of ambitious Latino high school students
239. Id. at 832.
240. See Virginia Millennium Diversity Initiative School-To-College Program, MET-
ROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Feb. 2002, at 33; supra notes 192-237 and accompanying
text; see also Interview with Jennifer McClellan, Founder of the Inititative, in New
York, N.Y. (Feb. 2, 2003).
241. Virginia Millennium Diversity Initiative School-To-College Program, supra
note 240.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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interested in the law and assist them as they strive to graduate high
school, enter college, and explore the legal profession.247
To assist in the formation and implementation of the program,
the organizers have established an advisory board comprised of
distinguished New York-area attorneys in private and public prac-
tice, elected and appointed officials, professors and deans, judges, a
high-school teacher, two law students, and one college student. 248
In March 2002, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education
Fund agreed to adopt the initiative and conduct the program as a
project of its education division. The advisory board is currently
working with PRLDEF to identify funding sources and launch a
test pilot program.
The pilot will target New York City high school sophomores and
provide participants with three principal forms of assistance: free
access to commercial SAT preparation; academic advisement in-
cluding supplemental pre-college counseling and intensive writing
workshops; and first-hand exposure to law schools and legal work-
places via visits to law schools, law firms, courtrooms, legal aid of-
fices, non-profits, and government agencies. In addition, each
advisor will adopt one participating student for one-on-one
mentoring support.
The effort is carefully designed according to the recommenda-
tions advanced in this Essay. First, the group will identify high
school sophomores, not college students or law school applicants.
In this way, the group aims to demystify the profession and inspire
young people who might not yet be focused on academic excel-
lence to do so early enough to create college admission opportuni-
ties. Second, to increase the future pool of Latino applicants, the
group will solely target economically disadvantaged youth. It will
not target students from wealthier families, who are more likely to
have access to financial resources, mentors, and information, and
who generally have a better opportunity to realize their academic
potential. Finally, the group will provide essential academic sup-
247. The planning for the project began in 1999 by William Malpica, two of his
Fordham University School of Law classmates, Jim Montes and Silvia Duarte, and
another friend, Laura Gonzalez.
248. The current board consists of Herb Barbot, Esq.; Silvia Duarte, Esq.; Dean
Nitza Escalera, Esq.; Robert Klingon, Esq.; William Malpica, Esq.; New York State
Supreme Court Justice Ruben Andres Martino; Ron Mazariegos, Esq.; Jim Montes,
Esq.; Kenneth Padilla, Esq.; New York State Supreme Court Justice Eduardo Padro;
Jos6 Luis Perez, Esq.; J.C. Polanco; Kim Ramos; Professor Jenny Rivera, esq.; Gloria
Yolanda Rivera, Esq.; Yasmin Soto; New York City Civil Court Judge Analisa Torres;
and Patricia Yanez.
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port to ensure that the participants ultimately possess the qualifica-
tions necessary to successfully compete for law school admission.
CONCLUSION
Poor Latino representation in law school-and ultimately the
profession-can be traced primarily to the limited pool of eligible
Latino college graduates and current law school admissions poli-
cies. Efforts to increase Latino enrollment in law school must ex-
pand that pool of candidates. As such, we must reach beyond
those Latinos who graduate college and apply to law school; aca-
demic talent must be mined at lower education levels and nurtured
over a period of years in order to produce more qualified Latino
candidates. Additionally, unless the existing admissions criteria
are modified, meaningful progress will remain an ellusive goal. Fi-
nally, the role of Latino lawyers and law students cannot be over-
emphasized-we must be willing to lead the effort to increase our
own representation.
The PRLDEF High School Initiative is a response to Presidents'
and the legal and Latino community's demand that Latino partici-
pation in the legal profession be increased. It considers and incor-
porates all the vital factors that hinder Latino youth from
becoming lawyers, discussed above. This initiative is unique for
two reasons. First, it takes into consideration the fact that by the
time many Latino students realize they desire to attend law school,
they are significantly behind in terms of grades and preparation. In
response to this concern, the PRLDEF Initiative targets high
school sophomores who still have the opportunity to prepare them-
selves for the long path ahead, that begins with finishing high
school and getting into a competitive college.
The second factor that makes the PRLDEF Initiative ground-
breaking is that it is all encompassing and long term based. By
providing free access to SAT preperation, academic advisement,
and exposure to the profession over a period of time, the proposal
is geared to insure that each participant gets the necessary support
and guidance to complete high school, enter college and compete
for law school admission. This is significant because, as the statis-
tics have shown, Latino students encounter many obstacles-finan-
cial, familial, and cultural-that lead to their low high school,
college, and law school graduation rates, even though they enroll in
high numbers.
Although many universities and organizations have attempted to
remedy these factors in innovative ways, the PRLDEF Initiative
1426
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stands to make a significant contribution towards increasing the
pool of Latino candidates. It has taken all these programs as mod-
els and built upon and improved them.
MCKM
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The new millennium was not yet one year old when it was
rocked by the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. The attack
was unprecedented in many ways; it was immense, unexpected,
cunning, ferocious, and devastating. For millions of Americans, it
portended a grim new world order for the days ahead, where even
the most secure society might be penetrated and devastated by a
small band of determined zealots.' The anthrax deaths later that
September only added to people's feelings of vulnerability.2 It is
no wonder that barely six weeks later, on October 26, 2001, Presi-
dent George W. Bush quickly signed into law3 the USA PATRIOT
Act 4-by all measures one of the most sweeping and controversial
acts in United States history,5 intended to dramatically increase
government powers of investigation and enforcement, many would
argue at the expense of individual liberties.6 The complex and dar-
ing 342-page Act had been hastily passed by overwhelming majori-
ties in the U.S. Senate (98-1) 7 and House (357-66),8 without public
* Lisa Finnegan Abdolian, a journalist specializing in civil liberties issues, com-
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University's Office of Public Affairs.
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1. See, e.g., Dean E. Murphy, Threats and Responses: The Jitters; The Nation Car-
ries on, Jumpy But Still Resolute, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2002, at A14.
2. See, e.g., Nicole Bode & Emily Guest, Rudy Bats Away Germ Fears, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Oct. 15, 2001, at 3.
3. Adam Clymer, Bush Quickly Signs Measure Aiding Antiterrorism Effort, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2001, at B5.
4. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
5. Jennifer C. Evans, Note, Hijacking Civil Liberties: The USA Patriot Act of
2001, 33 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 933, 974-76 (2002).
6. Id.
7. U.S. Senate, U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes, 107th Congress-ist Session, (2001),
available at http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/rollcalllists/roll-call-votecfm.
cfm?congress=107&session=l&vote=00313 (last visited May 15, 2003).
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hearings or debate, 9 even though the Act resembled portions of the
Antiterrorism Act of 1996,10 which had already been ruled uncon-
stitutional by federal courts. 1
More than a year-and-a-half later, how does the U.S. mass media
and the public regard this federal anti-terrorism legislation and its
abridgement of traditional liberties? This three-part Essay offers
an interdisciplinary examination of: (I) the legal provisions of the
USA PATRIOT Act; 2 (II) the distinct shift in U.S. media report-
ing on this legislation over time; 13 and (III) in-depth public opinion
findings on people's mixed views of post-9/11 civil liberties. 4
I. THE USA PATRIOT ACT
Under the pretense of enhancing national security, the USA PA-
TRIOT Act concentrates increased new powers in the executive
branch of government, while decreasing judicial oversight.15 These
measures included:
A. Creation of a New Crime
Section 802 of the Act creates a new federal crime of "domestic
terrorism,"' 6 which includes any dangerous acts that "appear to be
intended ... to influence the policy of a government by intimida-
tion or coercion." 7 Broadly applied, this could be used to silence
any political dissent critical of government policies. 8
8. U.S. House of Representatives, Role Call Votes, 107th Congress-ist Session,
(2001), available at http://clerkweb.house.gov/cgi-bin/vote.exe?year=2001&rollnum-
ber=398 (last visited May 15, 2003).
9. Seth Rosenfeld, Looking Back, Looking Ahead; A Nation Remembers, Patriot
Act's Scope, Secrecy Ensare Innocent, Critics Say, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 8, 2002, at Al.
10. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-
2255 (1996); see Evans, supra note 5, at 967.
11. See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664-65 (1996).
12. See infra Part I.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See Evans, supra note 5, at 976.
16. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, § 802, 115 Stat. 272, 376 (2001).
17. Id.
18. See Evans, supra note 5, at 965-67; see also NANCY CHANG, CTR. FOR CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHTS, THE U.S.A. PATRIOT ACT: WHAT'S So PATRIOTIC ABOUT TRAM-
PLING ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS? 3 (2001), available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/
reports/docs/USAPATRIOTACT.pdf (last visited May 15, 2003).
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B. Diminished Due Process for Immigrants
Section 411 of the Act expands the term "engage in terrorist ac-
tivity" to include any use of a weapon, as well as such nonviolent
acts as fund-raising for suspect organizations.1 9 Moreover, it allows
for the detention or removal of non-citizens with little or no judi-
cial review.20 The U.S. Attorney General and Secretary of State
can claim a domestic group to be a terrorist organization, 21 and
deport any non-citizen members.22
C. Diminished Privacy
The Act severely curtails the right to privacy at several turns,
including broadening the grounds for increased surveillance and
wiretap authority,23 sneak-and-peek searches,24 tracking Internet
25 2usage, and accessing private records.26
D. Lowering Standards of Probable Cause
Section 215 of the Act reduces the traditional Fourth Amend-
ment requirements for probable cause,27 as previously interpreted
by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA"). 28
E. Sharing of Intelligence
Section 203 of the Act now permits unprecedented sharing of
sensitive information across several independent agencies, includ-
ing the FBI, CIA, INS, and other state and federal agencies.29
As a result of the USA PATRIOT Act, more than 1,200 immi-
grants in the United States were taken into custody and detained
19. § 411(a), 115 Stat. at 345; see CHANG, supra note 18, at 3.
20. § 411(a), 115 Stat. at 345; see CHANG, supra note 18, at 7.
21. § 411(a), 115 Stat. at 347; see Susan Herman, The USA PATRIOT Act and the
U.S. Department of Justice: Losing Our Balances?, JURIST, Dec. 3, 2001, at 11, availa-
ble at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew40.htm (last visited May 15, 2003).
22. § 411(a), 115 Stat. at 347; see Herman, supra note 21, at 1.
23. §§ 201-202, 115 Stat. at 278.
24. § 213, 115 Stat. at 286.
25. § 216, 115 Stat. at 291.
26. § 215, 115 Stat. at 287.
27. Id. (allowing the FBI, under § 215 to now obtain personal records by certifying
that they are sought for an investigation to prevent terrorism; the FBI need not sus-
pect the person holding the records of any wrongdoing). See CHANG, supra note 18,
at 4-5.
28. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2003). FISA had required that the government specify in its
court order that "there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that
the person to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or agent of a foreign
power." CHANG, supra note 18, at 4.
29. § 203 (a), (b), (d), 115 Stat. at 278-81.
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for an extended period without being charged with committing a
terrorist act.3 ° In response to criticisms of this policy, Attorney
General John Ashcroft tersely replied: "Let the terrorists among us
be warned ... if you overstay your visas even by one day, we will
arrest you."' 31 Moreover, because habeas proceedings are civil
rather than criminal,32 the government has no obligation under the
Sixth Amendment to provide non-citizens with free counsel in such
proceedings.33
The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 goes far beyond the Antiterror-
ism Act of 1996, enacted in the wake of the 1995 Oklahoma bomb-
ing, which legal critics at that time termed "one of the worst
assaults on the Constitution in decades. ' 34 Despite the mounting
criticism from the American Civil Liberties Union and other pro-
liberty lobbies, the federal momentum continues to move away
from individual rights, with public discussions of a Terrorism Infor-
mation and Prevention System ("TIPS") Program35 to encourage
people to report each other's suspicious activities to the govern-
ment,36 and even use torture to extract useful information from
some detainees. 37 Compared to most other nations today, America
has certainly prided itself as a nation of laws, liberty, and due pro-
cess, which have "made America the envy of the world, inspiring
other nations' freedom movements for over 200 years. ' 38  One
must, therefore, wonder how the American public and its mass me-
dia are reacting to this current anti-liberty trend embodied in the
USA PATRIOT Act and other U.S. anti-terrorism legislation.
30. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, THE STATE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES, ONE
YEAR LATER 3 (2002).
31. Dan Eggen, Tough Anti-Terror Campaign Pledged, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2001,
at Al.
32. See, e.g., Browder v. Dir., I11. Dep't of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 269 (1978).
33. See I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-39 (1984).
34. JAMES X. DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION:
SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 2 (2002).
35. See Adam Chapter, Surveillance Rules Are Needed to Save Privacy, Senators
Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at A18.
36. Id.
37. Is Torture Ever Justified in the Fight Against Terrorism?, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11,
2003, at 9; Nat Hentoff, The American Way of Torture, VILL. VOICE, Feb. 11, 2003, at
27. American intelligence agents have been accused of torturing captured suspected
terrorists. Accusations of torture include: forcing suspects to kneel or stand for hours
wearing black hoods or painted goggles, sometimes in awkward or painful positions;
depriving suspects of medication or sleep through the constant bombardment of
bright lights; and the transfer of prisoners to countries with a history of brutality, such
as Egypt. Id.
38. Harold Takooshian & Robert Rieber, Introduction: Political Correctness and
Social Distress in Academe, 5 J. Soc. DISTRESS & HOMELESS 99, 99 (1996).
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II. THE MASS MEDIA
Historically, during troubled times, the American public has
turned to the mass media for information and solace.39 Trusted re-
porters such as Edward R. Murrow and Walter Cronkite informed
the nation that Nazi Germany had fallen to Allied troops,a° that
President John F. Kennedy had been assassinated, 41 and that the
Vietnam War was not as "winnable" as predicted.42
A. The Media's Coverage of September 11
On September 11, 2001, many Americans turned to TV news to
learn about the largest terrorist attack on U.S. soil in history. On
September 12, a CBS news survey showed that ninety-eight per-
cent of those polled said they were following the news about the
attacks.4 3 A few weeks later, attention to the news had not waned.
A survey conducted the last week of September 2001, found that
ninety-five percent of respondents were following news about the
attacks; eighty-five percent of them very closely.44
Most of those polled said they were thrilled with the manner in
which the press handled the coverage. 45 The news in the days fol-
lowing the attacks was straightforward, with facts outnumbering
opinions and few anonymous sources cited.46 A poll taken the
week of the attacks revealed that eighty-nine percent rated the me-
dia's coverage as good or excellent.4 7 In November, polls showed
39. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
40. See generally HERBERT W. HOBLER, AND NOW THE NEWS, 1945 (1994).
41. See All Things Considered: Walter Cronkite Remembers the Day President Ken-
nedy Was Assassinated (NPR radio broadcast, Nov. 22, 2002).
42. See generally NEIL SHEEHAN, THE PENTAGON PAPERS (1971).
43. CBS News: 98% Have Been Closely Following News of Attacks, HOTLINE,
Sept. 12, 2001.
44. Katherine Guckenberger, Rising to the Occasion, PUB. PERSP., July/Aug. 2002,
at 31 (discussing the results of a survey conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation/
Harvard School of Public Health between September 28-October 1, 2001).
45. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
46. See Guckenberger, supra note 44, at 31. The Project for Excellence in Journal-
ism ("PEJ"), a think tank affiliated with the Columbia University Graduate School of
Journalism, found that major news organizations devoted seventy-five percent of their
coverage to factual reporting; forty-five percent of the coverage cited four or more
sources, seventy-six percent of whom were named. Opinion accounted for just nine
percent of coverage. Id.
47. See id. (discussing a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center that found
that eighty-nine percent of people who participated in a poll taken September 13-17,
2001 rated the media's coverage of terrorism as good (thirty-three percent) or excel-
lent (fifty-six percent)).
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the public's opinion of the media had increased for the first time in
sixteen years.48
But how did the American media handle the events that un-
folded days and months after the crisis? It is difficult to maintain
objectivity in the best of times. When the world we all knew came
tumbling down with such well-known American symbols as the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, American reporters found
it difficult to resist the chest-puffing patriotism that enveloped the
nation.49
Many commentators, including members of the media itself, say
the press has failed to do its job as the guardian of democracy. °
Very few news reports filled in the basic blanks-the who, what,
where, when, and why-about U.S. policy, the USA PATRIOT
Act, and the government's insistence on the need for secrecy and
more power. Very few news reports discussed the dangers in-
volved in pushing aside civil liberties during a national crisis. In
fact, most stories about the country's response were positive.5 The
military strikes were reported as necessary and effective, and the
USA PATRIOT Act was hailed as a unified nation's quick re-
sponse to the terrorist strike.52 Some of the more troubling aspects
of the legislation received little or no scrutiny by the media until
months after it became law.53
According to John MacArthur, publisher of Harper's Magazine
and author of a book on censorship in the Gulf War, the Septem-
48. See id. (citing findings from a Pew Research Center Survey conducted Novem-
ber 13-19, 2001).
49. Bob Hackett, Covering (Up) the War on Terrorism: The Master Frame and the
Media Chill, CAMPAIGN FOR PRESS & BROADCASTING FREEDOM, Oct. 2001, availa-
ble at http://www.presscampaign.org/articles_15.html (last visited May 15, 2003); see
Paul D. Boin, Truth in Terror and in War, REAL NEWS NETWORK, Sept. 19, 2001;
Press Release, Steve Hill, University of Washington, Newsmagazines Downplayed
Opposition Voices After Sept. 11, Researchers Find (Aug. 19, 2002), available at http:/
/www.washington.edu/newsroom/news/2002archive/08-O2archive/kO81902a.html (last
visited May 15, 2003).
50. See generally Press Release, Fordham University Panel, Anchors Dissect 9/11
Coverage (Sept. 9, 2002), available at http://www.fordham.edu/general/whatsnew/
archive232.html (last visited May 15, 2003).
51. See Guckenberger, supra note 44, at 34 (citing a Project for Excellence in Jour-
nalism study that found that eighty percent of news stories in September 2001, were
all or mostly pro-American).
52. See, e.g., Justin Smith, Patriot Act Doesn't Create Police State, AUBURN PLAINS-
MAN ONLINE, available at http://www.theplainsman.com/vnews/display.v/ART/2003/
03/06/3e66d019e3290 (last visited May 15, 2003).
53. See infra Part II.B.
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ber 11 attacks had a depressing impact on the institution of the free
press in the United States:
54
There isn't even the spirit any more that was in Vietnam, of
skepticism, and the sense that the patriotic thing to do is to tell
the American people the truth and to try to be impartial and not
to be the cat's paw of the government. But when I say this on
TV the reaction is overwhelming; there is tremendous hostility
to the free press in this country. 55
The bulk of the stories about the attacks and their aftermath had
pro-American slants. A Project for Excellence in Journalism sur-
vey found eighty percent of coverage was pro-American in Sep-
tember, a figure that did not dip below seventy-one percent by the
year's end. 56 Those polled shortly after 9/11, however, said they
did not believe the media should become a mouthpiece for the
Bush Administration.57 A November poll revealed that fifty-two
percent believed reporters should dig to get all the facts and sev-
enty-three percent preferred news coverage that portrayed more
than the pro-American point of view.58
The troubling element of the coverage was not the patriotic
slant, however, but the media's decision to suppress debate over
sensitive topics, like the "why's" behind the terrorist attacks, the
history of U.S. policy in the Middle East, and the long-term impact
of the government's new powers. Even newsman Dan Rather fell
victim to the times, weeping with talk show host David Letterman
a few days after the attacks and pledging: "George Bush is the
President. . . Wherever he wants me to line up, just tell me
where.
59
Looking back, some veteran news people in the U.S. said they
regret allowing their emotions to dictate their reports. Nearly a
year after his Letterman appearance, Rather had a different per-
54. Interview by Gerti Schoen with John MacArthur, Publisher, Harper's Maga-
zine, Censorship and the War on Terrorism (Sept. 27, 2001), at http://www.mediachan-
nel.org/views/interviews/macarthur.shtml (last visited May 15, 2003). Media coverage
of the 1991 Gulf War was more highly managed, compared with later "embedding" of
journalists within military units in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
55. Id.
56. Guckenberger, supra note 44, at 34 (citing the Project for Excellence in Jour-
nalism study).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Tom Jica, Rather, Regis Join a Solemn Letterman, SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 19,
2001, available at http://www.sun-sentinel.com/entertainment/tv/sfl-tjdave9l9.column?
coll=sfla-entertainment-tv (last visited May 15, 2003).
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spective about lining up behind the President.6 0 At a September 9,
2002 forum, he berated reporters for couching the news in patriot-
ism. 61 Rather said, "The height of patriotism is asking the tough
questions .... We haven't been patriotic enough .... It is our
responsibility to knock on doors every day and ask what's going on
in there even if it makes us unpopular. '62
At the same forum, CNN's Aaron Brown said that reporters
need to focus on protecting basic human and civil rights-the very
ones that are highlighted in the USA PATRIOT Act.63 He recalled
the internment camps that held Japanese Americans during World
War II and worried that lack of oversight could lead to similar na-
tional embarrassments:64 "We need to raise questions about the
[Afghan] detainees, how they are being treated and about due pro-
cess, and we need to follow these stories .... This is the nature of
our role in a free society. 65
Not all agree, of course. William McGowan, author of Coloring
the News, How Crusading for Diversity has Corrupted American
Journalism, wrote a column in the right-leaning National Review
bashing the press for being partially responsible for the attacks.66
He believes the media continues to protect would-be terrorists liv-
ing in the U.S.:6 7
[A] reflexive, pro-diversity newsroom climate survives, espe-
cially with respect to post-9/11 coverage of Arab- and Muslim-
Americans, who have become the objects du jure [sic] of jour-
nalistic piety and skittishness. Although many Muslim-Ameri-
cans are appalled by the terrorist attack, a larger proportion
than has been admitted have expressed approval.68
B. The Media's Coverage of the USA PATRIOT Act
In the climate of fear and jingoism that followed the September
11 attacks, the media deemed it best to provide the public with
positive stories about the government and its strategies for oppos-
60. Press Release, supra note 50.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. William McGowan, Covering Terrorism, The Press and 9/11, NAT'L REV. ON-
LINE, Nov. 8, 2001, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-
mcgowanll0801.shtml (last visited May 15, 2003).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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ing terrorism. The deconstructing of a document titled the USA
PATRIOT Act so soon after such a horrendous attack on Ameri-
can soil must have seemed unthinkable. Most mainstream media
simply reported that the legislation had passed.69 There was little
debate about the PATRIOT Act's provisions during a time when
even a member of Congress would provoke cries of heresy 70 by
questioning the President's request for additional powers to catch
the evil-doers.
Stories about the PATRIOT Act's progress in the House and
Senate made it to page one in large media outlets, including The
New York Times7' and The Washington Post.72 The three major
news networks barely mentioned the new law. When the legisla-
tion was signed by the President, most stories in major newspapers
focused on the positive aspects of the bill.73
In fact, shortly after its passage, some members of the press
questioned whether the legislation went far enough to protect
Americans. 4 On November 25, 2001 National Public Radio
("NPR"), a well-known liberal-leaning media outlet, broadcast a
program debating "whether the USA PATRIOT Act will be
enough for law enforcement officials to protect against future ter-
rorist activity. 7
5
During the NPR program, broadcaster Barbara Bradley listed
some of the new powers granted to the FBI, including the ability to
implement roving wiretaps and perform nationwide searches for
terrorists, and explained that the program's guest "national secur-
ity expert" believed many of the new powers given to the FBI were
"long overdue. '76 Without mentioning the PATRIOT Act's poten-
69. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis & Robert Pear, A Nation Challenged: Congress; Nego-
tiators Back Scaled-Down Bill to Battle Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2001, at Al.
70. Stephen Brill, How America Confronted the Sept. 12 Era, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 10,
2003, at A32; Nat Hentoff, The USA Un-Patriotic Act; On Capitol Hill, Disturbing
Silence Follows Assault on Liberties, WASH. TIMES, June 17, 2002, at A17; The Rush
Limbaugh Show (Premiere Radio Networks, radio broadcast July 20, 2001).
71. See, e.g., Matthew Purdy, A Nation Challenged: The Law; Bush's New Rules to
Fight Terror Transform the Legal Landscape, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, at Al.
72. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, In War, It's Power to the President, WASH. POST, Nov.
20, 2001, at Al.
73. See, e.g., Frank James, Visa Process to Allow More Time For Background
Checks, CHi. TRIB., Nov. 1, 2001, at 8N.
74. See infra text accompanying note 75.
75. Weekend All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast, Nov. 25, 2001). On
October 30, 2001, however, NPR did broadcast a show where a Justice Department
official described provisions of the PATRIOT Act and a civil liberties advocate ex-
plained his concerns. All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast, Oct. 20, 2001).
76. All Things Considered, supra note 75.
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tial problems, NPR reported that security experts believed that
while the Act is flawed because its usage is still partially tied to the
courts, the "current climate of anxiety" the Act creates might be
even more effective than the legislation itself."
It wasn't until months after its passage that reporters took a hard
look at the new law and began to question what its provisions
meant.78 It did so after organizations, such as banks, libraries, and
universities began to complain about the law. 79 The media prolif-
erated coverage of breaches in civil liberties based on these com-
plaints.80 These stories also provided insight into how Americans
were guarding against the prospect of too much governmental
infringement.8'
An NPR story that aired on November 8, 2002-more than a
year after the attacks-focused on how the FBI confiscated com-
puters in a library in Patterson, New Jersey, shortly after Septem-
ber 2001.82 The story was straightforward with several highlighted
opinions about racial profiling.83 The most telling aspect was the
librarian's response to the FBI's visit: "They had partitioned a hard
drive, and you can do that and sort of, like track things more easily,
but we undid that. I mean we have people who have the expertise
who could say, 'Well, wait a second. What did they do to this hard
drive?' "84
As the press turned its attention to civil liberties and the USA
PATRIOT Act, it tended to return to its left- or right-leaning
slants. The Miami Herald reported that the PATRIOT Act "re-
mained shrouded in mystery."85 Newsday wrote a series of articles
called "Taking Liberties" about the government's new policy of se-
crecy and how immigrants were suffering under provisions of the
PATRIOT Act.86 A column in the Los Angeles Times noted that
the "new anti-terrorism legislation fosters a sense of insecurity. '87
77. Id.
78. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., infra note 82 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., infra note 82 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., infra note 82 and accompanying text.
82. Weekend All Things Considered: Patterson, N.J. Library Receives Visit From
the FBI Post-Sept. 11 (NPR radio broadcast, Nov. 8, 2002).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Frank Davies, USA Patriot Act Remains Shrouded in Mystery, MIAMI HER-
ALD, Sept. 10, 2002, at 13A.
86. See, e.g., John Riley, Taking Liberties, Part 4: Held Without Charge, NEWSDAY,
Sept. 18, 2002, at 6.
87. Patt Morrison, New Anti-Terrorism Legislation Fosters a Sense of Insecurity,
L.A. TiMES, Nov. 26, 2002, at B3.
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The San Jose Mercury News wrote about how the new law "tar-
nishes American ideals."'88 And The New York Times observed
that the Bush administration has been "exhibiting a penchant for
secrecy that has been striking to historians, legal experts and
lawmakers of both parties. 89
Cautioning that the government was abusing its powers without
enhancing protection, The Nation wrote:
The War on terror must be aggressive, but it must be smart. The
government needs to adopt measures that reflect our core val-
ues and that meaningfully promote security. It needs to explain
how its tactics achieve both goals. It should not squander its
own credibility with measures that undermine our nation's guid-
ing principals but do little to make us safer.90
At the same time, conservatives charged that questioning the
government's motives as it wages a war against terrorism is akin to
asking for another strike on American soil.91
In the summer of 2002, city councils throughout the country be-
gan to boycott the PATRIOT Act claiming they would not comply
with its provisions and would not assist the federal government in
enforcing the Act.92
Several conservative media outlets clung to the patriotism theme
when discussing municipalities' rejection of the Act. The O'Reilly
Factor's Bill O'Reilly told Cambridge City Council member Brian
Murphy that the city's decision not to cooperate with the PA-
TRIOT Act was unpatriotic and dangerous.93 Murphy explained
that citizens of Cambridge were concerned because "this was
passed in the wake of the heinous attacks of September 11 ... and
was done without a lot of debate, without a lot of discussion." 94
O'Reilly's response was: "So it looks to me like you're hysterical in
Cambridge, not an uncommon thing for that town.., and you may
be seditious, that you may be undermining this government. 95
O'Reilly added, "You're basically taking steps that could lead to
88. Editorial, INS' Iron Fist Tarnishes American Ideals, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Dec. 29, 2002, at 6P.
89. Adam Clymer, Government Openness at Issue as Bush Holds onto Records,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2003, at Al.
90. Donald Kerwin, National Security and Immigrant Rights, NATION, Dec. 19,
2002, available at http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030106&s=kerwin (last
visited May 15, 2003).
91. See, e.g., infra note 96 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 94 & 99 and accompanying text.
93. The O'Reilly Factor (FOX News television broadcast, July 1, 2002).
94. Id.
95. Id.
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anarchy if every municipality did the same thing. And you're leav-
ing all Americans vulnerable to this .... [Y]ou're protesting and
you're undermining the government."96 Murphy responded:
We are absolutely patriotic. But our patriotism doesn't derive
from a law that tries to cram the word "patriot" into its title so
that it can wrap itself in the flag, but rather a patriotism ... that
derives from the Constitution and the Bill of Rights and the civil
liberties that have really made this country ... the greatest na-
tion there is.97
O'Reilly answered, "You're protesting and you're undermining
the government and you don't even know if anybody's rights are
being violated."98
A similar interchange occurred on another conservative televi-
sion program, Hannity & Colmes, this time with Hope Marston, a
member of the Eugene, Oregon City Council, the fifteenth city to
reject the PATRIOT Act. 99 After Marston explained why her mu-
nicipality voted against the PATRIOT Act ("people ...are con-
cerned about liberty and protecting our Bill of Rights"), 100 Sean
Hannity berated her and the city council for passing a resolution
that is "meaningless.''0 "Hope, you know, you may have forgot-
ten, but America got attacked on Sept. 11. You may have forgot-
ten all of this. There are people plotting and planning and
scheming right now in America ... And you're creating hysteria
where there need not be hysteria. 10 2
An article in the conservative National Review Online hailed the
success of the PATRIOT Act and complained that other Western
nations had not followed suit. 10 3
Reeling off the success of the discovery of AI-Qaeda cells in
New York, Michigan, and Oregon, the United States has put the
emboldening PATRIOT Act to excellent use.... Though the
U.S. has enacted new laws such as the PATRIOT Act to combat
terrorism, the other nations of the West have not followed our
necessary lead. 10 4
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Hannity & Colmes (FOX News television broadcast, Dec. 2, 2002).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Rita Katz & Josh Devon, The Weakness of the West, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Sept.
17, 2002, at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-katz09l8O2.asp (last
visited May 15, 2003).
104. Id.
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III. PUBLIC OPINION
How does the public regard the continued protection of individ-
ual rights, after this greatest terrorist attack in U.S. history? This
has naturally been a topic of intense and thorough media reporting
in the United States, 105 and worldwide. 10 6 Yet media coverage,
even at its very best,'0 7 is no substitute for a systematic and objec-
tive survey of the public's opinion on this issue.
In the uneasy months following the WTC attack, an interdiscipli-
nary team of researchers at Fordham University'0 8 designed and
conducted a survey of public opinions on terrorism, with several
distinct objectives: 1) to question a representative sample of adults
in Greater New York, including those in the vicinity of Ground
Zero in New York; 2) to apply a previously standardized twenty
point scale of general attitudes toward terrorism10 9 to compare
with public opinions prior to 2001; and 3) to develop and use two
new scales to precisely measure attitudes toward al-Qaeda terror-
ism in particular, and toward security versus individual liberties in
the United States.
A. Assessing Attitudes Toward Terrorism
Traditional media polls are often faulted for reporting inconsis-
tent, rapidly shifting, or labile findings-in part because they are
typically report simple percentages of response to single questions.
In contrast, this survey was designed to be a psychometric-quality
105. TOM PYSZYNSKI ET AL., IN THE WAKE OF 9/11: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERROR-
ISM 98-100 (2002). See generally TERRORISM, ORGANIZED CRIME, AND SOCIAL DIS-
TRESS: THE NEW WORLD ORDER (Robert J. Kelly & Robert W. Rieber eds., 2003);
Colloquium, Terrorism and Its Consequences, 2 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL'Y
1 (2002).
106. Hina Gilani, Antiterrorism Strategies and Protecting Human Rights, AMNESTY
Now, Summer 2002, at 1, 16, 17.
107. See generally HERBERT J. GANS, DECIDING WHAT'S NEWS (1979). Most soci-
ologists of the mass media, like Gans, describe all mass media as inherently selective,
and all journalists heavily, if unconsciously, affected by dominant cultural values in
their selection and description of facts they report. For a post-9-11 extension of this
view, see generally HERBERT J. GANS, DEMOCRACY AND THE NEWS (2003) [hereinaf-
ter DEMOCRACY AND THE NEWS].
108. The Authors thank several researchers who cooperated in carefully collecting
surveys: Farhad Abdolian, Monica E. Beck, Ciara Bergman, Houri Geudelekian,
Despina Kolokithias, Angel Lopez, Elizabeth Lopez-Yang, Meghan L. Stone, Zina
Trost, and Meagan E. Winn.
109. Harold Takooshian & William M. Verdi, U.S. Attitudes Toward the Terrorism
Problem, 7 J. PSYCHOL. & BEHAV. SCI. 83, 83-87 (1993) [hereinafter U.S. Attitudes];
see Harold Takooshian, & William M. Verdi, Assessment of Attitudes Toward Terror-
ism, in VIOLENCE AND THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 33, 34 (Lenore Loeb Adler &
Florence L. Denmark eds., 1995).
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survey, assessing people's attitudes by statistically combining items
into total scores on more stable multi-item scales." 0 Such scales
aim to be more valid and reliable"' than single items, thus better
able to chart public views across times and across places." 2
The survey form consisted of thirty-six self-report items yielding
biodata on each respondent, and scores on four twenty-point
scales, in which a high score indicated one's high (a) authoritarian-
ism; (b) acceptance of terrorism in general; (c) acceptance of al-
Qaeda in particular; and (d) preference for individual liberties over
security needs.
This was an intercept survey, in which respondents were stopped
in person during their daily activities, and asked them to give their
frank opinions on the anonymous one-sheet survey form." 3 Most
of these 309 respondents were approached in the streets or parks
around Ground Zero, and others in office buildings, train stations,
or public areas in Greater New York. Despite the rapid pace and
incivility of the New York City streets,"14 almost half of all those
approached agreed to complete the survey. Demographically,
these 309 proved to be a diverse and representative group across
most categories." 5
110. See ANNE ANASTASI & SUSANA URBINA, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 49-54
(1997).
111. Valid or accurate in assessing what they intend to assess. Reliable or stable in
their assessment of an attitude. Indeed, a psychometric analysis of the data in this
survey found all three brief scales proved internally reliable measures, based on their
Cronbach's alpha scores: Terrorism alpha = .75; al-Qaeda alpha = .69; and Liberties
alpha = .76. Alpha values can vary from 0 up to 1.0, with higher values indicating
more reliable scales.
112. Though U.S. researchers have devised many scales to assess political attitudes
(such as alienation, leadership, and values), few are on the topic of political violence,
and none on the topic of terrorism. See generally JOHN P. ROBINSON ET AL., MEA-
SURES OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES (1999); see also W.F. Velicer et al., A Measurement
Model for Measuring Attitudes Toward Violence, 15 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
BULL. 349, 349-64 (1989).
113. See infra App. A.
114. Ray Gindroz, City Life and the New Urbanism, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1419,
1423-24 (2002); see Stanley Milgram, The Experience of Living in Cities, Scl., Mar.
1970, at 1461, 1461-68.
115. The 309 respondents were a demographically diverse group. They were fifty-
four percent women, and varied in age from fourteen to seventy-five, with a mean of
33.5 years. In ethnicity, fourteen percent described themselves as Hispanic, fourteen
percent as African-American, four percent as Asian, sixty-two percent as non-His-
panic Whites, and six percent as other. In religion, seventy-seven percent described
themselves as Christian, eleven percent as Jewish, eleven percent as none, zero per-
cent were Moslems, and one percent were other. In rating their degree of religiosity
from "none" to "highly religious," survey respondents ranged from eight percent
"none" to ten percent "highly religious"; the mean fell right in the middle, at 4.5 on
the 0-9 scale. In education, their highest level was one percent elementary school,
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In the course of charting public opinion, an objective survey can
occasionally reveal some unexpected patterns in public sentiment.
This was certainly the case here, as a few surprises emerged from
our findings.
B. Findings
Terrorism? How do people regard the use of terrorism in gen-
eral?116 When asked in a single item if the killing of innocent civil-
ians to achieve a political goal is ever a "morally acceptable" tactic,
a clear ninety percent majority said "No" (never, or rarely), and
virtually zero percent said "often." Yet this clarity blurs when the
moral acceptance is gauged by a more detailed five-item scale.11 7
On this zero to twenty-point scale, the mean score of 309 people
was not zero, but 6.8 on the 0-20 terrorism scale, indicating some
acceptance of terrorism as a political tactic. Moreover, individuals'
scores on the 0-20 scale ranged widely, from zero (eleven percent)
up to nineteen or twenty (three percent), revealing a spectrum of
attitudes toward terrorism, from abhorrence through acceptance,
and even advocacy among a few of us.' 18 Surprisingly, this terror-
ism mean of 6.8 after the 2001 terrorist attack was almost un-
changed from the mean of 6.5 among ninety college students in
1993.119 People in 2002, however, were far more willing to com-
plete a survey of their views on terrorism, compared with people in
the early 1990s, who often recoiled upon simple mention of the
violent topic. 12° Overall, we found people were not uniformly op-
fifteen percent high school, forty-three percent some college, thirty-five percent col-
lege graduate, six percent graduate degrees. In nationality, ninety percent were raised
in the United States. In ancestry, thirty percent had four grandparents born in the
U.S., five percent had three grandparents born in the U.S., eleven percent had two
grandparents born in the U.S., six percent had one grandparent born in the U.S., and
forty-eight percent had zero grandparents born in the U.S. In residence, twenty per-
cent were visiting from outside the greater New York area.
116. The survey concisely defined terrorism as "the use of violence against civilians
to achieve a political goal," a definition adapted from BURTON LEISER, LIBERTY, JUS-
TICE AND MORALS 393 (1986).
117. See infra Tbl. 1.
118. See infra Tbl. 1.
119. U.S. Attitudes, supra note 109, at 83-87. The identical twenty point terrorism
scale used here was used by in 1993. Id.
120. Id. at 86. The 1993 survey by Takooshian and Verdi found the topic of terror-
ism to be so abhorrent that it repelled many people, making "this survey especially
challenging; respondents seem uncomfortable with questions on terrorism, despite the
anonymity of the survey. This sampling has been a problem, and more representative
data must be collected." Id. In contrast, in 2002, people were far more willing, even
eager, to express their own views on terrorism.
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posed to terrorism,'12 and some Americans were accepting or even
supportive of it. 12 2 Their views of terrorism as a political tactic are
best described as mixed, leaning toward nonacceptance.
Al-Qaeda? How do people regard al-Qaeda in particular? On a
zero to twenty-point scale measuring "support for al-Qaeda," peo-
ple's views again averaged not zero, but 5.4, with another wide
spectrum of views from total abhorrence of al-Qaeda (twelve per-
cent scored zero points, or zero tolerance of al-Qaeda) through ac-
ceptance of al-Qaeda (three percent scores 15-16 points), though
no clear support for al-Qaeda (zero percent scored 17-20 points.
Twenty points would signify complete acceptance).1 23 Surprisingly,
inspection of the scale's five items finds one where a fifty-three
percent majority of people agree that al-Qaeda terrorists "have
some legitimate basis for their anger at the U.S. and its citizens.'1 2 4
People's overall attitudes toward al-Qaeda terrorism are again best
described as mixed, leaning toward non-acceptance.125
Individual Liberties? Where do people stand when asked to sac-
rifice individual liberties for greater national security? People
again varied widely, from totally pro-security (four percent scored
zero points, signifying the reluctance to give up any civil liberties)
up to totally pro-liberty (three percent scored twenty points, signal-
ing they would sacrifice it all for a feeling of safety). People's over-
all views averaged 9.5 on the individual liberties scale, very near
the mid-point of ten on this zero to twenty-point scale, indicating
that public views could not be more mixed.'2 6 A closer examina-
tion of the distribution of views in Figure 1 shows over fifty percent
of people clustered in the mid-range of seven to thirteen points,
indicating mixed feelings for most respondents.2 7 Sizable minori-
ties strongly favored individual liberties (twelve percent scored six-
teen or more), 128 or favored security at the expense of liberties
(sixteen percent scored four or less). Inspection of the five items
also indicates variations among them. In favor of liberties, over
fifty percent of respondents opposed the torture of terrorist sus-
pects, and supported suspects' right to an attorney. 29 But in favor
121. See infra Tbl. 1.
122. See infra Tbl. 1.
123. See infra Tbl. 1.
124. See infra Tbl. 1.
125. See infra Thl. 1.
126. See infra Thl. 1.
127. See infra Tbl. 1.
128. Survey data on file with Authors.
129. See infra Thl. 1.
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of increased security, over fifty percent preferred profiling at air-
ports, increased use of wiretaps, and the probing of suspects' pri-
vate files.130
Patterns? What sort of person is most likely to prefer individual
liberties, as opposed to increased security? This is adumbrated by
a detailed correlational analysis presented in Table 2.131 In their
attitudes, people who are more supportive of individual liberties
tend to be significantly less authoritarian in personality, more ac-
cepting of terrorism in general, and al-Qaeda in particular. In con-
trast, individual liberties were largely unrelated with one's
demographic categories-age, gender, educational level, being
raised in the U.S. or overseas, number of grandparents born in the
U.S., or comparing the ninety percent living in Greater New York
with the ten percent visiting New York City or Ground Zero.
Put another way, those most supportive of tightened national se-
curity at the expense of individual liberties were significantly more
authoritarian in personality, less sympathetic with terrorism in gen-
eral, and al-Qaeda in particular. Interestingly, one's higher self-
reported degree of religiosity from zero (none) to nine (high) was a
modest, but significant predictor of her desire for security above
liberty, but not at all of her attitude toward terrorism or al-Qaeda.
In line with past research, it seems that these sharp variations in
views within the population are not so much "demographic" seg-
ments (such as age, gender, and education) as they are "psycho-
graphic" segments (based on life style, personality, and personal
experiences). 32
The end of the survey invited respondents to add their written
comments on a few items, and many did. Is terrorism a morally
acceptable or effective tactic? What was the impact of September
11 on New York City? What is the impact of personally viewing
Ground Zero? Any other comments? A global analysis of respon-
dents' written statements revealed further surprises. For one thing,
some people exposed to terrorism while living outside the U.S. did
130. See infra Tbl. 1.
131. The Pearson product-moment correlation is calculated by a formula that pre-
cisely gauges the degree of relationship between two measures-from zero (none at
all), .25 (low), .50 (moderate), .75 (high), to 1.00 (perfect). A negative correlation
indicates a reverse relationship, in which a higher score on one factor means a lower
score on the other. Low correlations are considered negligible unless "p <.05," or
there is less than a five percent probability that the correlation is due to pure chance,
rather than a genuine connection between the two measures.
132. Richard Christie, Authoritarianism and Related Constructs, in 1 MEASURES OF
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTITUDES 501-22 (John P. Robinson et
al. eds., 1991).
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not necessarily abhor terrorism, but occasionally came to see it as a
natural part of modern life, or even an acceptable "tit-for-tat" tac-
tic for retribution. As an extreme example, two avowed Christians
from the Middle East whose families had suffered at the hands of
terrorists were among the six percent who scored above fifteen on
the twenty-point terrorism scale; both described terrorism as an in-
evitable and sometimes effective tactic, which originated in peo-
ple's hearts, and was likely out of control by any government
policies. Another notable trend: only a minority of respondents
described the 9/11 attack as purely negative in its impact on the
United States or New York. A seventy-five percent majority said
its impact was also positive in some ways-creating greater solidar-
ity among Americans, strengthening Americans' fiber, or serving
as an abrupt "wake-up call" for the nation.133 Another revelation
was the ferocity of about ten percent of respondents' comments on
individual liberties.134 At one extreme, some people voiced fears
that the 9/11 attacks will succeed in turning the U.S. into an armed
camp full of fear, anger, and suspicion.135 At the other extreme,
people felt it was time to close tight the U.S. borders to immigra-
tion, to better empower investigators, or crack down on the intoler-
ant enemies living among us, as well as overseas. 36
CONCLUSION
Historically, during times of crisis, it has been natural for demo-
cratic nations, including the United States, to temporarily abridge
individual liberties in ways that would never be considered in more
halcyon times. Is the USA PATRIOT Act a temporary measure, or
the signal for a lasting new world order to combat a faceless enemy
in this new millennium? U.S. public policies continue to unfold
with international events, such as the War in Iraq, tumult in the Far
and Middle East, and potential "wars and rumors of war" with
other unfriendly nations. The U.S. mass media have reported in-
tense, mixed, volatile feelings going in many directions within the
U.S. public today. In such times, public opinion polls have a spe-
cial value in a democratic society, to precisely gauge and analyze
133. These phrases were extracted from the verbatim comments that some respon-
dents wrote at the end of their surveys.
134. Fortunately, this split opinion among Americans is not "bimodal," with two
groups clustered at the extremes; rather, this is a still a relatively flat normal distribu-
tion with most respondents clustered toward the center.
135. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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citizens' views. Such polls are best seen as a snapshot in time, as
views continue to shift in tandem with world events. 137 As of 2002,
the public clearly is deeply divided in their views of terrorism, lib-
erty, and related issues. This seemed the case on U.S. Election
Day 2002, when the main story was not so much a Republican or
Democratic victory so close to fifty percent, but rather the fifty
percent itself-the clear split within the nation.1 38 When it comes
to U.S. policy on terrorism, survey respondents of all sorts seem to
expect "the other shoe to drop-be that a bio/chemical or nuclear
attack" 139 -but this shoe will almost surely have dramatically dif-
ferent impacts on those pro-liberty or pro-security people among
us. Media coverage of events is best accompanied by tracking
polls, to chart how much and why the U.S. public is coalescing or
further dividing on this important issue of individual liberties dur-
ing crisis.
137. NORMAN M. BRADBURN & SEYMOUR SUDMAN, POLLS AND SURVEYS: UN-
DERSTANDING WHAT THEY TELL Us 229 (1986).
138. Norman J. Orenstein, Has the Nail-Biter Election Become a Way of Life?, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4. 2002, at A23.
139. See DEMOCRACY AND THE NEWS, supra note 107, at 16-18.
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TABLE 1
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD TERRORISM, AL-QAEDA,
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES
Percent
0 1 2 3 4 Mean
82 8 5 5 0 .3 Acceptable tactic? (0-4)
41 21 19 11 8 1.2 Effective? (0-4)
53 29 16 1 .9 Terrorists must be considered the enemy of civilized
society, regardless of their motives. [r]
38 31 24 7 1.4 It is sometimes understandable if people resort to
terrorism as their only way to be heard.
38 23 29 9 1.6 Only a cruel, cowardly group would resort to
terrorism to achieve its goals. [r]
23 30 33 13 1.9 Most terrorists seem like disturbed people who
would act violent even in an ideal society. [r]
51 28 16 4 1.0 Terrorism is sometimes morally justified.
6.8 Accept Terrorism (0-20).
In particular, about the 9-11 terrorists and their world-wide al-Qaeda network, I feel:
56 26 14 4 1.0 they would have exploded nuclear weapons in New
York City if they had the chance. [r]
24 22 40 13 1.9 they have some legitimate basis for their anger at the
United States and its citizens.
35 37 24 4 1.1 they are the enemy of all civilized people, including
moderate Moslems. [r]
48 33 17 3 0.8 outside the U.S., the government should be
aggressive to eliminate their network. [r]
68 21 9 3 0.6 inside the U.S., the government should be aggressive
to eliminate their network. [r]
5.4 Accept al-Qaeda (0-20)
About the treatment of suspects in the United States, I feel the government should.
34 31 25 9 1.3 "profile" people at U.S. airports and elsewhere if
this can increase public safety. [r]
20 31 35 11 1.8 probe the otherwise private files of U.S. students and
workers from suspect nations. [r]
19 18 33 28 2.3 torture U.S. detainees linked with al-Qaeda if their
information could save lives. [r]
31 31 28 9 1.4 expand its wiretaps of suspects in the U.S. [r]
12 16 42 26 2.7 ensure the right to an attorney and other legal rights
of suspects in U.S. custody.
9.5 Favor civil liberties over security (0-20)
Notes: The four columns of numbers to the left indicate percentage of respondents who agreed
with that view, from 0 (low) to 4 (high). The fifth column indicates the mean score for each item
(0-4) or scale (0-20). Some items marked [r] are reverse-scored, so "disagree" is scored high for
that item.
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TABLE 2
INTERRCORRELATIONS OF PEOPLE'S VIEWS AND BIODATA
Liberties Terror al-Qaeda Authorit.
2. Terrorism (0-20) .39**
3. al-Qaeda (0-20) .45** .47**
4. Authoritarianism (0-20) -. 46** -. 11 -. 12
5. T-accept (0-4) .08 .30** .19"* .20**
6. T-effective (0-4) .18** .32** .22** .01
7. Ground Zero (number) -. 11 -. 05 -. 09 .07
8. Age -. 13* .03 -. 18 -. 06
9. Gender (1=m, 2=f)] .00 -. 08 .02 -. 05
10. Raised in U.S. (N/Y) .03 .15** .11* .03
11. Grandparents (0-4) .06 -. 16** -. 17** -. 05
12. Education (1-5) .07 .01 -. 07 -. 17*
13. Religiosity (0-9) -. 19** -. 06 .01 .16*
14. Away (N/Y) .08 -. 07 -. 03 -. 15"
Note: Pearson correlations were significant at p<.05 (*) or p<.01 (**).
Attitudes and biodata:
(1) LIBERTIES scale score, from 0 (national security) to 20 (individual liberties).
(2) TERRORISM scale score, from 0 (abhorrence) to 20 (support).
(3) AL-QAEDA scale score, from 0 (rejection) to 20 (support).
(4) AUTHORITARIAN personality scale score, from 0 (low) to 20 (high).
(5) T-ACCEPT= One item on the acceptance of terrorism, from 0 (never) to 4 (often).
(6) T-EFFECT= One items on the effectiveness of terrorism, from 0 (never) to 4 (often).
(7) GROUND ZERO, number of times personally visited by respondent.
(8) AGE, in years.
(9) GENDER, 1 (male), 2 (female).
(10) RAISED IN U.S., 0 (No), 1 (Yes).
(11) GRANDPARENTS, the number born in the USA, from 0 to 4.
(12) EDUCATION, 1 (elementary school) to 5 (graduate degree).
(13) RELIGIOSITY compared to others, from 0 (none) to 9 (high).
(14) AWAY, living outside of the New York area, 0 (No), 1 (Yes).
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APPENDIX A
POLITICAL OPINIONS SURVEY
Please give us your frank opinions in this anonymous survey. Answer each item by
circling A (Agree strongly), a (agree), d (disagree), or D (Disagree strongly). There
are no right or wrong answers, only your personal opinions. Save any comments for
the end of the survey. For your free summary of the survey's results next month,
contact Fordham University at takoosh@aol.com. THANK YOU.
1. A a d D Human nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict.
2. A a d D A few strong leaders could make this country better than all the laws
and talk.
3. A a d D People cannot be trusted.
4. A a d D Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power.
5. A a d D An insult to your honor should not be forgotten.
In recent history, all sorts of groups have used terrorism, "the use of violence against
civilians to achieve a political goal." These include religious groups, such as Christians
in Ireland, Moslems, Jews, and Hindus in the East; national groups, such as Latins,
Armenians, and Africans; and ideological groups, such as communists and fascists. Is
terrorism "freedom-fighting?" Please answer these questions on terrorism in general:
1. A a d D Terrorists must be considered the enemy of civilized society, regard-
less of their motives.
7. A a d D It is sometimes understandable if people resort to terrorism as their
only way to be heard.
8. A a d D Only a cruel, cowardly group would resort to terrorism to achieve its
goals.
9. A a d D Most terrorists seem like disturbed people who would act violent
even in an ideal society.
10. A a d D Terrorism is sometimes morally justified.
11. If terrorism involves "killing innocent civilians to achieve a political goal," I
feel this tactic:
a. is a morally acceptable tactic:
El never El rarely El occasionally El sometimes El often.
b. has been an effective tactic:
El never El rarely El occasionally El sometimes El often.
Add any comments on back.
In particular, about the 9/11 terrorists and their world-wide al-Qaeda network, I feek
12. A a d D they would have exploded nuclear weapons in New York City if they
had the chance.
13. A a d D they have some legitimate basis for their anger at the United States
and its citizens.
14. A a d D they are the enemy of all civilized people, including moderate Mos-
lems.
15. A a d D outside the U.S., the government should be aggressive to eliminate
their network.
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16. A a d D inside the U.S., the government should be aggressive to eliminate
their network.
About the treatment of suspects in the United States, I feel the government should:
17. A a d D "profile" people at U.S. airports and elsewhere if this can increase
public safety.
18. A a d D probe the otherwise private files of U.S. students and workers from
suspect nations.
19. A a d D torture U.S. detainees linked with al-Qaeda if their information
could save lives.
20. A a d D expand its wiretaps of suspects in the U.S.
21. A a d D ensure the right to an attorney and other legal rights of suspects in
U.S. custody.
22. Since 9-11-01, I have felt more:
a. A a d D fearful or anxious
b. A a d D angry
c. A a d D suspicious of strangers
d. A a d D spiritual
e. A a d D proud to be an American
23. Since 9-11-01, 1 have:
a. A a d D reduced my air travel
b. A a d D acted more alert in public
c. A a d D stayed at home more
d. A a d D gone out more to support the economy
e. A a d D displayed the U.S. flag more
24. About the 9-11-01 attack, I would say its impact on New York City really has
been:
ED none
E mainly negative
IZ both negative and positive
fl mainly positive.
Any comments on back.
25. 1 have personally visited and seen Ground Zero. E no El yes, time(s).
If yes, what was its immediate or long-term impact on you?
Add any comments on back.
26. My age: _.
27. My gender: El M El F.
28. The country where I was raised:
29. Of my four grandparents, the number born in the U.S. is (circle one):
0 1 2 3 4
30. My education:
El Grammar school
El High school
El Some college
El College graduate
El Graduate school
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31. My ethnicity:
El Hispanic
El White
El African-American
El Asian
El Other:
32. My religion:
El Moslem
El Christian
El Jewish
El None
El Other:
33. 1 would say my degree of religiosity is (circle #):
(less) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9(more)
34. I live in the New York area:
0 Yes l No, in:
35. (Optional) Which words would you use to describe individual terrorists today?
Put an N beside words you feel are never true, an A beside those you think are
always true of terrorists. Leave blank all the other words you think might apply
to some terrorists but not others:
Rational
Dedicated
Cruel
Idealistic
_ Strong
Clever
Fanatic
Sensible
__ Calculating
_ Cowardly
- Misguided
Effective
Any additional comments (optional):
Mature
Immature
Sincere
- Mentally disturbed
- Self-sacrificing
Malcontent
Selfish
Selfless
Thrill-seeking
Sadistic
Brainwashed
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•..11. An acceptable or effective tactic?
.. 24. 9-11 impact on New York City?
... 25. Impact of seeing Ground Zero?
36. Any further comments on terrorism, 9-11, its impact, this survey...?
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THE IMPACT OF 9/11 AND ITS AFTERMATH
ON SUBSTANCE USE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
FUNCTIONING: AN OVERVIEW
Patrick B. Johnson*
and Linda Richter**
Like Pearl Harbor six decades previously, the tragic events of
September 11, 2001 transformed this nation. In some respects,
however, because the events occurred in the electronic age, and in
the nation's capitol and its largest city, these events seemed to pos-
sess greater immediacy and possibly greater short- and long-range
consequences as well. This Essay provides a brief summary and
evaluation of findings on the mental health and substance abuse
consequences of the events of 9/11 throughout the nation and in
our cities. It also presents new data obtained from clients who en-
tered substance abuse treatment in New York and other cities ei-
ther before 9/11 or during a six-month period following the events.
This Essay concludes with a discussion of how best to interpret
these various research findings.
Two general types of data have been used to explore the nature
and extent of the consequences of the 9/11 tragedy. The first ap-
proach utilized retrospective reports either from interviews with
randomly selected respondents1 or from interviews with respon-
dents who either represented groups with some specialized respon-
* Ph.D., Fellow in the Division of Health and Treatment Research and Analysis
at the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse (CASA) at Columbia Uni-
versity. Educated at the University of California at Los Angeles and the University of
Wisconsin-Madison, Dr. Johnson is a social psychologist who has been involved in
substance abuse research for over two decades. He has also been involved in the
development of the Drug Evaluation Network System, a real-time treatment intake
monitoring system. This system is to become the platform for the National Treatment
Outcome Monitoring study to be funded by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration.
** Ph.D., Senior Research Associate, Policy Research and Analysis Division of
the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse (CASA) at Columbia Uni-
versity where her area of concentration is adolescent substance use and the pathways
to addiction. She also teaches in the psychology department at Barnard College and
in the Department of Organization and Leadership at Teachers College, Columbia
University.
1. Mark A. Schuster et al., A National Survey of Stress Reactions After the Sep-
tember 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1507, 1507 (2001); Linda
Weiss et al., A Vulnerable Population in a Time of Crisis: Drug Users and the Attacks
on the World Trade Center, 79 J. URB. HEALTH 392, 393 (2002).
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sibility for addressing the consequences (for example, government
officials charged with providing social services)2 or who repre-
sented specific vulnerable populations (for example, drug addicts
or children). In each instance, these reports only contained data
collected post-9/11 in which respondents were asked to report on
their reactions at the time of the attacks or in their aftermath.4
The second type of approach looked at data collection systems
that had been in place before 9/11 and continued collecting infor-
mation afterward.5 Some of this ongoing research data enabled re-
searchers to compare the responses of the same individuals before
and after the terrorist attacks.6 Other studies enabled researchers
to compare the responses of different people before and after the
terrorist attacks.7 The Authors' research on the characteristics of
clients entering substance abuse treatment facilities pre- and post-
9/11 falls into this latter category.
The results of the various retrospective studies suggest both the
specific, localized effects, as well as the more widespread, national
effects of the events of 9/11. For example, a telephone survey con-
ducted by the Rand Corporation in the days immediately following
the attacks found that while ninety percent of the 560 adults inter-
viewed had one or more symptoms of stress to some degree, forty-
four percent reported "one or more substantial symptoms."8 In-
cluded among these stress symptoms were sleeplessness, night-
2. Connie Kendig et a]., Perceived Changes in the Behaviors of Counselors and
Patients Following the September 11th Attacks, Presentation at the College for Pre-
vention of Drug Dependence Convention (June 2002) (PowerPoint presentation on
file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
3. Weiss et al., supra note 1, at 393.
4. Schuster et al., supra note 1, at 1507; Weiss et al., supra note 1, at 392.
5. See, e.g., Stephanie H. Factor et al., Drug Use Frequency Among Street-Re-
cruited Heroin and Cocaine Users in Harlem and the Bronx Before and After Septem-
ber 11, 2001, 79 J. URB. HEALTH 404, 405 (2002); M.W. Perrine et al., The Impact of
September 11 on Alcohol Consumption and Selected Psychological Variable, Presen-
tation at the Twenty-Fifth Annual Scientific Meeting of the Research Society on Alco-
holism (June 2002) (on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
6. See Deni Carise et al., Changes in Characteristics of Individuals Seeking Sub-
stance Abuse Treatment After the September 11th Terrorist Attacks, Presentation at
the College for Prevention of Drug Dependence Convention (June 2002) (PowerPoint
presentation on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal) (describing how the Drug
Evaluation Network System ("DENS"), a nationwide electronic system providing
clinical information on patients entering substance abuse treatment, was utilized to
compare information pre- and post-9/11).
7. Patrick B. Johnson et al., Alcohol Use Patterns Before and After September
11th, 21 AM. CLINICAL LABORATORY 25, 25 (2002).
8. Schuster et al., supra note 1, at 1507.
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mares, an inability to concentrate, and irritability.9 These
researchers also reported that although the effects were wide-
spread, "the people we surveyed who were closest to New York
had the highest rate of substantial stress reactions."' 0
Similarly, a telephone survey of Manhattan residents directed by
researchers at the New York Academy of Medicine found in-
creased levels of self-reported alcohol, tobacco, and marijuana
use." While the increase in marijuana use was relatively small (3.2
percent), larger increases were reported for smoking (9.7 percent),
and alcohol use (28.8 percent). 12 Interestingly, symptoms of post-
traumatic stress disorder were associated with increases in mari-
juana use and cigarette smoking, while symptoms of depression
were associated with increases in the use of each of the three
substances. 3
Retrospective reports by current or former users of heroin and
cocaine from a qualitative investigation designed to determine the
impact of 9/11 events on this vulnerable population indicated that
they also reported serious emotional turmoil, including anger, anxi-
ety, and sadness. 4 In contrast to the increases in substance use
observed in the telephone survey,15 reports of lowered drug use
were as commonly observed as reports of increased use among
those interviewed by Dr. Weiss and her colleagues. 16 This suggests
that the effects of the attacks may have been more varied with re-
gard to individual substance use behavior.
This variability is also highlighted in studies where pre- and post-
9/11 retrospective data was available. 17 For example, another qual-
itative investigation interviewed street-recruited samples of heroin
and cocaine users between July and November of 2001.18 Compar-
isons of the data taken pre- and post-9/11 in the Bronx and Harlem
revealed no differences in the average number of days per month
9. Id. at 1508.
10. Id. at 1511.
11. David Vlahov et al., Increased Use of Cigarettes, Alcohol, and Marijuana
Among Manhattan, New York, Residents After the September l1th Terrorist Attacks,
155 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 988, 988 (2002).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Weiss et al., supra note 1, at 392.
15. Vlahov et al., supra note 11, at 991.
16. Weiss et al., supra note 1, at 392.
17. See Factor et al., supra note 5, at 404 ("Recently, rates of cigarette, alcohol,
and marijuana use increased among the general population of Manhattan after the
events of September 11, 2001.").
18. Id.
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that respondents sniffed cocaine, snorted heroin, or smoked crack
or marijuana. 19 Similarly, no differences were observed in the pro-
portions of daily users of drugs in the groups interviewed before
and after 9/11.20
Another approach to investigating the mental health and sub-
stance abuse consequences of the 9/11 terrorist attacks was to com-
pare clients entering substance abuse treatment facilities in the six
months before and the six months following these events.2 1 This
investigation was based on data from the Drug Evaluation Net-
work System ("DENS"), a real-time data collection system de-
signed to assess substance-abusing clients at treatment admission in
order to monitor national drug use trends and treatment utilization
patterns.22 The system is currently operating in drug and alcohol
treatment programs around the country. 3 This analysis examined
data collected in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Miami.24
Overall comparisons of alcohol use (frequency of use and fre-
quency of intoxication in the past thirty days) did not reveal any
differences between clients entering treatment in the three months
before 9/11, and those entering in the three months following 9/
11.25 Psychiatric symptoms were also assessed and revealed that
clients who entered substance abuse treatment in the three-month
period following the events of 9/11 generally reported being less
anxious than those who entered before that date.2 6 To determine
whether increases in alcohol use might be found in New York City
because of its proximity to the attacks, comparisons were made
within each city of those entering treatment in the three months
before and after the attacks.27 Once again, regardless of the city
involved, no differences were observed in alcohol ,use rates be-
tween those entering treatment prior to 9/11 and those entering
afterward.28
Results from the DENS study presented at the College for the
Prevention of Drug Dependence meeting also failed to find signifi-
cant differences in the clients' overall drug use profiles. 29 Results
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Carise et al., supra note 6.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Kendig et al., supra note 2.
25. Perrine et al., supra note 5.
26. Id.
27. Johnson et al., supra note 7, at 26.
28. Id. at 25.
29. Factor et al., supra note 5, at 407; Carise et al., supra note 6.
1458
9/11 & SUBSTANCE USE
indicated, however, that among those presented for admission after
9/11, there appeared to be an increased proportion of individuals
who had been drug-free for a relatively short time.3 ° This suggests
that among abstinent drug users, the attacks may have precipitated
relapses among those most recently free of drugs.31 At the same
time, overall psychiatric composite scores were lower among those
clients entering treatment after 9/11 than those entering before this
time. 32 Finally, most counselors at substance abuse treatment facil-
ities who were questioned about the substance use patterns of cli-
ents before and after 9/11 reported an increase in alcohol and drug
use after September 11.33 These reports occurred, of course, de-
spite the fact that actual client intake profiles in the DENS system
demonstrated little change in the drug use profiles of clients enter-
ing the treatment facilities before 9/11 and those entering after 9/11. 34
Research by Dr. Perrine and his associates also found no statisti-
cally significant increase in substance use after September 11,
2001. 31 The results of this research are particularly compelling be-
cause they are based on responses of the same individuals who re-
ported on their own daily alcohol use as part of a two-year
investigation. 36 In this study, 120 respondents who lived approxi-
mately 300 miles north of Ground Zero in Vermont reported each
day on their mood, stress levels, and the number of alcoholic drinks
consumed between May 23, 2001 and December 30, 2001. 37
Data collected from eighty-six respondents who drank alcohol
revealed that anger, stress, and sadness ratings all increased dra-
matically on September 11.38 At the same time, "[n]o significant
elevation of alcohol consumption was observed on either Septem-
ber 11, or on the days following the attack. ' 39 Results also re-
vealed that anger ratings remained elevated for females for
fourteen days and for males for forty-one days following the at-
30. Weiss et al., supra note 1, at 401.
31. See id. (noting that the evidence of release among former users was restricted
to those who had most recently stopped using).
32. Carise et al., supra note 6.
33. Id.
34. Kendig et al., supra note 2.
35. Perrine et al., supra note 5.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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tacks, while sadness ratings remained elevated for thirty-seven days
for males and for sixty-three days for females.4 0
In preparing this Essay, the DENS data system was used to ana-
lyze the composite drug use scores of clients entering substance
abuse treatment in New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles.
These three cities were chosen for three reasons. First, they re-
present the three largest cities in the nation. Second, each repre-
sents a distinct geographic area of the country, the Northeast,
Midwest, and West. Third, each represents a different distance
from the events of 9/11. While New York City was directly and
dramatically affected by the attacks, Chicago and Los Angeles, be-
cause of their distance from these events, were less directly
affected.
In these analyses, the Authors compared the drug and alcohol
use and psychological profiles of clients entering treatment in four,
three-month time periods: March 11-June 10, 2001 ("Ti"), June 11-
September 10, 2001 ("12"), September 11, 2001-December 10,
2001 ("T3"), and December 11, 2001-March 10, 2002 ("T4"). Drug
and alcohol use and levels of psychological disturbance were as-
sessed with composite scores derived from the Addiction Severity
Index, the most frequently used admission assessment tool cur-
41rently in use. Composite scores are derived from client responses
to a series of individual items.42 Scores range from 0, indicating no
problems, to 1, indicating the highest problem level.43
The first analysis was a regression in which the impacts of city,
time period, and their interaction were used to predict individual
client drug use scores. The findings revealed a significant interac-
tion between city and time period (b=-.21, t=-4.05, p<.O01). To
illuminate its meaning, a series of one-way analyses of variance
("ANOVAs") were conducted in which time periods were used to
predict drug use scores in each city. Figure 1 presents the pattern
of results by city. For New York, the analysis revealed that there
was a significant increase in drug use scores between T1 and T3.
For Chicago, the analysis revealed a significant reduction in com-
posite drug use scores between T1, T2, T3, and T4. For Los Ange-
les, results revealed a significant reduction between T1 and T4.
40. Id.
41. A. Thomas McLellan et al., An Improved Diagnostic Evaluation Instrument for
Substance Abuse Patients: The Addiction Severity Index, 168 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL
DISEASE 26, 26 (1980).
42. Id. at 27.
43. See id. at 28.
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Taken together, these findings suggest that while clients entering
substance abuse treatment in New York City in the three-month
period following 9/11 appeared with elevated drug use profiles, this
was not true of clients entering in Chicago or Los Angeles. Moreo-
ver, while there was a general trend in Chicago and Los Angeles
for clients entering treatment in the fourth time period, between
December 10, 2001 and March 10, 2002, to possess less elevated
drug composite profiles, a similar reduction was not observed
among clients entering treatment in New York City.
Analyses of the alcohol use composite scores, in contrast, re-
vealed no combined effect (interaction) of city and time period.
Instead, independent effects of city and time period were observed.
Results indicated that clients entering treatment in New York City
possessed higher alcohol composite scores (Mean=.32) than clients
entering in Chicago (Mean=.29) or Los Angeles (Mean=.24). The
scores of Chicago clients were significantly higher than those of
Los Angeles clients. In addition, clients entering treatment during
T4 (December 11, 2001 to March 10, 2002) possessed significantly
lower scores than clients entering during T2 or T3.
Analyses of psychological disturbance scores revealed no signifi-
cant interaction of city together with time period, but only an im-
pact of time period. Figure 2 provides a graph of this effect.
Subsequent analysis of this effect revealed a general downward
trend in psychological disturbance. The only significant difference
between time periods in psychological disturbance was observed
between T1 and T4.
It should be clear from the above presentation that, with respect
to the impact of the 9/11 events on substance abuse and psychologi-
cal functioning, the findings are far from clear and consistent.
Rather it would seem that while studies generally indicate in-
creases in psychological distress following the attacks, their impact
on alcohol and drug use was more variable. Of course, it is possi-
ble that substance-abusing individuals who were extremely dis-
tressed were unable to take upon themselves the emotionally
difficult task of seeking substance abuse treatment, producing a po-
tential selection bias in the DENS sample.
Nevertheless, while the results of some studies suggested that the
attacks were associated with increases in substance use and psycho-
logical disturbance, others suggested little or no impact. This does
not indicate that the attacks had little impact, but rather that there
were individuals who coped differently with the emotional distress
caused by these events. The variability of these findings strongly
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suggests that people responded in distinct and sometimes idiosyn-
cratic ways. While it might seem self-evident, in light of cultural
biases or preconceptions, that individuals would turn to alcohol
and drugs to medicate their feelings of distress and discomfort,
there are many possible responses. Some may have increased the
frequency of their drinking or prescription drug use in the days fol-
lowing the events of 9/11. Others, however, may have stopped
drinking, begun attending religious services more regularly, or de-
cided to volunteer to assist others in coping with the aftermath.
Finally, the variability in the findings may also have been due, in
part, to the different data collection methods employed, the differ-
ent time periods during which data were collected, or the different
samples from which data were collected. On the one hand, the
findings of Dr. Perrine and his colleagues, which indicated no in-
crease in alcohol use post-9/11, were part of a larger, ongoing in-
vestigation in which people responded about their alcohol use and
emotional states on a daily basis.44 His data indicated sharp in-
creases in anger and depression, but no change in alcohol con-
sumption.05 On the other hand, the findings of Dr. Vlahov and Dr.
Schuster and their colleagues were based on single time responses
to telephone surveys conducted shortly after the attacks. 6 In these
surveys, it was probably clear to many respondents that they were
being questioned about the impact of 9/11 on their lives. Accord-
ingly, some may have responded in a way that indicated that their
lives had been affected and they overestimated changes in their
alcohol use. It is possible that the apparent increase in drug use
may reflect the respondents' attempts to validate their distress and
solidarity with the victims and their families rather than a state-
ment of fact.
The findings of Dr. Kendig and her colleagues provide some sup-
port for this position 7.4  While counselors in substance abuse treat-
ment facilities found that people who entered treatment after 9/11
were drinking and using drugs more than those who entered treat-
ment before 9/11, the actual client profiles did not generally sup-
port this contention.48  The counselors' perceptions were
apparently not based on reality. They may have been based on
44. See Perrine et al., supra note 5 (conducting a two year longitudinal study of
120 subjects who live 300 or more miles north of Ground Zero on daily alcohol con-
sumption and mood between May 23, 2001 and December 30, 2001).
45. Id.
46. Vlahov et al., supra note 11, at 988-89.
47. Kendig et al., supra note 2.
48. Id.
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perceptions that were influenced by the distress they felt during
this time and the general belief that people were more likely to
drink and consume drugs during this period.
In any event, it is important to understand that crisis produces
many responses. Even if humans are cut from the same cloth, that
cloth has been tailored to suit different cultural fashions. This ap-
pears to have been true in society's responses to what is arguably
the most devastating single-day crisis in the history of this nation.
Some individuals collapsed momentarily, while others made coura-
geous decisions and responded heroically. Most people just coped
in their individual ways. Others, however, experience personal, but
often distinctly different, short- and long-term consequences.
These unique and varied responses show the individuality as well
as the multiplicity of society.
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LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE
PURSUIT OF TERRORISTS:
AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE
GOVERNMENT'S RIGHT TO CLASSIFY
UNITED STATES CITIZENS SUSPECTED OF
TERRORISM AS ENEMY COMBATANTS AND
TRY THOSE ENEMY COMBATANTS BY
MILITARY COMMISSION
Amanda Schaffer*
INTRODUCTION
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks drastically changed atti-
tudes about personal freedom.' Fear that a terrorist could strike at
anytime, anyplace made individuals more willing to put up with
inconveniences, such as longer lines at airport security and baggage
checks in subway stations.2 This fear drove the government to im-
plement measures that it believed would help track down terrorists
and prevent future attacks.3 One such measure, promulgated by
President George W. Bush, is the Military Order of November 13,
2001: "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in
the War Against Terrorism."4 Those subject to the order can be
"detained, and, when tried, to be tried for violations of the laws of
war and other applicable laws by military tribunals."5
Section two of the order defines the non-citizens subject to the
order.6 Any non-U.S. citizen is subject to the order where:
[T]here is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant
times, is or was a member of the organization known as al
* J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2004; B.A., History and
Sociology of Science, Magna Cum Laude, University of Pennsylvania, 2000. I would
like to thank the Editors and Staff of the Fordham Urban Law Journal for their help
with this Comment. I would also like to thank my parents, Lynda and Jeffrey, for
their love and support in every aspect of my life.
1. Oyez! Oyez!, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2002, at A18.
2. Patrick Tyler & Elisabeth Bumiller, A Nation Challenged: The White House;
Bush Offers Taliban '2nd Chance' to Yield; Says He'd Welcome U.N. in Nation Build-
ing; F.B.I. Issues Alert on Signs of New Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2001, at Al.
3. See discussion infra Part II.A.l.
4. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 57,834.
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Qaida; has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to com-
mit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in preparation there-
fore, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to
cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citi-
zens, national security, foreign policy, or economy; or has know-
ingly harbored one or more individuals described in
subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of this order.
This order details procedures for handling such non-citizens sus-
pected of terrorism.7
While the order does not specifically give the government the
right to try citizens by military commissions,8 deeming a citizen an
enemy combatant 9 gives the government the authority to try him in
this manner. 10 An individual who is considered an enemy combat-
ant can be detained for the duration of an armed conflict under the
laws and customs of war,11 not under the domestic criminal laws. 12
President Bush has declared that two U.S. citizens, Yaser Esam
Hamdi and Jose Padilla, are enemy combatants, and they are cur-
rently being held in military prisons. 13 It has not yet been deter-
mined what the fate of Hamdi and Padilla will be. 4 They could be
held and not tried at all, they could be tried by military commis-
sions, like their non-citizen colleagues, or they could be tried in
criminal court. 15 This Comment will explore the government's
right to treat citizens as enemy combatants and whether their trials
should be by military commissions or by the non-military criminal
justice system.
Part I of this Comment gives background information and ex-
plains the source of the government's right to determine enemy
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See discussion infra Part I.
10. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 35 (1942) (holding that there is "a class of
unlawful belligerents" not entitled to be treated as prisoners of war and who can be
tried and punished by military commission).
11. See id. at 48. To determine the laws and customs of war, the Court looked to
Article 15 of the Articles of War, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1593 (repealed); LiszT, Das
Volkerrecht § 58(B)4 (12 ed. 1925); 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 225 (6th ed.
1940); COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE GREAT WAR 208
(1915); J.M. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 283 (1924); J.M. SPAIGHT, WAR
RIGHTS ON LAND 110 (1911); WAR OFFICE, GR. BRIT., MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW
§§ 445, 449 (1929); see infra Part I.B.
12. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48.
13. See Martha Neil, Avoiding the 'Enemy Combatant' Label Some Say Plea by
Taliban Fighter Shows Criminal Prosecutions Work in Terrorism Battle, A.B.A. J. E-
REPORT, July 19, 2002, at 2.
14. See discussion infra Part I.C.
15. See discussion infra Part II.
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combatant status and to use military commissions. Part I also de-
scribes the distinctions between a military trial and a regular crimi-
nal trial and explains the status of the Hamdi and Padilla cases.
Part II explains why the government wants to use military commis-
sions to try terrorists and the advantages of these commissions over
regular criminal proceedings. Additionally, Part II analyzes the
distinctions between citizens and non-citizens and examines the
constitutionality of declaring citizens enemy combatants. Part II
also discusses how terrorists differ from other types of criminals
and how those differences justify disparate treatment. Part III of
this Comment proposes a solution and determines that the govern-
ment does have the right to treat citizens as enemy combatants.
Part III also argues that military commissions should try these en-
emy combatants, however, there must be a structured judicial pro-
ceeding to determine whether an individual is actually an enemy
combatant. 6
I. ORIGINS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S RIGHT TO USE MILITARY
COMMISSIONS AND TO DETERMINE
ENEMY COMBATANT STATUS
A. Prior Use of Military Commissions
The United States has made use of military tribunals since the
country's inception. 17 The government used the commissions dur-
ing the Revolutionary War, the Mexican Wars, and the Civil War.' 8
The Supreme Court in Ex parte Quirin and Application of
Yamashita, declared that it is constitutional to try foreign belliger-
ents in military trials.19
Citizens also have been tried by military commissions in the
past. 0 After the surrender and occupation of Germany and Japan
in 1945, military tribunals tried U.S. citizens for ordinary criminal
16. See discussion infra Part III.B.
17. Byard Q. Clemmons, The Case for Military Tribunals, 49 FED. LAW. 27, 27
(2002).
18. Id. at 27-28. Military tribunals were used during the Civil War to try Confed-
erate soldiers who were captured as saboteurs in civilian clothing or spies. Id. Tribu-
nals were also used during the Mexican War and during the Revolutionary War for
acts of treason. Id.
19. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9 (1946); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 35 (1942);
Clemmons, supra note 17, at 28.
20. See infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
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activity in the occupied territories.21 The Supreme Court upheld
the jurisdiction of these tribunals.22 Additionally, in Madsen v.
Kinsella, the Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of a military
commission to try a U.S. citizen for murdering her husband, a U.S.
serviceman. 3 Finally, in Quirin, the Supreme Court upheld the
trial by military commission of a person presumed to be a U.S.
citizen. 4
1. Ex parte Quirin
In Ex Parte Quirin, German saboteurs trained to use explosives,
secret writings, and other terrorist tactics landed in the United
States during World War 11.2 They came ashore while it was dark,
got rid of their German uniforms and changed into civilian clothing
with the intent to destroy U.S. facilities that contributed to the war
effort.26 President Franklin D. Roosevelt set up military commis-
sions to try non-citizens during wartime who were charged with
committing or attempting to commit, "sabotage, espionage, hostile
or warlike acts, or violations of the laws of war.''27 The Supreme
Court held that these military commissions were constitutional,
stating:
[A]n enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly
through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction
of life or property, are familiar examples of belligerents who are
generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of
war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial
and punishment by military tribunals.28
In Quirin, the defendants argued that their trial should be in ci-
vilian court because those courts were open and functioning and
21. Am. Bar Ass'n Task Force on Terrorism & the Law, Report and Recommenda-
tions on Military Commissions, ARMY LAW., Mar. 2002, at 8, 10 [hereinafter Task
Force Recommendations].
22. Id.
23. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 362 (1952).
24. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48.
25. Id. at 21.
26. Id.
27. Juan R. Torruella, On the Slippery Slopes of Afghanistan: Military Commis-
sions and Exercise of Presidential Power, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 648, 668 (2002).
28. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31. Under the Geneva Convention, recognized prisoners
of war have to be charged or repatriated at the end of a conflict, and they are ex-
pected to give only their name, rank, and number when questioned. Thorn Shanker &
Katharine Q. Seeyle, Word for Word/The Geneva Conventions; Who Is a Prisoner of
War? You Could Look It Up. Maybe, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2002, § 4, at 9.
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therefore not precluded from hearing their case; the Supreme
Court rejected that claim.29 The Court held:
Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does
not relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is
unlawful because in violation of the law of war. Citizens who
associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy govern-
ment, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country
bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning
of the Hague Convention and the law of war.3 °
Citizenship, therefore, is not an escape from enemy combatant sta-
tus or treatment.
2. Application of Yamashita
In Application of Yamashita, the Supreme Court again allowed
the use of military tribunals to try the Japanese commander of the
Philippines, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, who had massacred ci-
vilians and prisoners of war and destroyed property without cause
or military necessity. 31 In Yamashita, the Court held that the mili-
tary commission was lawful, despite its creation after the cessation
of hostilities between the United States and Japan.32
The reasoning behind Yamashita helps support the constitution-
ality of Congress' authorization of military commissions to remedy
the terror produced by war crimes, "regardless of whether there
are ongoing hostilities at the time of trial. ' 33 This applies to terror-
ism because often the acts of war that a terrorist engages in are
sporadic and do not necessarily occur in one triable offense.34
29. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24, 48; Task Force Recommendations, supra note 21, at 10.
30. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38. The Hague Convention is one of a number of inter-
national conventions that address different legal issues and attempt to standardize
procedures between nations. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 717 (7th ed. 1999). The laws
of war are the body of rules and principles observed by civilized nations for the regu-
lation of matters inherent or incidental to the conduct of a public war, such as the
relations of neutrals and belligerents, blockades, captures, prizes, truces and armi-
stices, capitulations, prisoners, and declarations of war and peace. Id. at 895.
31. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14 (1946); Clemmons, supra note 17, at 28.
32. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 11; Torruella, supra note 27, at 674.
33. Spencer J. Crona & Neal A. Richardson, Justice For War Criminals of Invisible
Armies: A New Legal and Military Approach to Terrorism, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
349, 371 (1996).
34. Id.
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3. The Constitution and Other Sources of Authority
The authority for military commissions comes mainly from Arti-
cles I and II of the Constitution.3 ' Article I gives Congress the
power to "provide for the common Defense ' a6 and to "declare War
... and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water. '37
Article II gives the President "executive Power"38 and makes him
the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. ' 39 Additionally,
Congress, in Article 15 of the Articles of War, provided that "mili-
tary tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses
against the law of war in appropriate cases."40 Article 21 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (which is materially identical to
Article 15) provides:
[T]he provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon
courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost
courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with
respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of
war may be tried by military commission, provost court, or other
military tribunals.4"
B. Differences Between a Military Trial and a
Regular Criminal Trial
A panel of military officers makes up a military tribunal and tries
"both fact and law."42 In the military proceeding, there is no right
to a trial by jury.43 Military commissions do not use the traditional
rules of evidence.44 Instead, evidence is admitted if "in the opinion
of the Presiding Officer,45 the evidence would have probative value
35. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 21, at 8-9.
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
37. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
38. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
39. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
40. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 21, at 9.
41. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000).
42. Clemmons, supra note 17, at 29. Each commission consists of at least three,
but no more than seven members, the number determined by the appointing author-
ity. DEP'T OF DEF., MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER No. 1, at 2 (2002), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf (last visited May 15,
2003).
43. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 42, at 1-3.
44. Id. at 8-9.
45. Id. at 9. The presiding officer is designated by the appointing authority to pre-
side over the proceedings of that commission. Id. at 3. The presiding officer is a
military officer who is a judge advocate in any of the United States Armed Forces. Id.
The primary responsibilities of the presiding officer are to admit or exclude evidence
at trial, close proceedings, ensure the decorum of the proceedings, act upon any con-
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to a reasonable person. ' 46 This allows the commission to hear evi-
dence that would be inadmissible as hearsay in a non-military crim-
inal trial.47
Further, in a regular criminal court, the jury must unanimously
agree to convict, whereas in a military proceeding two-thirds of the
panel must agree to convict.48
An additional distinction between a military trial and a regular
criminal proceeding is that in a military trial the accused is not free
to select whomever he wants as his attorney.49 He can:
[S]elect a Military Officer who is a judge advocate of any United
States armed force ... [t]he [a]ccused may also retain the ser-
vices of a civilian attorney of the Accused's own choosing...
provided that attorney.., has been determined to be eligible for
access to information classified at the level SECRET or
higher.5 °
This civilian attorney will not necessarily be present at closed
commission proceedings.51 A proceeding can be deemed closed by
the presiding officer of the commission on his "own initiative or
based upon a presentation . . . by either the prosecution or the
defense. '5 2 Closing a proceeding could "include a decision to ex-
clude the Accused, Civilian Defense Counsel, or any other person
... from any trial proceeding or portion thereof."53
C. The Accused Citizen Terrorists: Padilla, Hamdi, and Lindh
1. Jose Padilla
Jose Padilla is thirty-one years old and was born in Brooklyn,
New York. 4 Padilla, who converted to Islam in 1992, was arrested
tempt, ensure the expeditious conduct of the trial, certify all interlocutory question.
Id.
46. Id. at 9.
47. Clemmons, supra note 17, at 29.
48. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 42, at 13. With the exception of cases where the
death penalty would be imposed; in those cases a unanimous vote is needed to con-
vict. Id.
49. Id. at 5.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 8. Grounds for closure include the protection of information classified
or classifiable under Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17, 1995)
"Classified National Security Information"; the physical safety of participants in com-
mission proceedings; safety of national security interests. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note
42, at 8.
53. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 42, at 8.
54. Jodi Wilgoren, Traces of Terror: The Bomb Suspect; From Chicago Gang to
Possible al Qaeda Ties, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2002, at A19.
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in Chicago on May 8, 2002 after arriving on a flight from Pakistan
via Zurich. 55 Padilla is currently being held in a military prison in
Charleston, South Carolina. 6 He is known as the "dirty bomber"
and is accused of planning to build and detonate a radioactive
bomb in the United States.57 Padilla had been under surveillance
by U.S. intelligence for at least five weeks before being taken into
custody.5 8 Padilla allegedly lied to U.S. authorities, claiming he
had never been to Afghanistan, and he did not give a clear expla-
nation as to why he was carrying $10,000 in cash in his suitcase.5 9
The "Mobbs Declaration," drafted by Michael Mobbs an official
in the Department of Defense, states the reasons for Padilla's de-
tention and enemy combatant status.6" Only part of the declara-
tion has been released to the public, however.6' The government
has declined to release the parts of the report it deemed to contain
sensitive government information. 6 The released part of the dec-
laration "describes Padilla's multiple contacts with senior al Qaeda
officials while in Pakistan and Afghanistan and their alleged plan
to have him return to the United States on a bombing mission."63
Attorneys for both Hamdi and Padilla filed petitions for a writ of
habeas corpus, claiming that their detention is unlawful.64 The gov-
ernment claims that neither individual has the right to file a habeas
petition. 65 The government also contends that the President's au-
thority as the Commander-in-Chief of the military to classify some-
one as an enemy combatant in wartime cannot be challenged.66
On December 4, 2002, a District Court for the Southern District
of New York ruled that Padilla has a right to meet with his attorney
and to offer evidence to contest the government's allegation that
55. Id.
56. Mark Hamblett, Padilla's 'Combatant' Status Challenged, 228 N.Y. L.J., Oct.
30, 2002, at 1.
57. Stephanie Francis Cahill, In the News: Citizen Held Without Charges as 'En-
emy Combatant' Case of Suspected 'Dirty Bomber' Raises Constitutional Questions,
A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, June 14, 2002, at 2.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Hamblett, supra note 56, at 1.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Mark Hamblett, Scope of Judicial Review in Terror Cases Debated, 228 N.Y.
L.J., Nov. 1, 2002, at 1.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1.
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he is associated with al Qaeda.67 The court also stated that the
President does have the right to detain unlawful combatants, re-
gardless of U.S. citizenship.68 This ruling is being challenged by the
government, which does not want Padilla to have access to his
attorney.69
2. Yaser Esam Hamdi
Yaser Esam Hamdi, a twenty-two-year-old Louisiana-born citi-
zen who moved to Saudi Arabia when he was a toddler, was ar-
rested in Afghanistan while allegedly armed and fighting for the
Taliban.70 The government initially transferred Hamdi to Guanta-
namo Bay, Cuba.71 After the government realized Hamdi was a
citizen, however, it sent him to a naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia.7 2
On January 8, 2003 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Richmond, Virginia, said that it was improper for
courts to probe too deeply into the detention of Hamdi.73 The
court held that a wartime president can indefinitely detain a
United States citizen captured as an enemy combatant on the bat-
tlefield and deny that person access to a lawyer.74 The court addi-
tionally held, "[t]he safeguards that all Americans have come to
expect in criminal prosecutions do not translate neatly to the arena
of armed conflict. In fact, if deference is not exercised with respect
to military judgments in the field, it is difficult to see where defer-
ence would ever obtain. '' 75 Since Hamdi was undisputedly present
in a zone of active combat operations, he does not have the right to
an in depth review of the facts underlying his seizure.76
3. John Walker Lindh
The third U.S. citizen captured as a terrorist suspect is John
Walker Lindh, twenty-one, who served as a Taliban militia member
67. Benjamin Weiser, Threats and Responses: The Courts; Judge Says Man Can
Meet With Lawyer to Challenge Detention as Enemy Plotter, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2002,
at Al.
68. Id.
69. Benjamin Weiser, Threats and Responses: The Courts; Judge is Angered by
U.S. Stance in Case of 'Dirty Bomb' Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2003, at A5.
70. Frederick N. Egler, Jr., Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 18 LAW. J. 4, 4 (2002).
71. Hamblett, supra note 56, at 1.
72. Egler, supra note 70, at 4.
73. Neil A. Lewis, Threats and Responses: The Courts; Detention Upheld in Com-
batant Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2003, at Al.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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in Afghanistan from August to November 2001.77 He pled guilty to
supplying services to the Taliban and carrying an explosive during
the commission of a felony.78 Despite his terrorist activities, he has
not been declared an enemy combatant.79 The government has not
offered a concrete reason as to why Lindh is not an enemy combat-
ant, while Padilla and Hamdi are. As part of Lindh's plea bargain,
however, he agreed to cooperate in the government's al Qaeda in-
vestigation;80 critics suggest that his cooperation is the reason for
his non-enemy combatant status.81
II. ADVANTAGES OF A MILITARY TRIAL, PROBLEMS WITH
A CRIMINAL TRIAL
A. Arguments Against Trying Accused Terrorists in
Non-Military Courts
Trying suspected terrorists in civilian courts raises various con-
cerns. These include the physical security of the courthouse and
the participants in the trial, and the ability to protect classified in-
formation, including "intelligence sources and methods whose
compromise could facilitate future terrorist acts." '82 Even if a trial
were kept confidential and closed to the press and public, the gov-
ernment could not risk a defendant passing classified information
to other terrorists, or risk the defendant later using the information
himself.8 3
Additionally, in a non-military court, the accused could escape
conviction on a technicality or a jurisdictional issue.84 The relaxed
evidentiary rules of military courts are more likely to prevent this
from happening. According to some prosecutors, the government
is also concerned that allowing a terrorist suspect to have un-
77. Neil, supra note 13, at 2. Lindh was captured in Afghanistan on December 2
or 3, 2001. He was interrogated by the FBI on December 9th and 10th, 2001. During
questioning, Lindh said that he had trained in explosives and firearms at a terrorist
camp run by al Qaeda, had fought shoulder-to-shoulder with the Taliban before he
was captured, had met with Osama bin Laden, and knew that bin Laden had ordered
suicide attacks against the United States. Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged:
The American Captive American Charged as a Terrorist Makes First Appearance in
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2002, at Al.
78. Neil, supra note 13, at 2.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 21, at 15.
83. Id. at 14-15.
84. See Crona & Richardson, supra note 33, at 371-74.
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restricted contact with a lawyer could impede an investigation. 85
For example, a lawyer could tell his client to remain silent and not
give information to the government.86 This information could be
vital to the war effort and prevent future terrorist activities.8 7 Fre-
quently, prisoners relent over time; the longer they go without ac-
cess to counsel the more likely they are to reveal information and
cooperate.88 The interest in preventing mass murder by terrorists,
some argue, is more important than the interest in applying the
Miranda rule to the questioning of terrorist suspects.89
1. The President's Rationale
The President's order to try al Qaeda suspects with military com-
missions explains:
[T]he September 11 attacks created a state of armed conflict be-
tween the United States and al Qaeda, that al Qaeda has both
the capability and intention to undertake further terrorist at-
tacks against the United States that could result in mass deaths
and injuries.., and that al Qaeda's actions may place at risk the
continuity of the operations of the U.S. government.9°
The President, therefore, has decided to use military commis-
sions to try non-citizen al Qaeda suspects; to allow for the effective
conduct of military operations and as a means to prevent future
terrorist attacks. 91
a. Support for the Presidential Order
Several military and legal scholars support the President's or-
der.92 Major General Michael J. Nardotti, a retired Judge Advo-
cate General of the Army, stated that military commissions were
needed to address "legitimate concerns for public and individual
safety, the compromise of sensitive intelligence, and due regard for
the practical necessity to use as evidence information obtained in
85. Joseph Bianco, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York
& Eric Seidel, Manhattan District Attorney's Rackets Bureau Deputy Chief , Class
Discussion in Terrorism and the Law, Fordham University School of Law (Nov. 20,
2002).
86. See Crona & Richardson, supra note 33, at 386-87.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 386.
90. Robert C. O'Brien, Trying Circumstances: The Military Commissions that Will
Try the Cases of the Detainees Have Been Established with Appropriate Due Process
Guarantees, 25 L.A. LAW. 48, 51 (2002).
91. Id.
92. Id.
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the course of military operation rather than through traditional law
enforcement means."93 Ruth Wedgwood, a professor of law at
Yale University and member of the United Nations Human Rights
Committee, stated that an "open trial would permit al Qaeda mem-
bers to scrutinize the trial record to see what the government
knows about their operating methods. 94
B. Constitutional Rights: Citizens, Non-Citizens,
and Enemy Combatants
1. The Fifth Amendment
Citizens normally are afforded all the rights guaranteed in the
United States Constitution.95  Included in the Constitution, the
Fifth Amendment requires due process of law and states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger ... nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... 96
A terrorist act is potentially a capital offense, and a military trial
would not include a presentment or indictment to a grand jury.97
Therefore, a citizen could argue that trial by a military commission
would violate Fifth Amendment rights.98
Further, a citizen could claim that a determination of enemy
combatant status, without any sort of trial, deprives him of due
process, because enemy combatants are held in prison until the
government decides to release them.99
The government can respond by asserting that because this is a
time of public danger, the lack of presentment or indictment to a
grand jury is acceptable. 100 The government can also argue that
due process is not violated because enemy combatant status is fac-
tually based. 1° 1 Additionally, the government could argue that a
93. Id. (quoting Major General Michael J. Nardotti, Military Commissions, re-
printed in ARMY LAW., Mar. 2002, at 4 (remarks Before the Senate Judiciary Sub-
Committee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts (Dec. 4, 2001))).
94. Id.
95. See infra notes 96-114 and accompanying text.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
97. See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
98. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
99. See infra Part II.B.3.b.
100. See infra Part II.B.3.b.
101. See supra Part I.C.
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military commission would not necessarily deprive an individual of
due process because there are numerous procedures in place to en-
sure that the proceeding is fair.10 2 These procedures include a pre-
sumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.10 3
2. The Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment describes the rights of the accused and
states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the As-
sistance of Counsel for his defense. 10 4
As an enemy combatant, an individual may be held for extended
periods of time without access to counsel. 10 5 If a military commis-
sion tries an enemy combatant, he will not be tried by an impartial
jury. 0 6 Additionally, the presiding officer of the commission has
the right to close the proceeding at any time, removing it from pub-
lic view." 7 A military commission also places a restriction on
whom the accused may choose to represent him.108
3. Case Law and Commentary
Case law and the Supreme Court's interpretation favor the gov-
ernment's position. In Quirin, the Supreme Court allowed the use
of military commissions to try enemy combatants, and held that
these commissions did not violate the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments.10 9 The Supreme Court held:
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments, while guaranteeing the con-
tinuance of certain incidents of trial by jury which Article III,
§ 2 had left unmentioned, did not enlarge the right to jury trial
as it had been established by that Article ... § 2 of Article III
and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments cannot be taken to have
102. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
103. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 42, at 2.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
105. See supra text accompanying note 74.
106. See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
107. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 42, at 2.
108. Id.; see supra Part I.B.
109. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1942).
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extended the right to demand a jury to trials by military commis-
sion .... 11o
Additionally, not all crimes must be tried by a jury. For exam-
ple, "petty offenses triable at common law without a jury" need not
receive a jury trial, and criminal contempt cases where at common
law a jury was not required also do not need to be tried by a jury.111
The mere fact that an individual is tried by the military does not
mean that his trial will be unfair.1 1 2 Professor Lawrence Tribe, a
constitutional law expert, argues, "there is nothing to suggest that
civilian juries in wartime will be any more fair than military tribu-
nals," and that military tribunals could be "less vulnerable to the
emotional pressures and prejudices which could tempt a civilian
jury to convict a person who was factually innocent. 11 3 Individu-
als tried before tribunals are still represented by counsel, are still
presumed innocent, and still must be proven guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt." 4
a. "War" Absent a Formal Declaration by Congress
A citizen could argue that because the war on terrorism is not a
declared war," 5 military commissions should not be used. Both
Congress and the Supreme Court have recognized, however, that a
formal declaration of war is not necessary for a state of war to ex-
ist.11 6 The government has argued that "whether a state of armed
conflict exists to which the laws of war apply is a political question
for the President, not the courts to decide."'"17 These tribunals
have been used in other situations where there was no declared
war, such as the Civil War and the Indian Wars. 1 8
Further, the Fourth Circuit, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, has recently
held that "[t]he unconventional aspects of the present struggle do
not make its stakes any less grave" or lessen the military's author-
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. See infra notes 11.3-114 and accompanying text.
113. Clemmons, supra note 17, at 30.
114. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 42, at 2.
115. A declared war defines the enemy as another state and its nationals, and
marks a clear beginning and end to the conflict with a legal act or instrument marking
its conclusion. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 21, at 10.
116. Id. at 11; see infra text accompanying notes 117-121.
117. Respondent's Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Amended Petition
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 8, Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02 Civ. 4445) (referring to the holding in The Prize Cases, 67
U.S. 635 (1862)).
118. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 21, at 11.
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ity to hold enemy combatants. 119 Additionally, Article 21 does not
specify that there must be a declared war in order for military com-
missions to be used.120 Finally, in Talbot v. Seeman, the Supreme
Court recognized the ability of Congress to declare a "partial war"
targeted at a specific type of enemy aggression even if we are not at
war with an enemy nation in the traditional sense. 121
b. Extrapolation of the President's Order to Citizens
A citizen can point out that the President's order is directed at
non-citizens, and, therefore, citizens should not be tried by military
commissions and should not be declared enemy combatants. A
joint Congressional resolution, enacted on September 18, 2001,
however, authorized the President "to. use all necessary and appro-
priate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he de-
termines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001 .... ",2 The President could, there-
fore, include military commissions under "necessary and appropri-
ate force."'1
24
Additionally, Congress has accepted that the President's Com-
mander-in-Chief powers during wartime include authorizing the
detention of enemy belligerents. 25 The provisions of 10 U.S.C.
§ 956(5) support the "expenditure of funds for the detention of
'prisoners of war' and persons-such as enemy combatants-'simi-
lar to prisoners of war,"' indicating Congress' understanding that
the military can capture and hold enemy combatants, including citi-
zens, during wartime. 2 6
A citizen could argue that a declaration that he is an enemy com-
batant violates 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a). 127 This statute "prohibits the
detention of a United States citizen without a specific authorization
119. Id. at 9 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002)).
120. See Respondent's Reply Brief at 9, Padilla (No. 02 Civ. 4445).
121. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 28 (1801). Talbot involved a ship that was taken
during 1799 when the United States and France were in a state of partial war. The
Court deliberated over whether it was lawful to take a ship at this time. Id.; see Crona
& Richardson, supra note 33, at 360.
122. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
123. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 21, at 11 (citing Pub. L. No. 107-40,
115 Stat. 224 (2001)).
124. Id. at 11.
125. Respondent's Reply Brief at 16, Padilla (No. 02 Civ. 4445).
126. Id. at 17.
127. See infra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
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by an act of Congress." '128 The legislative history of this statute
indicates Congress' intention to repeal the Emergency Detention
Act, which allowed the "detention of each person as to whom there
is reasonable ground to believe that such persons will engage in, or
probably will conspire with others to engage in acts of espionage or
of sabotage. ' 129 This suggests that the government does not have
the right to detain citizens like the two that are currently being
considered enemy combatants. 130
The government can counter this argument by claiming that
§ 4001(a) does not apply to enemy combatants during times of
war.13 1 This statute was specifically placed in Title 18, which per-
tains to "Crimes and Criminal Procedure," instead of Title 10 or 50,
which govern the "Armed Forces" and "War and National De-
fense. ' 132 Additionally, if this statute did apply in wartime, a citi-
zen could never be classified as an enemy combatant regardless of
his actions.1 33 This would directly contradict the holding in Quirin,
declaring that citizens can be considered enemy combatants. 34
Also, § 4001(a) does not apply to detentions "pursuant to an Act of
Congress," and in this case, Congress has given the President sup-
port for "all necessary and appropriate force. '135
Another way for a citizen to challenge the government's author-
ity to declare him an enemy combatant is to rely upon the Posse
Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385.136 This Act, created to prevent
abuses by the military,1 37 prohibits the military from involvement
in civilian law enforcement.1 38 Declaring a suspected terrorist an
enemy combatant and holding him in a military prison seemingly
violates this Act.139 The government can argue, however, that the
128. Petitioners' Brief in Support of the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and in Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss at 6, Padilla ex rel. New-
man v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02 Civ. 445).
129. Id. at 7.
130. Id.
131. See Respondent's Reply Brief at 18, Padilla (No. 02 Civ. 4445).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 19.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 20.
136. Petitioners' Brief in Support of the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and in Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss at 6, Padilla ex rel. New-
man v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02 Civ. 445).
137. Id.
138. Id. The Act is intended to prevent the military from taking over civilian gov-
ernment and suspending constitutional liberties. Bissonette v. Haig, 485 U.S. 264, 264
(1988).
139. See supra notes 136-138 and accompanying text.
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act is directed at civilian law enforcement and, therefore, should
not apply to the military matter of detention of enemy combat-
ants.1 n It is "the exercise of a core military function to safeguard
the national security in a time of war."14'
Citizens can also argue that the U.S. government has protested
the use of military tribunals to try its citizens in other countries, yet
they are considering the use of these tribunals within their own
country.142 The government can respond, however, that as long as
reasonable procedural safeguards are in place, military commis-
sions can be mechanisms for a fair trial and do not violate due pro-
cess, and that the foreign commissions they oppose are not as fairly
constructed. 43
C. Treating Terrorists Differently from Other
Types of Criminals
Terrorists involved with al Qaeda could have information that, if
exposed in a regular criminal proceeding, could threaten national
security. 144 The Pentagon and other intelligence agencies are un-
willing to allow suspects access to certain witnesses and evidence
that could compromise this security.145 The government argues
that it has a justified interest in keeping terrorists in isolation and
under interrogation. 46 Without access to witnesses, however, a
suspect in the regular criminal justice system would be deprived of
his Sixth Amendment right to seek witnesses that could exonerate
him. 14
7
The criminal justice system is designed to "err on the side of let-
ting the guilty go free rather than convicting the innocent.' 48 Ar-
guably, this is not a good method for dealing with a terrorist linked
to a network such as al Qaeda and the September 11th attacks.
Another problem with a criminal trial is that potential jurors
could fear that conviction of the suspect would place their lives in
140. See Respondent's Reply Brief at 21, Padilla (No. 02 Civ. 4445).
141. Id.
142. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 21, at 15.
143. Id.
144. See supra Part II.A.
145. See supra Part II.A.
146. Philip Shenon & Eric Schmitt, Threats and Responses: the 9/11 Suspect; White
House Weighs Letting Military Tribunal Try Moussaoui, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2002, at A17.
147. Id.
148. Clemmons, supra note 17, at 31 (citing Crona & Richardson, supra note 33, at
379).
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danger.149 Additionally, a public trial would not keep sensitive in-
formation secure and could "disclose methods and sources to the
enemy. "150
As to the different evidence rules, the normal rules of evidence
could make it difficult for the court to learn the truth.1 51 The intro-
duction of hearsay gives the tribunal more information, and the
more information the tribunal has, the more credible its decision
will be.15 2
Another advantage of military tribunals is that the proceedings
take less time. 153 This faster process is necessary because terrorism
is an ongoing threat. 54 "Trials to the court are shorter than jury
trials by at least one-half.' 1 55 This speed is exemplified by the dif-
ference in trial length between the first World Trade Center bomb-
ing trial and the Yamashita case. The World Trade Center case
involving 207 witnesses took over five months (from November
1993 to March 1994) while the Yamashita case heard 286 witnesses
and 3,000 pages of testimony in a little more than five weeks.' 56
Citizens accused of terrorism are not being tried by military
tribunals for ordinary criminal activity. 57 Their behavior can be
construed as violations of the laws of war, therefore, it is legitimate
to try them by military commissions.1 58 They acted under the di-
rection of al Qaeda while in civilian clothing, and they committed
acts of aggression against innocent, noncombatant civilians and
their property, thus violating the laws of war. 59 While al Qaeda is
not an independent state, the laws of war also apply to non-state
actors, such as insurgents. 60 In fact, al Qaeda itself claims they are
waging a jihad against the United States. 61
Further, terrorist acts transcend ordinary criminal acts and,
therefore, terrorists should not be tried by the criminal justice sys-
tem.162 Spencer Crona, a Denver attorney and writer of an award-
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. See infra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.
154. See supra Introduction.
155. Crona & Richardson, supra note 33, at 387.
156. Clemmons, supra note 17, at 31.
157. See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
158. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 21, at 11.
159. See id. at 12.
160. Id.
161. See Crona & Richardson, supra note 33, at 351.
162. Id. at 354.
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winning essay on international law, and Neal Richardson, a Deputy
District Attorney for Denver who has written about constitutional
issues, feel that "terrorism is not a social problem susceptible to
civilian intervention and law enforcement, but a military threat and
menace to our civilization appropriate for military repulsion. "163
Finally, as noted above, some believe that terrorists need to be
detained as enemy combatants for the duration of the armed con-
flict to ensure that they do not aid the enemy and gather additional
intelligence that would hurt the U.S. war effort.1 64 They are not
being held for punishment purposes. 65 Therefore, they are not be-
ing punished without due process merely because they are being
detained in a military prison.16
6
III. MILITARY TRIBUNALS: IF THEY ARE FAIR,
THEY ARE APPROPRIATE
A. Specific Steps to Ensure Fairness
The United States must take into account the implications of its
actions on future circumstances. If we try our own citizens with
military commissions, what is to prevent other countries from try-
ing U.S. citizens this way? The government must therefore ensure
that these commissions are fair and give defendants a presumption
of innocence.
These tribunals should only be used when there is a compelling
security interest at stake.' 67 It is important to ensure that those
tried by military commissions are given a "full and fair trial.'
'1 68
Some principles that could ensure fairness include an independent
and impartial tribunal with proceedings open to the press and the
public, except for specific and compelling reasons,'169 and the fol-
lowing rights for the defendant: presumption of innocence; prompt
notice of charges; trial without undue delay; to be present; to ex-
amine, or have examined, the witnesses against him; to the free
163. Id. at 357.
164. See Respondent's Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Amended Peti-
tion for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 22, Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp.
2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02 Civ. 4445).
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text.
167. Task Force Recommendations, supra note 21, at 17.
168. Id. at 18.
169. Id.
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assistance of an interpreter; and not to be compelled to testify
against himself or confess guilt.170
B. A Better System to Determine if a Citizen is
an Enemy Combatant
While the courts have traditionally given great deference to "the
President's wartime detention decisions," there must be some sys-
tem of review to determine enemy combatant status.171 Otherwise,
certain citizens will live in fear that they could be picked up off the
street and declared an enemy combatant at the whim of the Presi-
dent. 172 While the country is in a state of increased fear and anger
and is more willing to accept the detention of citizens, there must
be a fair system of review to ensure that the government has good
cause in declaring that an individual is an enemy combatant. 3
Because of national security issues, the government should have
the right to declare someone an enemy combatant and detain him
for the duration of the armed conflict. 174 If a citizen is legitimately
declared an enemy combatant, the President's Executive Order
should apply and a military commission should try him. The cur-
rent standard of review to determine enemy combatant status,
however, is not enough. 75 A procedural system needs to be in
place to make certain that individuals are not unfairly deemed en-
emy combatants. A set standard of review to determine enemy
combatant status will give U.S. citizens fair warning of the conse-
quences of terrorist acts.
The process for determining enemy combatant status will need
to be top secret to guarantee that sensitive information is not re-
leased. 76 It could be comprised of a panel of three to five judges
nominated by the President and approved with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, similar to the way in which Supreme Court jus-
tices are appointed.177 The defendant will have the right to have
the attorney of his choice, as long as the attorney can pass security
170. Id. Principles taken from Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. Id.
171. See Respondent's Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Amended Peti-
tion for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 24, Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp.
2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02 Civ. 4445).
172. See discussion supra Part III.A.
173. See discussion supra Part III.A.
174. See supra Part I.A.1.
175. See discussion supra Part I.C.
176. See discussion supra Part I.C.
177. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
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clearance. The standard of review will be probable cause and the
evidentiary rules will be similar to that of a grand jury proceeding,
where hearsay is admissible. This is necessary because of the diffi-
culty in establishing these cases, and because witnesses may also be
terrorists who are unlikely to cooperate or who are out of the
country. The standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" is too high
for cases such as these. Although it should be ensured that civil
rights of the accused are not violated, the standard cannot be so
high that it is impossible for the government to make its case. The
decision of this special court will be final and will not be subject to
review, ensuring that the case is not held up by way of lengthy and
expensive appeals.178
Claiming that someone is an enemy combatant when he is inno-
cent could destroy that person's life, and contravenes the constitu-
tional principles we hold dear. The approach suggested in this
Comment would decrease the chances of that happening. While it
is possible that some innocent people could slip through cracks in
the system and be declared enemy combatants without merit, the
minimal risk is warranted considering the large-scale destruction of
life and property that terrorists affect.1 79 Blackstone, in a commen-
tary on the terrorists of his era, said:
Lastly, the crime of piracy, or robbery and depredation upon the
high seas, is an offence [sic] against the universal law of society;
a pirate being, according to Sir Edward Coke, hostis humani
generis. As therefore he has renounced all the benefits of soci-
ety and government, and has reduced himself afresh to the sav-
age state of nature, by declaring war against all mankind, all
mankind must declare war against him: so that every community
hath a right, by the rule of self-defense, to inflict that punish-
ment upon him, which every individual would in a state of na-
ture have been otherwise entitled to do, for any invasion of his
person or personal property.18
0
The United States must defend itself against terrorism. One of
our best defense mechanisms is the ability to detain terrorists, min-
imizing their ability to harm innocent civilians. Another important
defense mechanism is the capacity to try terrorists by military com-
missions so they have swift trials designed to extract fact and are
178. Crona & Richardson, supra note 33, at 395. This is in line with the Charter of
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg which stated that the judgment of
the tribunal was final and not reviewable. Id.
179. Id. at 406.
180. Id. at 406-07 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *71).
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less likely to create a situation in which a terrorist is released on a
technicality. These commissions are a much more effective and le-
gally appropriate way to try and punish terrorists.'8 Just as the
U.S. military would not hand over our guns and tanks on the bat-
tlefield, so too should the legal system refuse to hand over our legal
defense mechanisms and allow terrorists to roam the streets of our
country while it is under attack.
181. Id. at 349.
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